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ANDREAS KELLERHALS AND TOBIAS BAUMGARTNER 
The conditions for security in Europe in the 21st century differ fundamen-
tally from those in the second half of the 20th century. The consequences 
of the East-West conflict no longer determine the security agenda. Due 
to the pan-European process of integration and cooperation, European 
countries have for the first time in history the chance of a future together 
in an “area of peace, freedom, security and justice”. However, the security 
situation in Europe is determined by new challenges, risks and threats 
that appear more complex and less predictable. Security policy became 
a cross-cutting issue that needs to be thought along in various areas of 
politics and life. Comprehensive security means that external and internal 
as well as civilian and military security aspects are closely linked. It goes 
beyond the traditional security issues and includes, inter alia, instruments 
of economic, social, environmental, media and health policy. 
In addition, today’s risks and threats are global in nature, conventional 
attacks have become unlikely in the foreseeable future. All the more chal-
lenges arise from phenomena which cannot be managed on the national 
level: attacks on the security of IT systems; international terrorism; illegal 
migration, unsuccessful integration; environmental catastrophes; pan-
demics; organized crime; scarcity of resources like energy, food and 
water; climate change. 
Given the complexity and cross-border nature of the challenges existing 
security risks appear to be solvable mainly through international coop-
eration. The role of international organizations is becoming increasingly 
important. Concerned with the security in Europe are the European 
Union, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe. 
vii
The 11th Network Conference of Network Europe analysed the corner-
stones of an appropriate security architecture for Europe. The confer-
ence included presentations on central security issues such as 
cybercrime and migration as well as on institutional issues such as the 
concept of a European army and the role of neutral states in the 21st cen-
tury. This publication comprises the conference contributions. 
September 2019 
Andreas Kellerhals and Tobias Baumgartner 
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I. Security Situation in Europe 
Defense matters’ has become a well-established mantra in capitals across 
Europe. After more than two decades of ‘strategic time-out’ characterized 
by budget cuts and limited expeditionary crisis management abroad, 
European leaders are once again pressed to focus on how to defend their 
territories, citizens and open societies. 
The security environment in and around Europe has worsened and 
become more complex. Threats have multiplied. Terrorism, hybrid 
threats, cyber-attacks or armed conflicts in Europe and our neighbour-
hood can have a direct impact on the security of European citizens. When 
it comes to security the core interests of all EU Member States are insep-
arably linked. 
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Today’s threats do not know borders and no EU Member State can tackle 
them alone. A European Union that protects is what citizens expect the 
EU and all Member States to deliver. 
French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent call for the creation of a 
‘true European army’  was dramatically echoed by German chancellor 
Angela Merkel  in mid-November and has brought the debate over a 
shared European military back into the public eye. This may mark a 
watershed moment in European politics. The debate has  never been far 
from media headlines during the European Commission Presidency of 
Jean-Claude Juncker, but as the past four years have seen seismic changes 
in global and European politics, the advent of a true European military 
now seems to be more likely than ever before. With the United King-
dom’s imminent departure from the Union,  increasing instability in the 
transatlantic relationship , the fear of  Russian military encroachment, 
and a worsening EU-Turkey relationship, the question in EU institutions 
increasingly seems to be not ‘if’ a European army ought to exist – but 
‘when’ and ‘how’. 
II. European Security and Defence Union 
1. Current discussion 
The current discussion is driven by a recognition that the EU needs to do 
more in the area of security and defence. Three developments in particu-
lar have pushed ESDU to the top of the Union’s agenda. Firstly, its failure 
to deal with the 2011 Libya crisis and the 2014 Ukraine crisis without the 
United States (US). 
Secondly, the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) decision to leave the EU, or ‘Brexit’, 
which means that the Union will lose its strongest military power and the 
main obstacle for deeper defence cooperation. 
Thirdly, concerns about America’s willingness to defend its European 
allies under President Donald Trump in all circumstances. 
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ESDU is not a new idea. It was first discussed during the Convention on 
the Future of Europe (CFE), which drafted the EU’s failed constitution in 
2001-2003. During the CFE, France and Germany called for developing an 
ESDU on the grounds that ‘a Europe fully capable of taking action’ was not 
feasible without  ‘enhancing its military capabilities’. 
The current ESDU discussion differs from the 2002-2006 one because 
there is now much broader support for it. Since 2016, the European Com-
mission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EP, the Council 
of the EU, and various EU member states have expressed support for the 
ESDU. 
The European People’s Party (EPP), which has been leading the debate 
on EU defense since 1992, called for an ESDU ‘worthy of that name’ in 
June 2015. Germany’s 2016 security policy white paper also mentioned 
that achieving ESDU is Berlin’s ‘long-term goal’. Furthermore, Commis-
sion President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 2017 State of the Union address 
stated that the EU needs  ‘a fully-fledged European Defence Union’  by 
2025. 
The call by Macron for a ‘true European army’ marks a significant shift in 
tone in French attitudes toward the idea of a shared European military. 
Whilst European military cooperation has existed since the Union’s foun-
dation, the concept of a single, unified military was considered something 
of a taboo subject. However, with Merkel’s statement on 13 November in 
Strasbourg seeming to intentionally echo the language used by Macron, 
Europe could be seeing the first unambiguous signs of a much more 
cohesive Franco-German approach to a European military project than 
has historically been the case. 
There were indications that a significant sea change in European atti-
tudes toward shared defence was coming; the  signing  of the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) agreement by twenty-three of the 
twenty-eight European Union Member States was a watershed moment 
in European history and politics. In brief, whilst PESCO did not directly 
establish a European army, it did create unprecedented binding obliga-
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tions for formal security cooperation between Member States, and con-
tained pledges for increased defense spending across the Union that 
might ultimately lay the foundation for a European army in all but name. 
The groundwork for “permanent structured cooperation” between Mem-
ber States in military affairs has existed  since 2009 , and since 2003 
thirty-four joint missions by EU Member States have taken place under 
the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). How-
ever, PESCO’s signing into effect may well be seen by future generations 
as  the harbinger of a European army  given the unparalleled cooperation 
in security and defense to which it aspires. Enshrined within PESCO are 
binding plans  to develop joint rapid reaction forces, new state-of-the-art 
European drones and armoured vehicles, and the creation of centralised 
European military logistics and medical command centres among other 
shared projects. 
It should also be noted that PESCO is not the only avenue for developing 
military cooperation above and beyond the usual joint missions taking 
place under the CSDP framework. In February 2017, the Czech Republic 
and Romania contributed soldiers and material to a growing multinational 
military division led by Germany. This was not an unprecedented devel-
opment – the Netherlands had previously contributed two army divisions 
to the same multinational brigade under the Bundeswehr. However, the 
fresh expansion of the multinational military unit led by Germany sparked 
media controversy for appearing to silently constitute and assemble  a 
European army in all but name  under German control. Naturally, this 
development gave fuel to another controversial issue at the heart of the 
European army concept: the issue of sovereignty. 
2. Purpose of the EDSU 
As the 2016  EPP Paper on Security and Defence  states, this is the pur-
pose of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Given that 
it should also be the main purpose of ESDU, it should be created around 
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two main deliverables that would boost the EU’s ‘defence’ dimension: (1) 
an unqualified mutual defence commitment, and (2) a military Schengen 
area. 
First, given that not all EU members are NATO members and therefore 
not under the protection of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, ESDU 
participants should commit to defending each other through all means 
in their power, including military force, in the event that one of them 
becomes subject to armed aggression. 
Although this sounds similar in tone to Article 42(7) of the Treaty on 
EU (TEU), the so-called mutual assistance clause, it is not. Article 42(7)’s 
mutual assistance commitment is rendered hollow by its second para-
graph, which states that it ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain Member States’. This means that 
the Article 42(2) can be interpreted in a highly subjective way. Thus, a gen-
uine ESDU should include an unqualified mutual defence commitment. 
Second, in ESDU, there should be minimal to no obstacles to moving mil-
itary forces and equipment from one state to another. At the moment, 
such movement is hindered by various bureaucratic requirements, such 
as passport checks at some border crossings. 
Furthermore, infrastructure problems, such as roads and bridges that 
cannot accommodate large military vehicles, create additional obstacles 
to the movement of military personnel and equipment in Europe. This is 
something that has also been called for by NATO, which means that it 
would also further boost EU-NATO cooperation. 
ESDU should be created around an unqualified mutual defence commit-
ment and a military Schengen area. These would form the core of the new 
defence core group, or the “Euro” of a “Defence Eurozone”. 
In addition, ESDU could include looser commitments, such as a commit-
ment by the participating EU member states to invest a certain percent-
age of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in defence; and a commitment 
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to improve the EU’s existing rapid response capabilities, particularly the 
battlegroups. However, given that such commitments could eventually be 
ignored, they should not form the backbone of an ESDU. 
III. Permanent Structured Cooperation 
1. Deepening defence cooperation among EU 
member states 
In light of a changing security environment, the EU Global Strategy for 
Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) started a process of closer coopera-
tion in security and defence. The EU Member States agreed to step up 
the European Union’s work in this area and acknowledged that enhanced 
coordination, increased investment in defence and cooperation in devel-
oping defence capabilities are key requirements to achieve it. This is 
the main aim of a Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and 
Defence (PESCO), as outlined in the Treaty of the EU, Articles 42 (6) and 
46, as well as Protocol 10. Through PESCO, Member States increase their 
effectiveness in addressing security challenges and advancing towards 
further integrating and strengthening defence cooperation within the EU 
framework. 
This will thus enhance the EU’s capacity as an international security 
actor, contribute to the protection of EU citizens and maximise the effec-
tiveness of defence spending. The difference between PESCO and other 
forms of cooperation is the legally binding nature of the commitments 
undertaken by the participating Member States. The decision to partici-
pate was made voluntarily by each participating Member State, and deci-
sion-making will remain in the hands of the participating Member States 
in the Council. This is without prejudice to the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain EU Member States. 
On 13 November 2017, as the first formal step towards setting up PESCO, 
Ministers signed a common notification on the PESCO and handed it over 
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to the High Representative and the Council. The notification sets out a list 
of 20 more binding common commitments in the areas of defence invest-
ment, capability development and operational readiness. It also contained 
proposals on the governance of PESCO and its principles. Based on this 
notification, on 11 December 2017, the Council took the historic step to 
adopt a decision establishing PESCO and its list of participants. A total of 
25 Member States decided to participate in PESCO.1 
2. Structure and Governance 
PESCO has a two-layer structure: 
• Council Level: Responsible for the overall policy direction and decision-
making, including as regards the assessment mechanism to determine 
if participating Member States are fulfilling their commitments. Only 
PESCO members are voting, decisions are taken by unanimity (except 
decisions regarding the suspension of membership and entry of new 
members which are taken by qualified majority). 
• Projects Level: PESCO’s effectiveness will be measured by the projects it 
will develop. Each project will be managed by those Member States that 
take part in it, under the oversight of the Council. To structure the work, 
a decision on general governance rules for the projects has been adopted 
by the Council. 
PESCO Secretariat: The European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EEAS, 
including the EU Military Staff, are jointly providing secretariat functions 
for all PESCO matters, with a single point of contact for the participating 
Member States. Implementation of PESCO: On 6 March 2018, the Council 
adopted a Recommendation which sets out a roadmap for the further 
implementation of PESCO. 
The participating Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 




PESCO projects: A Member State owned process > PESCO projects must 
have a clear European added value in addressing the Union’s capability 
and operational needs, in line with the EU Capability Development Pri-
orities and CARD. The projects contribute to fulfilling the more binding 
commitments and to achieving the EU Level of Ambition. > On 6 March 
2018, the Council formally adopted the first set of 17 different projects and 
the project members for each of them. A second set of another 17 projects 
is was adopted by the Council on 20 November 2018. 
The 34 projects in the areas of capability development and in the oper-
ational dimension range from the establishment of a European Medical 
Command, an EU Training Mission Competence Centre, Cyber Rapid 
Response Teams, Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security, Military Disaster 
Relief or an upgrade of Maritime Surveillance to the creation of an Euro-
pean Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network, a joint EU Intelli-
gence School, specialised Helicopter Training as well as co-basing, which 
would allow the joint use of national and overseas bases. 
Third States participation in PESCO projects While membership of the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation is only for those Member States who 
have undertaken the more binding commitments, third States may excep-
tionally participate at the level of PESCO projects. In principle before the 
end of 2018, the Council will agree on the general conditions under which 
third states may exceptionally be invited to participate in PESCO projects. 
It is first up to members of individual projects to consider inviting a third 
State that meets the general conditions. The Council will decide whether 
a third State meets these requirements. Following a positive decision, the 
project may then enter into administrative arrangement with the con-
cerned third State, in line with procedures and decision-making auton-
omy of the Union. PESCO is both a permanent framework for closer 
cooperation and a structured process to gradually deepen defence coop-
eration within the Union framework. It will be a driver for integration in 
the field of defence. Each participating Member State provides a plan for 
the national contributions and efforts they have agreed to make. These 
national implementation plans are subject to regular assessment. This is 
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different from the voluntary approach that is currently the rule within the 
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. PESCO is designed to con-
tribute to making European defence more efficient and to deliver more 
output by providing enhanced coordination and collaboration in the areas 
of investment, capability development and operational readiness. Per-
manent structured cooperation in this domain will allow for decreasing 
the number of different weapons’ systems in Europe, and therefore will 
strengthen operational cooperation among Member States, connect their 
forces through increased interoperability and enhance industrial com-
petitiveness. PESCO will help reinforce the EU’s strategic autonomy to 
act alone when necessary and with partners whenever possible. Whilst 
PESCO is underpinned by the idea that sovereignty can be better exer-
cised when working together, national sovereignty remains effectively 
untouched. Military capacities developed within PESCO remain in the 
hands of Member States that can also make them available in other con-
texts such as NATO or the UN. 
3. Relevance for the security of the EU and its 
citizens 
On 25 June 2018, the Council adopted a Decision establishing the common 
set of governance rules for the PESCO projects. It includes an obligation 
to report on progress to the Council once a year, based on the roadmap 
with objectives and milestones agreed within each project. 
– Each year by November, the process to generate new projects will be 
launched in view of updating the list of projects and their participants by 
the Council. Assessment criteria have been developed by the PESCO sec-
retariat to inform the evaluation of the project proposals by the partici-
pating Member States. 
4. Part of a comprehensive defence package 
PESCO is closely connected to the new Coordinated Annual Review on 
Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). They are com-
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plementary and mutually reinforcing tools supporting Member States’ 
efforts in enhancing defence capabilities: CARD, run by the European 
Defence Agency, through the systematic monitoring of national defence 
spending plans, will help identify opportunities for new collaborative ini-
tiatives. 
The EDF provides financial incentives for Member States to foster 
defence cooperation from research to the development phase of capa-
bilities including prototypes through co-financing from the EU budget. 
PESCO projects may benefit from increased EU co-financing, which could 
amount to 30% – instead of 20% – for prototypes. 
PESCO will develop capability projects responding to the EU priorities 
identified by EU Member States through the Capability Development 
Plan, also taking into account the results of the Coordinated Annual 
Review on Defence. Eligible projects could also benefit from financing 
under the EDF, as explained above. 
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I. Introduction 
The EU and NATO have 22 members in common, which makes a co-oper-
ation not only reasonable but to some extent also necessary. In this sense, 
the 2016 NATO summit welcomed an enhanced co-operation between 
NATO and the EU. The conclusions of this summit recognised „the impor-
tance of a stronger and more capable European defence, which will lead 
to a stronger NATO, help enhance the security of all Allies, and foster an 
equitable sharing of the burden, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance 
membership”.  The NATO also encouraged further mutual steps in this 
area to support a strengthened strategic partnership.1 
On 8 July 2016, the President of the European Council and the President 
of the European Commission, together with the Secretary General of 
NATO signed a Joint Declaration in Warsaw in order to reinvigorate the 
EU-NATO strategic partnership. Based upon this declaration a number of 
Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, para 124-126. 
1 
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further actions and proposals were endorsed by the EU and NATO. On 
10 July, 2018, the President of the European Council and the President of 
the European Commission, together with the Secretary General of NATO 
signed a second Joint Declaration in Brussels calling for swift and demon-
strable progress in implementation. 
As the Delors Institute persuasively put it, complex threats call for smart 
division of labour, as “neither NATO nor the EU has the toolkit to address 
these increasingly complex threats alone”.2 And indeed there is consider-
able ongoing practical co-operation between the EU and NATO: the EU 
has considerable soft power and economic tools to contribute to the aims 
of NATO, and NATO has the capabilities to support the EU as happened 
during the migration crisis as ships were deployed on the Aegean Sea to 
assist Greece and Turkey, as well as the European Union’s border agency 
FRONTEX. The EU also supported NATO’s manoeuvres in Afghanistan 
with its diplomatic and economic capabilities. Nonetheless, it would be 
hard to overlook the tensions between (and within) the NATO and the EU: 
earlier Iraq, later Libya and most recently Iran are probably the most obvi-
ous examples. 
Moreover, it is an ongoing issue since the 1960es that Europe has to 
develop its own defence capabilities, and cannot rely on the US. President 
Kennedy claimed in 1963 that the US cannot „continue to pay for the 
military protection of Europe while NATO states are not paying their 
fair share and are living off the fat of the land.” President de Gaulle also 
emphasized that Europe has to take its defence into its own hands.3 Not 
only did Mr. Trump tweet furiously a very similar message after his elec-
tion victory, but European leaders have also questioned America’s com-
mitment during the few last years. This worry was voiced most obviously 
by Mrs. Merkel in the European Parliament in November 2018. There is 
even some detachment of the US from the defence of Europe, and there is 
Jacques Delors Institute Berlin: Three arguments for an ever closer EU-NATO cooperation, 
<https://www.delorsinstitut.de/en/publications/three-arguments-for-an-ever-closer-eu-
nato-cooperation/>. 




also an observable wish for Europe to assume responsibility for her own 
defence, as the 70 years of NATO alliance created a kind of path towards 
dependency in co-operation. The following essay will firstly take a histor-
ical look at the defence co-operation, set out the legal framework of the 
co-operation, and consider the political context of it. 
II. A Historical Overview4 
Today’s hotchpotch relationship between NATO and the EU goes back to 
the founding years, and it is hard to understand without taking the his-
toric events into account. 
Just as the economic integration among the founding Member States of 
the ECSC and EEC were forged by historic pathways, amongst long-term 
interests and the at that time obvious threats from the Soviet Union, the 
military alliance was born under the very same conditions. As the Soviet 
threat became imminent, Harry S. Truman, the then President of the US 
expressed his concerns regarding Greece and Turkey in a speech to Con-
gress on 12 March 1947 and said that “it must be policy of the United 
States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressure”. This doctrine, which required 
and offered economic and military assistance, framed the US policy dur-
ing The Cold War. 
A first European military alliance after World War II begins with the 
Treaty of Dunkirk between France and the UK, which later encompassed 
the Benelux States and so formed the WEU. This Treaty was established 
on the principle of mutual defence similarly to NATO, but its members 
were solely Western European countries. 
As the first proxy war between the capitalist West and the communist 
East broke out in Korea, the French Prime Minister René Pléven made an 
unofficial proposal for a European Defence Community (hereinafter EDC) 
For a detailed analysis see: TRYBUS MARTIN, European Union Law and Defence Integration, 
London 2005, p. 65. 
4 
13
with the participation of the six ECSC Member States. The EDC Treaty 
had a supranational character, established common institutions, common 
armed forces and a common budget, something which is nowadays still 
trying to be achieved. 
All six governments of the ECSC signed the EDC Treaty in May 1952. The 
German, Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg parliaments had also ratified it 
by summer 1954, and, as it is well-known, the French Parliament declined 
its consent. After this debacle, an alternative was sought for addressing 
the German contribution to the defence of Western Europe, thus Ger-
many and Italy had been inclined into a revised Brussels Treaty establish-
ing the Western European Union (hereinafter WEU), and Germany was 
also admitted into NATO. 
A duplication of the military alliance, a WEU in addition to NATO has been 
criticized as a waste of resources, a critique which is also brought up 
nowadays regarding the European Common Defence Policy which is that 
it would result in an unnecessary duplication of existing NATO capabili-
ties. 
Nonetheless, the WEU was a reaction to the failure of the EDC. As political 
integration had been cooled down, and European integration was focused 
on the Common Market, defence integration was not a central topic any-
more. Besides Ireland, which has been neutral in international relations 
since the 1930s,5 all EEC Member States were members of NATO as well, 
and hence the unsolved question of military alliance did not make too 
much trouble: defence and military questions were dominated by the 
conflict with the Soviet Union, and the common enemy overshadowed 
the existing tensions within the alliance. 
This modus vivendi was ended by the collapse of the communist regime, 
which required some new objectives of the European integration as well. 
COTTEY ANDREW (Ed.), The European Neutrals and NATO, Non-alignment, Partnership, Mem-
bership?, London 2018, pp. 158-159. 
5 
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The reference to the WEU was repealed by the Treaty of Nice signalling 
the wish of the EU to assume direct responsibility for its own defence and 
operational capabilities. 
Besides establishing European citizenship and launching the new Euro-
pean currency, defence integration was also supposed to be reinvigorated 
by the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty was concluded with the 
aim „to implement a common foreign and security policy including the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead 
to a common defence thereby reinforcing the European identity and its 
independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe 
and in the world”. The last 26 years did not suffice to live up to this 
promise and expectation, and the EU still lacks military capabilities. 
Security questions were defined very narrowly however, and they 
included merely the so-called Petersberg Tasks: “humanitarian and res-
cue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including peace-making.”6 Furthermore a possibility for 
co-operation in the field of armaments was mentioned,7 which does not 
mean the same thing as common capabilities.8 
The EU was also obliged to respect the obligations of certain Member 
States, which see their common defence realised in NATO, and the CFSP 
had to “be compatible with the common security and defence policy 
established within the NATO framework”.9 Moreover, the common 
defence should “not prejudice the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain Member States” which was intended to take into 
account the neutrality of Ireland, and later that of Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden. Moreover, it could have also been constructed in favour of the 
special status of the United Kingdom and France as nuclear powers and 
as permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
Art. 17.2 TEU, Maastricht Version. 
Art. 17.1 subparagraph 4 TEU, Maastricht Version. 
TRYBUS (footnote 4), p. 65 






The Treaty of Amsterdam somewhat broadened the powers of the EU, and 
enabled it to conclude international agreements with one or more states 
or an international organisation, which also might have included NATO. 
The Lisbon Treaty, which in essence kept the former pillar structure 
regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy,10 widened the scope 
of possible enhanced co-operation to cover the whole CFSP field, includ-
ing defence,11 and added a new inbuilt closer cooperation: the ‘permanent 
structured co-operation’ in the field of defence,12 and in doing so sig-
nificantly modified the provisions of the TEU on European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP).13 
III. Legal Framework: The Bonds That Tie 
It goes without saying that every EU measure must be grounded upon a 
legal base set out in the Treaty.14 A legally binding, formal co-operation 
between NATO and the EU would request an international agreement. 
This could be eventually concluded by invoking Art 37. TEU.15 
According to Art 37 TEU, the Union may conclude agreements with one 
or more States or international organisations in areas of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. As The Common Security and Defence Policy is an 
integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy according to 
Article 42 para 1 of the TFEU, international agreements might be also 
signed in the areas of The Common Security and Defence Policy. The aims 
of The Common Security and Defence Policy are peace-keeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter, which are by and large com-
PIRIS JEAN-CLAUDE , The Lisbon Treaty, A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge 2010, p. 66. 
PIRIS (footnote 10), p. 89. 
PIRIS (footnote 10), p. 91. 
PIRIS (footnote 10), pp. 265-279. 
CHALMERS DAMIAN/TOMKINS ADAM, European Union Public Law: Text and Materials, Cambridge 
2007, p. 140. 
KAUFMANN-BÜHLER, Art 37 para 52, in Eberhard Grabitz/Meinhard Hilf/Martin Nettesheim, Das 








patible with the purpose of the NATO-Treaty, as it was agreed with the 
intention „to unite […] efforts for collective defence and for the preservation 
of peace and security”. Thus, the EU has the necessary power to conclude 
international agreements with NATO. 
Contrary to the earlier version of the Treaty on the European Union, Arti-
cle 37 TEU does not contain any specific procedural rules regarding the 
treaty-making, which makes Art 218 TFEU and Art 31 TEU applicable and 
requires basically unanimity16 of all Member States except for Denmark 
which opted out of common defence policy. 
Reaching this unanimity might be difficult for different reasons: first, 
Member States who consider themselves neutral might be constitution-
ally barred17 from underwriting defence agreements with NATO, and sec-
ond, the very different (geo)political interests of the Member States might 
hinder achieving unanimity. 
Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Malta and Cyprus are neutral states 
which is either constitutionally safeguarded or they pursue neutrality as a 
longstanding policy. This neutrality, irrespectively its practicality in mod-
ern times, is defined in international law as the status of a state which is 
not participating in an armed conflict between other states. 
Therefore, a neutrality might bar member states of the EU from partic-
ipating in some forms of military co-operation, especially with NATO: if 
neutrality bars them from being a member of NATO, it might also hinder 
them from co-operating with NATO. Art 42 TEU Para (2), the so-called 
HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG WOLFF Art 37, rn 8, in Matthias Pechtstein, Carsten Nowak, Ulrich 
Häde, Frankfurter Kommentar, EUV/AEUV/GRC, Tübingen 2017. 
The federal constitution commits Austria to comprehensive national defence in order to safe-
guard permanent neutrality (Art 9a B-VG). Art 1 para 3 of the Maltese Constitution is probably 
more specific regarding the content of the neutrality. It reads as follows: „Malta is a neutral 
state actively pursuing peace, security and social progress among all nations by adhering to a 
policy of non-alignment and refusing to participate in any military alliance”. Moreover, the 




‘Irish Clause’ intends to address this tension within EU foreign policy,18 
according to which the policy of the EU „shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States 
and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see 
their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and can be compatible with the 
common security and defence policy established within that framework.” 
It would be hard to conceive more Delphic words. Basically, it says that 
both a membership in NATO and a non-membership will be tolerated 
and is compatible with the EU membership: every European country irre-
spective of its membership in NATO or its neutral status may join the 
EU. This is of course to welcome countries, but the question at hand is 
whether this flexibility is compatible with an even deeper military co-
operation within the EU. If the EU evolves common military capabilities, 
and a defence concept similar to Art V of the NATO Treaty, those EU 
member states which are not members of NATO will be de facto members 
of the alliance.19 
Considering that all those Member States of the EU which did not opt out 
from CFSP are entitled to vote in CFSP issues, including any forms of co-
operation with NATO, and are obliged to take a fair share of the financial 
and probably military burdens, it is easy to foresee some forms of ten-
sion in the case of a more and more intensive co-operation between the 
EU and NATO. A substantial pooling of capabilities and military command 
might cause tensions of constitutional significance hindering some Mem-
ber States from participating similarly to the deepening of the monetary 
union: as too was needed in order to beef up European financial capabil-
Although it is called Irish clause because Ireland was the first member state of the EU which 
pursued neutrality, the concessions are in favour of all neutral member states of the EU, cf. 
PETER HILPOLD, Österreichs Neutralität nach Lissabon, Österreichische JuristenZeitung 2010, 
590 (594) THEO ÖHLINGER, Österreichs Neutralität in der Europäischen Union, Zeitschrift für 
Öffentliches Recht 2018, pp 621-635. 
Malta does not even participate in PESCO because of her policy of neutrality: BRENDAN FLYNN, 
PESCO and the Challenges of Multilateral Defence Cooperation for Ireland: More of the Same 




ities and to expand monetary powers by quantitative easing, many Mem-
ber States worried as to whether these measures are compatible with 
their own constitutions and the powers transferred to the EU. A very sim-
ilar scenario is possible in military co-operation, as well. 
A further obvious challenge is of course the unanimity on which The 
Common Foreign and Security Policy is based, requiring all Member 
States (except Denmark) to agree. Putting aside legal and constitutional 
complications following from eventual neutrality, there are obvious polit-
ical obstacles too, namely the veto power of a minority of EU Member 
States. The qualified majority voting, which was adopted for the single 
market by the Single European Act and step by step expanded to further 
areas, offers some useful lessons in this respect. The Ioannina Compro-
mise of 1994,20 which was also overtaken by the Lisbon Treaty in an 
updated form, shows that some Member States might find it hard not to 
make use of the veto power in case of essential interests. Moreover, even 
if there is only one Member State opposing EU policy, this Member State 
might challenge the decision made in the Council before the CJEU,21 or 
may simply ignore a decision, as some central European states did with 
the refugee quotas in 2015, and refused to accept the allocated migrants. 
Besides those Member States of the EU which might not be fully inter-
ested in a co-operation with NATO, NATO Member States which have 
eventual political conflicts with some EU Member State may create a fur-
ther obstacle. It is worthwhile to look at the conflict regarding the name 
of the country which was called Macedonia earlier and is Northern-Mace-
donia. This conflict blocked any integration of Northern-Macedonia for a 
very long time very effectively. Turkey, a member state of NATO, is one 
obvious open wound, a country which is officially a candidate for EU-
Which was a reincarnation of the Luxembourg compromise, cf RUDOLF STREINZ, Die Luxem-
burger Vereinbarung, München 1984. 
See e.g. the Czech Republic’s action against EU legislation introducing more stringent rules for 
the acquisition and possession of firearms, which at least shows how sensitive issue is the 




Membership but accession did not come nearer during the last years. In 
a similar situation, signing an international treaty or blocking the ratifica-
tion might be used as leverage in other areas of political co-operation. 
These issues, of course, raise our attention to the political dimension of 
co-operation. 
IV. Co-operation: Capabilities, Command and Trust 
A sincere co-operation with the NATO presupposes “a stronger and more 
capable European defence” according to the NATO Warsaw Summit Com-
munique. A stronger and more capable defence requires a meaningful 
European Army based upon economies of scale comparable to the US, 
Russia or China. It is remarkable that the EU has as many citizens as 
the USA and Russia combined, but its military capabilities are far from 
either of them because the EU lacks economies of scale. This, of course, 
cannot be achieved as long as every European national army disposes of 
every kind of capabilities. Therefore pooling and sharing capabilities is 
also needed, and the building up of European defence capabilities. 
This idea is also part of a Franco-German plan called “permanent struc-
tured co-operation”, or PESCO22 that aims to allow a kind of enhanced 
co-operation towards greater integration of their military capabilities. It 
is based upon a reactivated provision of the Lisbon Treaty that allows 
groups of EU countries to make progress on policies led by a vanguard 
of states.23 By and large, there have basically been two concepts of how 
to co-operate: either a large group of states should engage in a relatively 
limited types of cooperation, or a smaller number of states should become 
involved in a more ambitious defence cooperation.24 
BLOCKMANS STEVEN, The EU’s modular approach to defence integration: An inclusive, ambitious 
and legally binding PESCO?  55 Common Market Law Review (2018), pp. 1785–1826. 
FLYNN (footnote 19), p. 74. 





Enhanced defence co-operation puts emphasis on pooling and sharing 
of resources and capabilities. It is very tempting in theory but is a much 
harder nut to crack in practice. In theory, it would allow that some Mem-
ber States specialize in different capabilities, which enable them to make 
use of economies of scale and economies of scope, and the Member 
States together can build up a much more vigorous and capable army in 
comparison with the present situation of 28 different national military 
forces. 
This kind of pooling and sharing relies extremely on European (or from 
a very national perspective foreign) capabilities, on the very deep trust 
in the other Member States that they unconditionally will defend each 
other. Specializing in some areas namely also means neglecting other 
capabilities, relinquishing know-how, and giving them up at the end of the 
day. This dilemma is very similar to the 1950s and 1960s, as the French 
President Charles de Gaulle worried about the reliability of the American 
nuclear deterrence, because it was far from certain that the USA would 
risk atomic warfare if the Soviet Union would limit a nuclear first strike 
to Europe. General de Gaulle was therefore obsessed with building up 
French nuclear deterrence independent from the will of a foreigner even 
if  this was an allied force, such as the United States. One might also take 
the example of Ukraine, which gave up its nuclear arsenal for security 
guarantees according to the so-called Budapest Memorandum signed by 
the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, whose guarantees did 
not fully prove themselves. 
Obviously, the Member States agree in theory, „to do things together, 
spend together, invest together, buy together, act together”, as Federica 
Mogherini summed up the raison d’etre of PESCO, and they started 17 EU 
defence projects in 201725 but only very few of them progressed substan-
tially. If ones takes a closer look at those few projects which have some 
FLYNN (footnote 19), p. 80-81. 25 
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meaningful support among the member states, it will be apparent that 
these are not the militarily most significant projects but rather logistic 
and support staff issues. 
So, for example, there are many participants in the Military Mobility pro-
ject, but almost none in the Artillery or the Light Armoured Vehicle pro-
jects, which have par excellence military capabilities. Also very telling is 
the story of the Eurofighter, a genuine transnational European defence 
capability project: the Eurofighter Typhoon is, according to its manufac-
turer, “the world’s most advanced swing-role combat aircraft providing 
simultaneously deployable Air-to-Air and Air-to-Surface capabilities”,26 
but is in service only in five EU Member States, which at least hints at how 
hard it is to achieve unanimity among EU Member States in defence mat-
ters. 
This is sobering but logical, because the sale of arms and the defence 
industry are of vital economic and political interest as well. The different 
interests are influenced by the circumstance of being a manufacturer or a 
buyer of weapons and weapon systems. Hence, a pooling and sharing pro-
vokes the question as to whether, and, if yes, to what extent, the national 
defence industry is or might be influenced by a further military integra-
tion. 
Does a defence integration aiming to achieve economies of scale require 
the restructuring of defence industry facilities? If yes, and those facilities 
are needed to scale down in some Member States, then it is not only eco-
nomically painful, but results in the loss of vital know-how and capabil-
ities which are of interest to national security. If industry facilities are 
needed to be kept for economic or political reasons, which seems to be 
a more viable option, economies of scale might only be achieved if exist-
ing facilities produce cross border co-operation, which would require the 
sharing of military secrets, and this again raises our attention to the ques-
tion as to whether there is such a mutual trust among the Member States. 
<https://www.eurofighter.com/>. 26 
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Mr. Macron demanded in his Sorbonne address a much more beefed 
up form of defence cooperation, a “common intervention force, a com-
mon defence budget, and a common doctrine for action”. This points to 
a further possible tension in defence co-operation, which I would call 
the Clausewitz challenge. As Clausewitz put it in his famous treatise “On 
War”, armed conflicts never stand alone, have no purpose in themselves, 
because they are always fought to achieve some political aim, which of 
course is also the case for defence co-operations as they are called into 
life because of the eventuality of an armed conflict. France for example 
quite often intervenes in Africa, to help her former colonies out, so it is 
understandable that she is keen on having a common intervention force 
which would enable the sharing of the cost of these operations. Other 
Member States, however, do not necessarily share this political aim, for 
example Central and Eastern European countries having had no colonies 
at all see no reason to shed the blood of their countrymen in Africa fran-
caise. This tension would be similar to The Migration Crisis, as Central 
and Eastern European countries and their leaders did not volunteer for 
the reallocation of asylum seekers and migrants not only because of cheap 
nationalism, but also because they felt that taking care of former colonies 
is none of their business at all, as they have had none of them and did not 
profit from them. This only highlights that defence and military co-oper-
ation do require common political aims. 
A further question of a political but also of a constitutional nature is the 
question of command. Deploying armed forces is a most intricate ques-
tion, mirroring the constitutional culture of a political entity. The French 
President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces according 
to Art 15 of the French Constitution has wide-ranging powers regarding 
the armed forces, the German Armed Forces may basically be deployed 
only by virtue of a parliamentary decision. The United Kingdom have leant 
basically towards the French solution, and until very recent times, the 
Prime Minister could have essentially decided without the approval of the 
Parliament to deploy British armed forces (this has changed somewhat 
during the last two decades). There is no space to fully develop a com-
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parative reasoning, but it is necessary to point out that there are very dif-
ferent rules for deploying armed forces which have to be respected in a 
future NATO-EU framework. 
V. The B-Word 
Brexit is one of the big question marks in the NATO-EU alliance for many 
reasons. Even if the United Kingdom leaves the EU, but does not leave the 
NATO, it will be involved in any EU-NATO relation on the one side of the 
table or the other. 
Moreover, the UK has key capabilities in many areas, and hence an even-
tual Brexit means a serious gap in military capabilities, especially the 
nuclear deterrent and aircraft carriers.  The UK has a policy of continuous 
at-sea deterrent, which are based in Scotland, and are a pillar of European 
defence. The second area where British capabilities will painfully lack are 
aircraft carriers as the two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers of UK 
have no match in Europe. Neither the French nor the Italian navy have 
air-craft carriers of the same size. 
VI. Conclusions 
NATO and the EU relations should be built on a stronger and more capa-
ble European defence. There are however serious challenges which need 
to be addressed. 
The legal framework of the EU Treaty is by and large viable, nonetheless 
the neutrality of some Member States might hinder deeper integration. 
Much more demanding however are the political challenges. The sharing 
and pooling of military capabilities offers economies of scale but requires 
painful choices which can only be made in the case of deep mutual trust. 
24
East meets West - The Idea of European 
Integration and Security 
PRZEMYSŁAW SAGANEK 
Table of Contents 
I. Introductory Remarks ..........................................................................................................25 
II. The Problem of Security and of Lawyers .........................................................................27 
III. The Polish Experience with Respect to European Integration ...................................29 
IV. The Polish Experience with Respect to Security ............................................................32 
V. The EU Treaty Framework on Security Matters .............................................................34 
VI. The Attitude of Poland to the EU Treaty Provisions and Their Implementation ....38 
VII. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................41 
I. Introductory Remarks 
The 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the ongoing conflict in East-
ern Ukraine make the discussion on security in Europe a pressing ques-
tion. This discussion is all but easy. The choice of the perspective or even 
of a paradigm seems to have great influence on the arguments presented 
and conclusions suggested by the participants of this discussion. That is 
why it seems reasonable to reveal the perspective of the present author. 
It is namely the perspective of a lawyer and not of a specialist on military 
matters. Secondly, it is the perspective of a person who spent quite a lot 
of time dealing with the legal aspects of the European integration. Thirdly 
it is the perspective of a national of Poland – in all possible respects (e.g. 
as the first victim of The Second World War, the former socialist state, the 
“new” NATO and as an EU member, the neighbour of Russia and a country 
governed at present by a government hated by the European elites). Last 
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but not least it is the perspective of a person interested in public matters 
and seemingly having some thoughts on the ideas which may or should 
have influence on the Polish politicians and statesmen. 
It is mainly the Polish point of view that is meant under the cover of “East” 
which was used in the title of the present text. On the other hand, what is 
meant by “West” will refer mainly to three capitals, that is to Paris, Brus-
sels, and Berlin. Two remarks must be made. Firstly, the sequence is not 
a coincidence. Secondly, Brussels is listed here not as the capital of the 
Kingdom of Belgium and not even in the character of the NATO Head-
quarters. It is its status as the seat of the most important EU institutions 
that is of importance here. 
Regarding the sequence there can be no doubt that France and its young 
President, Mr. Macron, seem to be the most active, important or at least 
visible actors in the field of the European security identity. On 6 Novem-
ber 2018 Mr. Macron called for a “real European army” to “allow the bloc 
to defend itself against Russia and even the United States, a hugely sen-
sitive idea amongst EU nations which jealously guard their defence.”1 Also 
Mr. Juncker was reported to say that deference to NATO can no longer 
be used as a convenient alibi to argue against greater European efforts.2 
The picture would be completely false however if we forget that the state-
ments of Mr. Macron and Mr. Juncker are just responses to a set of utter-
ances of the US President Mr. Donald Trump concerning both NATO and 
the defence expenditures of its European members.3 
There is no doubt that NATO and the EU are at the centre of the discus-
sion. One also gets the impression that the two are being presented as 
alternatives or as rivals. The aim of the present text is to show that such 










II. The Problem of Security and of Lawyers 
One should start with the remark that security is an element which can 
hardly be grasped by lawyers. They feel awkward when trying to approach 
it. The reason seems to be that lawyers are trained to give “yes” or “no” 
answers. This hardly works in the field of economics, almost never works 
in the world of diplomacy, and it does not work at all in the field of secu-
rity. In this respect one remains in the field of probabilities. 
The most important message for lawyers is in my opinion that ‘security 
cannot be decreed’. What I mean by this is that a strong and aggressive 
State is not in a position to effectively convince its weak neighbour that 
the latter is secure. Coming back to the past it would be difficult to say 
that 1930s Germany was in a position to convince Luxemburg or Czecho-
slovakia that they were safe. No unilateral promise or treaty provision 
would change this fact (however unpleasant it may it be for the self-con-
fidence of lawyers). The problem is that if this weak neighbour is really 
afraid it has no interest in showing it. It would have even worsened its 
situation. So in this respect we have to do with a phenomenon of falsifi-
cation of the picture. It is a paradox that in the contemporary matrix of 
words of the ‘media democracy’ this falsification is even bigger. If asked 
everyday about its security, a representative of a weaker state can only 
falsify this picture day after day or worsen its position day after day (how-
ever unpleasant this may be for the self-confidence of the mainstream 
media and their admirers). 
It is certainly a given that a State may try to improve its security. Two 
means to this end are feasible. Firstly, a State may improve its own mili-
tary capabilities. Secondly, it can conclude alliances. All the same there is 
no guarantee of surviving the next conflict. In this sense a strong state, 
namely France, was not able to win in confrontation with Germany in 
1940. On the other hand, a weak state, namely Sweden, was able to sur-
vive the second WW without material, personal or territorial losses. The 
true reason had to do with the fact that Sweden was not on the list of 
Germany’s targets. The same is true about Portugal. In this respect the 
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location of a State on a map as well as its policy may be of the utmost 
importance. However, the only certain factor is that there are no certain 
factors. In this sense Mexico being a neighbour of the USA may fear a mil-
itary confrontation with the latter much less than Iran which is situated 
thousands of kilometres from the American continent. 
Another element is the state of mind. Actually, Poland borders the Kalin-
ingrad area, sometimes called the most armed region of the world.4 
Objectively, Poles should be afraid 24 hours per day. However, it is not 
so. It may be difficult to explain this phenomenon. One can argue that 
some level of insecurity is to some extent the fate of any state bordering 
or even not bordering but having some disputes with a state having atom 
weapons. The idea of security in the atom era is incomparable with the 
one from the time preceding it. The feeling of security or insecurity 
among the people in Poland rather has to do with the actual activities 
of Russia than with its actual size and military potential. The latter are 
known to everybody. It is another paradox that Russia likes warning other 
states by informing them of the targeting of missiles on their capitals.5 
However how can anybody think seriously about discussing any precise 
price for not targeting them if retargeting can take place within a very 
short time? 
This lack of actual frightening of the people can only help statesmen to 
make decisions which consider security in less psychological and more in 
geopolitical contexts. 









III. The Polish Experience with Respect to European 
Integration 
Poland found its place in great politics in the 10th century, upon the 
acceptance of Christianity. After the very intensive period of power and 
fame at the edge of the 10th and the 11th centuries, its role became smaller 
– extending from a complete collapse of the state in the 1030s to its 
reunification (1940s) and a temporary re-emergence of the Polish king 
in the 1070s. In 1138 Poland was divided into several smaller organisms 
with different rulers. The reunification took place at the beginning of 
the 14th century. At the end of the 14th century the union with Lithuania 
was established – at the beginning it was just personal and in 1569 it 
became a real one (creation of a Polish-Lithuanian State) which survived 
till 1795. The union meant the establishment of a state which was huge 
and which was based on principles similar to the contemporary democ-
racies (though limited to noblemen only). It showed its ability to coun-
teract its neighbours and domestic crises for more than 200 years. In 
the 18th century however Poland found itself completely dependent upon 
Russia. The attempts to get rid of this dependence resulted in three par-
titions. The last of them (1975) meant that the entire territory of the Pol-
ish-Lithuanian state became part of Russia, Prussia and Austria. 
It was only in 1918 that the independent Poland reappeared on the map. 
In 1939 it was attacked by Germany and the Soviet Union and apparently 
removed from the map. After the 2nd World War Poland reappeared on 
it and became a member of the UN but its dependence upon the Soviet 
Union was a cruel and long-lasting fact. 
In this sense the year 1989 could be looked at as a kind of miracle. 
There can be no doubt that had it been Mr Putin and not Mr Gorbatshov 
who replaced Mr Czernenko as the leader of the Soviet Union, this mir-
acle would have not taken place or maybe would have taken place but in 
such a shape which does not deserve the name of miracle. 
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After some period in which Poland was mainly preoccupied by its internal 
affairs, the most important decisions dealing with the future of interna-
tional policy had to be made. Two such directions were chosen. They 
were namely the EU (then the European Communities) and NATO. 
What is more, security aspects were present behind both decisions. As 
regards NATO they are obvious and require no special comment. What 
may be less clear are security elements connected with the decision to 
join the EU. However cruel it may sound for Mr Macron, those consider-
ations would have been more or less the same had the EU not had pro-
visions dealing with the security matters. The truth is that the European 
economic integration created so many visible and invisible ties among the 
Member States that a war among them is hardly possible. What is more, 
an attack on one of them seems to complicate the life of the others. It 
can be a deterrent factor for possible aggressors who would like to keep 
good relations with such powerful players as Germany, France, Italy or 
Spain. This argument is often used by persons who support a quick entry 
of Poland to the Eurozone. 
In fact the people who supported the Polish entry to the EU could be 
divided into three groups. I could suggest the names: materialists, realists, 
and idealists. The main preoccupation of materialists were the European 
funds. In my opinion, important as they are, they are just one element 
of the entire picture. The idealists seemed to believe in a fundamental 
change of the entire state (or maybe even society). In fact, they believed 
that the Polish civil servants will be like Germans (of course not from the 
period 1933-1945) or Dutch ones. On the other hand, realists looked at the 
process of integration from the point of view of geopolitics. They were 
afraid of remaining in a grey area between the EU and Russia. In fact, the 
fate of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova seems to confirm how reasonable 
that type of thinking was. 
One should stress that a high price was paid by those states. In my opin-
ion the economies of the Central and Eastern European states needed 
bigger protection from the richest Western European economies. In fact, 
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the collapse of communism meant the collapse of the hitherto trade pat-
terns and the collapse of entire branches of the economy. From the pre-
sent perspective one can say that those states (and Poland in particular) 
needed a longer adaptation period which would allow them to create new 
branches of economy and new relatively strong enterprises. In fact, there 
is neither a Polish Mercedes nor a Polish Nokia. 
The adaptation period seems to be necessary because of legal reasons as 
well. In my opinion the former socialist states needed more time to work 
out not only the “paper” norms but also the kitchen of democracy. What 
was necessary was the time for all major political parties to get expe-
rience with working under the constitutional norms. In my opinion, the 
present situation in Poland has to do with the fact that it was only in 2015 
(that is more than 10 years after the accession to the EU and 18 years after 
the adoption of the constitution) that a right-wing party got a real chance 
to govern the state under the present constitutional norms. It is all the 
more dramatic as the constitution was adopted by former communists 
and liberals; the right-wing parties calling for its denial in the popular ref-
erendum. What is more, the Polish very influential mainstream6 seems to 
deny the right-wing parties the ‘moral’ right to rule. 
All the same we do not know the actual alternative that is the price of 
postponing the entry into the EU. If the alternative would have been a 
Russian veto for entry into the EU, the price seems to be worth paying. 
The same is true if the alternative would have been a decision of the EU 
to build a fortress and accept no new members for 25-50 years. 
The references to the EU as a security area is right to a very high degree. 
All the same one should recall that when discussing security matters we 
are within the realm of probabilities. One can imagine the aggressor state 
which not only attacks one of the EU members, but also warns the oth-
ers that all which criticize it will be deprived of gas supplies. It is a kind of 
In fact one daily, two weeklies and one TV station as well as a big group of highly educated per-
sons and a small but loud group of completely uneducated celebrities. 
6 
31
paradox that an ambitious EU environmental policy may turn out to be an 
element lowering rather than increasing the strength of the EU and the 
ability of its Members to cope with a potential aggressor state. 
That is why NATO was present in the picture of the Polish aspirations 
from the early 1990s. The resistance of Russia to this movement was great 
but it could only show that the direction adopted by Poland was right. At 
no moment was NATO membership looked as an obstacle to EU member-
ship. In fact, it was possible for Poland to access NATO five years before 
the entry to the EU. Looking at the situation of the former Soviet states 
one can easily see that some states may find it easier to enter the EU 
than NATO. Both are treated as a choice of “Western” political culture as 
opposed to the Soviet or Russian. 
IV. The Polish Experience with Respect to Security 
It is important that neither Poland nor the other States of Central and 
Eastern Europe looked at NATO and the EU as the alternatives. There 
were no special reasons to look at them in this way. 22 EU members are 
Members of NATO. NATO helped the European democracies to keep their 
security during The Cold War. 
One can see some paradoxes in this respect, as in many other fields. We 
can argue that NATO proved its strength and usefulness at the time of The 
Cold War when the Soviet Union was a strong, dangerous and aggressive 
player. Nowadays the strength of NATO should be bigger as there is no 
such an enemy. On the other hand, some would say that NATO is not as 
necessary as there is no longer the USSR. All the same it would be diffi-
cult to say that the level of security of the USA, France, Portugal, Poland 
and Lithuania is the same. From the perspective of Poland and Lithuania 
NATO is as important as it was for the Federal Republic of Germany 35 
years ago. 
The second paradox has to do with the pressure of President Trump on 
the European states to increase their military expenditure. If the Euro-
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pean allies get angry with President Trump, start to build the strate-
gic autonomy and increase the expenditure, then this is what President 
Trump wants of them. If they do what he wants, the risk of weakening 
NATO may be overcome. 
Of course, this is only a part of the picture. Some utterances of President 
Trump to NATO are worrying for its members. They include the ones 
putting into doubt the reliability of the alliance7 or the American role in 
it.8 
In fact, there are many elements in the Transatlantic exchange of views 
which look like political or even PR tricks. Especially the relationships 
between Mr. Trump and Mr. Macron give this air of a competition of 
strongmen, culminating in their famous handshakes. It is not the business 
of Poland to make positions and comments on each and every such 
“event”; they are just the most important of unimportant events. Poland 
and many other states of the region have more important challenges and 
real problems. That is why we are interested in the preservation of NATO 
as well as the preservation of the EU. 
Of course, if one day the US will decide to come back to isolation we will 
be able to do nothing about this. There is no doubt that it would be a very 
bad scenario for this part of Europe. It is no wonder that States such as 
Poland do not want this scenario and will do nothing to weaken NATO or 
to accelerate its dissolution and the withdrawal of the US. On the con-
trary, Poland is ready to invest a lot in NATO and the American presence 
in this part of Europe. 
This is in no case any action against the EU. The simple fact is that NATO 
means 22 EU members (including the UK), the USA, Canada and 5 non-
EU European states (counting Turkey as a European state). It is objec-
TAYLOR, “Fort Trump” Or Bust? Poland and The Future Of European Defence, Report, Friends of 
Europe, December 2018, p. 16. 
MUTI, Poland, The Missing Link in European Defence, <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/
poland-missing-link-european-defence>.; TERLIKOWSKI,  PeSCo: The Polish Perspective/ Octo-





tively stronger than any force of the EU as such. The presence of the 
world superpower makes it highly risky to attack one of the members of 
NATO (once again recalling that we can talk only about probabilities and 
not confirmed and certain facts). In this respect the combination of NATO 
and the EU is the best choice for the states of the Central and Eastern 
Europe. Any other scenario would be against our interests and we will do 
everything to avoid it or at least postpone it as much as possible. 
V. The EU Treaty Framework on Security Matters 
It must be stressed that Poland as any EU member is bound by the treaty 
provisions on security matters. A few words must be said about their 
development. 
The 1954 collapse of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty and 
the 1957 signature of two Rome Treaties meant that the question of secu-
rity found itself outside the scope of the founding treaties. The return of 
them to security matters required about 30 years. 
It was connected with the entry into force of the Single European Act 
(SEA). What is of importance here is the establishment of the European 
Political Cooperation. It was regulated by Title III of the SEA (comprising 
one article only, namely art. 30). A separate set of provisions devoted to 
security found their place in art. 30 para. 6. According to it: 
(a) The High Contracting Parties consider that closer co-operation on 
questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to 
the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They 
are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and 
economic aspects of security. 
(b) The High Contracting Parties are determined to maintain the techno-
logical and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They shall 
work to that end both at national level and where appropriate within the 
framework of the competent institutions and bodies. 
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(c) Nothing in this Title shall impede closer co-operation in the field 
of security between certain of the High Contracting Parties within the 
framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.’ 
It is visible that only ‘closer cooperation’ was provided for. All the same 
Member States were cautious enough to insert a separate safety clause – 
concerning both the WEU and NATO. 
The TEU in its original 1992 version (The Maatricht Treaty) was the sec-
ond step in this respect. The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
became for the next 16 years a so-called Second Pillar of the newly cre-
ated EU. The provision of special importance for security and military 
matters was then art. J 4. 
Its para. 1 made it clear that ‘The common foreign and security policy shall 
include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead 
to a common defence.” This provision turned out to be a permanent solu-
tion, present in the EU law until now, though in a modified version. 
What turned out to be much less permanent was the exclusion of the 
decision-making mechanism typical for the entire 2nd pillar.9 
Another element typical for the Maastricht treaty in its original version 
was a reference to the Western European Union. Art. J 4 (2) provided that 
“The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an 
integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. 
The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt 
the necessary practical arrangements.” 
It was quite a bizarre provision as only certain members of the EU were 
also members of the WEU. In this sense this part of The Maastricht Treaty 
was the first treaty solution on enhanced cooperation. What is more, art. 
J 4 (5) provided that ‘The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the 
According to art. J 4 (3), ‘Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall 
not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J. 3.’ 
9 
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development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States 
on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, 
provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that pro-
vided for in this Title.’ 
Last but not least a safeguard clause was addressed to the NATO mem-
bership. According to article J 4 (4) “The policy of the Union in accordance 
with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security 
and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the oblig-
ations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and 
be compatible with the common security and defence policy established 
within that framework.’ 
This safeguard (in slightly modified version) could be found in art. 17 (1) of 
the TEU in the versions resulting from The Amsterdam and Nice Treaty 
and now forms art. 42 (7) second para. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam shifted the complex regulation of security and 
military matters to article J 7 of the TEU, which was at the same time 
renumbered as art. 17 of the TEU. 
Its para. 1 (1) repeated that ‘the common foreign and security policy shall 
include all questions relating to the security of the Union’. It was more 
precise as regards the possible introduction of the ‘common defence’. 
Its adoption was dependent upon the decision of the European Council 
accepted later by the Member States in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements.10 
Unlike its predecessor, the Treaty of Amsterdam made it possible for the 
EU organs to adopt all measures of the 2nd pillar in matters of security. 
The most characteristic (though possibly not the most important) ele-
ment was a reference to the EU missions. Art. 17 (2) of the TEU provided 
Identical solution is adopted by art. 42 (2) TEU in the current version. 10 
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that: ‘Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peace making.’ 
An element of great importance was a complex regulation of the relation-
ship between the EU and the WEU. There is no room for a detailed discus-
sion of the matter, as it is a part of history at present. It must be stressed, 
however, that the WEU was seen rather as a tool in the hands of the EU. 
In fact, the Treaty of Nice eliminated all references to the WEU. Other 
provisions of art. 17 were left intact. 
The TEU in the present (that is after-Lisbon) version contains a complex 
set of rules on security. There is no room to present all of them. 
According to art. 42 (1) TEU ‘The common security and defence policy 
shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall 
provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and 
military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union 
for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international 
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Char-
ter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities 
provided by the Member States.’ 
Despite the similarities one can see more decisive and ambitious lan-
guage. It can be seen in art. 42 (3) TEU which reads that ‘Member States 
shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the 
implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute 
to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which 
together establish multinational forces may also make them available to 
the common security and defence policy.’ 
The same provision obliges the Member States to progressively improve 
their military capabilities and defines the tasks of the European Defence 
Agency.11 
It shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those require-
ments, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure 
11 
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Art. 42 (7) TEU contains a relatively weak casus foederis, according to it 
‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the 
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assis-
tance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific charac-
ter of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.’ However 
it reserves the primacy of NATO commitments (of course for NATO Mem-
bers).12 
One should also cite art. 46 TEU which is the legal basis of permanent 
structured cooperation (PESCO).13 
VI. The Attitude of Poland to the EU Treaty 
Provisions and Their Implementation 
There is no doubt that the present shape of the treaty provisions on secu-
rity is the result of evolution. A modest beginning and the progressive 
direction (‘always more, never less’) are quite typical for the philosophy of 
European integration. What is atypical is a rather slow speed of reforms. 
This is due to many elements. Just to name one we can refer to the close 
link of security not only to state sovereignty (whatever it means in Europe 
in the 21st century) but also to the very preservation of statehood. 
needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall partici-
pate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in 
evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.” See also art. 45 TEU. 
‘Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains 
the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.’ 
1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation 
referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on mili-
tary capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their 
intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. 
2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall 
adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of 





In any case, it is not the intention of Poland to cancel those provisions 
or to reverse their evolution and to come back to e.g. the SEA version. 
As it was said several times that NATO is not against the EU, one can 
reverse this statement and say that the EU is not against NATO. Safeguard 
clauses to this effect present in the various versions of the treaties were 
already mentioned. There is no doubt that the strength of the European 
NATO Members means the strength of NATO. If this strength can increase 
due to the EU instruments, EU-NATO Member States can only be sat-
isfied. As M. Terlikowski puts it ’Ever since its accession to the EU, the 
CSDP has been considered an additional security mechanism for Poland, 
complementing the national defence capacity, membership in NATO and 
strategic partnership with the U.S.’14 Poland is also aware that the building 
of the European capabilities may be useful for some unpredicted and 
unwelcome future developments regarding NATO. All the same the for-
mer should not be seen as an invitation or catalyst of the latter. 
It must be said however that the opinions on Poland’s attitude refer to a 
lack of trust, lack of interest, or lack of engagement. K.Muti for example 
writes that “As EU member states step-up efforts to strengthen defence 
cooperation and integration, Poland’s role and contribution remain an 
enigma.”15 However even the author of a very Euro-enthusiastic report 
does not leave any doubts that „Russia remains the main security chal-
lenge for Poland, and NATO is believed to be the only concrete protection 
against a possible military threat from this country. NATO is seen as nec-
essary for the security of their country by 91% of Poles, 81% of Hungari-
ans, 75% of Czechs and 56% of Slovaks.”16 
What is a most interesting for some commentators was the Polish attitude 
to the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence 
(PESCO). Its establishment is associated on the one hand with the aggres-
TERLIKOWSKI (footnote 8), p. 2. 
MUTI (footnote 8). 
New Pact for Europe, National Report, POLAND, November 2017, Institute of Public Affairs, 





sive attitude of Russia and with Brexit on the other.17 Actually Poland was 
one of 23 Member States which acceded to PESCO at once.18 It was not 
a sponsor of the initiative, however.19 Interestingly enough, one state of 
the region (the Czech Republic) was one of the sponsors.20 According to 
J.Gotkowska, „Central Europe perceives the whole process sceptically.”21 
A. Ciupiński notes that the first reaction of Poland was rather reserved 
and that it cared not to undermine NATO.22 As M. Terlikowski puts it: 
‘Already at the meeting of EU defence ministers in September 2016, when 
the European Global Strategy (EUGS) implementation agenda was dis-
cussed, Poland argued that the EU should avoid duplication of compe-
tencies and tasks of the Alliance, particularly in planning and conducting 
operations.’23 Another reason for scepticism is a care about smaller enter-
prises.24 Two projects in which Poland participated initially referred to 
mobility and to the  European Secure Software Defined Radio (ESSOR).”25 
What attracted the attention of the specialists of international security 
are the Polish efforts to increase the American presence on the Polish 
territory. It took the shape of the ‘Fort Trump’ initiative. For P. Taylor it 
means putting too many eggs into one basket.26 In my opinion however, 
a much more pertinent analysis is provided by P. Buras and J. Janning. 
They write about two fatalisms: the German one and the Polish one. They 
describe the latter by writing that: 
CIUPIŃSKI, PESCO jako próba osiągnięcia europejskiej autonomii strategicznej, Kwartalnik Bel-
lona, 1/2018, p. 30. 
CIUPIŃSKI (footnote 17), p. 32. 
CIUPIŃSKI, Nowe struktury obrony Europy Zachodniej, Security Review, 4(9)/2018, p. 16. 
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Number 69, Warsaw, February 2018, p. 5. 
CIUPIŃSKI (footnote 17), p. 34. 
TERLIKOWSKI (footnote 8), p. 4. 
CIUPIŃSKI (footnote 17), p. 34, see also Zaborowski, Poland and European Defence Integration. 
Policy Brief, 25 January 2018. 
CIUPIŃSKI (footnote 19), p. 17. TERLIKOWSKI (footnote 8), p. 2. 












‘Poland’s fatalism about America (…) is anchored in the notion that US 
security guarantees are indispensable in an increasingly dangerous 
geopolitical environment. Due to the lack of viable alternatives, Poland 
has no choice but to bet on continuous American security engagement 
with Central and Eastern Europe. (…) And, if it fails, the outcome will not 
be more disastrous than that of any other strategy.’27 
P. Taylor is more accurate when he realizes that ‘The experience of having 
been abandoned by the European powers when Nazi Germany invaded 
in 1939 underlies Polish scepticism about EU efforts at closer defence 
integration, and doubts about whether NATO would agree collectively 
to jump to Warsaw’s defence in a timely manner in case of a possibly 
ambiguous hybrid Russian attack.’28 
VII. Conclusion 
We can say that the future remains a secret. All that we can do is to try to 
increase our level of security. The EU can help in many respects. It must 
be understood that it can also make the defence of its flaking Members 
more difficult. In my opinion the EU cooperation should be welcome. All 
the same it must be stressed that security is not a banana market and the 
Community methods typical for the internal market are not to be intro-
duced here. Successful as they are, they must be kept to their proper 
scope of application. The defence of Gdansk must be first of all a decision 
for Poland. If a future common army is to help that is good. If Brussels 
thinks about replacing Poland in such decisions, there is nobody to opt 
for such a solution. 
BURAS /JANNING, Divided at the Centre: Germany, Poland, and the Troubles of the Trump Era, 
December 2018, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 8. 
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I. Introduction 
The phenomenon of a massive movement towards Europe of migrants 
and refugees from the Middle East, particularly from Syria in 2015/16 has 
been described as the world’s worst refugee crisis of our time. This forced 
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migration wave has been provoked not only by the continuing violations 
of international humanitarian law within and beyond the region, but also 
by the deteriorating situation in neighboring countries such as Turkey 
and Lebanon, where the majority of refugees continue to seek shelter.1 
Therefore, an increasing number of persons have been moving to those 
European countries perceived as safe countries of asylum. 
As regards Middle Eastern refugees moving into Europe, a large number 
of these persons reached Central and Western Europe by taking the West-
ern Balkans route. Travelling along this route meant travelling through 
certain countries which were not bound by EU asylum legislation – the 
Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia. Their asylum 
systems were of poor quality. These countries’ principal source of oblig-
ations towards refugees remains the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Status of Refugees from 1951 (Refugee Convention). Therefore these coun-
tries provide an excellent model for a broader examination of the position 
of transit countries under International Refugee Law. 
Neighboring countries such as Croatia and Bulgaria are no less “transi-
tory” than North Macedonia and Serbia. However, these two countries are 
EU Member States which implies that they are bound by EU acquis and its 
Dublin system.2 Being an EU Member State opens up another legal aspect 
that is not strictly relevant to an analysis of universal legislation. 
Policy towards refugees and migrants travelling along the Western 
Balkans route did evolve through several distinct stages, usually through 
joint undertakings by major EU receiving countries and the governments 
KILIBARDA PAVLE, Obligations of transit countries under refugee law: A Western Balkans case 
study, International Review of the Red Cross, 99/2017, pp. 211-238, p. 212. 
The Dublin system refers to a list of criteria established by the EU’s Dublin Regulation in order 
to determine which country is responsible for addressing an individual’s asylum claim. The 
specificity of this system is reflected in fact that the criteria are applied in a subsidiary manner. 
It means that the Member State in which an asylum-seeker is located may not necessarily be 




of the Western Balkan countries themselves. It was so until the Western 
Balkans route was completely closed in March 2016 after the EU-Turkish 
Agreement. 
A comprehensive analysis of the relations between migrations and Euro-
pean security goes beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, this article 
attempts to shed light only on some aspects of the migration crisis, i.e. to 
explain the position and obligations of transit countries. Accordingly, the 
presentation of this issue through the prism of Serbian experience could 
provide an excellent model for a broader examination of the position of 
transit countries under International Refugee Law. After short introduc-
tory notes (Part I.) and clarification of terminology (Part II.), the present 
paper analyses the so-called Western Balkans route (Part III.). Thereafter, 
the experience of Serbia as a transit country is examined (Part IV.). Special 
attention is devoted to the new Law on Asylum and Subsidiary Protection. 
Finally, in order to define the obligations of transit country under Refugee 
Convention, the article seeks to determine minimal standards of protec-
tion applicable to refugees in a transit context (Part V.). 
II. Terminology 
With respect to terminology, the phrase refugees and migrants is used 
in the present article. Different stakeholders use different terms to refer 
to the same phenomenon of forced migrations employing such terms as 
migrants, vulnerable migrants, forced migrants, asylum-seekers, persons 
in need of international protection, or even transit migrants. However, 
referring to refugees and migrants seems to be the most appropriate way 
of pointing out the legal relevance of status in a mixed-migration flow. 
As regards mixed-migration flow, the fact is that contemporary irregular 
migration is mostly mixed. It means that it consists of flows of people who 
are on the move for different reasons but who share the same routes, 
modes of traveling and vessels. They cross land and sea borders without 
authorization, frequently with the help of people smugglers. Mixed flows 
can include refugees, asylum seekers and others with specific needs, as 
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well as other irregular migrants. It should be emphasized that groups are 
not mutually exclusive, as people often have more than one reason for 
leaving home. 
The safe third country concept operates on the basis that an applicant 
for international protection could have obtained it in another country 
and therefore the receiving State is entitled to reject responsibility for 
the protection claim. As is the case for the first country of asylum con-
cept, which covers refugees who have already obtained and can again 
avail themselves of protection in a third country, the safe third country 
concept is in most cases applied as a ground for declaring an application 
inadmissible and barring applicants from a full examination of the merits 
of their claim.3 
Finally, the concept of a transit country refers to a country that refugees 
and migrants pass through along the way to their preferred country of 
asylum. Hence, transit country may be located anywhere between the 
country of origin and the country of destination. But it is important to 
note that no transit country may be absolutely regarded as such. There 
will always be a certain number of persons interested in staying there 
and genuinely seeking some form of protection. So the designation is also 
subject to change as circumstances change. 
Therefore, it seems to be the most suitable to define a transit country as 
a country in which, in a given moment, a large majority of refugees and 
migrants otherwise interested in seeking and receiving international pro-
tection refrain from doing so, or do so without genuinely intending to stay 
there; where they do not remain for a significant span of time; and which 
they eventually attempt to leave in an irregular manner. Western Balkan 
countries (Serbia and North Macedonia) meet this definition.4 
<https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Policy-Note-08.pdf.>. 





III. The Western Balkan Routes 
The Balkans has been an entry point for refugees and migrants into Cen-
tral Europe for years. However, from April/May 2015, the number of 
new arrivals began to increase. In fact the old Mediterranean route was 
replaced by the Western Balkans route. Travelling from Turkey to Greece 
and then through the Balkan countries in order to reach Western and 
Central Europe gradually became a preferable alternative for the danger-
ous journey across the Mediterranean. 
Nevertheless, Western Balkan countries such as Serbia and North Mace-
donia remained almost exclusively transit States. Actually, the vast major-
ity of refugees and migrants simply passed through them without 
intending to request asylum from their authorities. 
1. Unique way of operation 
Although there were many different migrant routes active before 2015, 
the way the Western Balkans route operated between the summer of 2015 
and the spring of 2016 was unique. 
The Western Balkans route was special because from September 2015 to 
March 2016, it was the countries on this route which facilitated the trans-
port of forced migrants towards the most desirable destinations rather 
than human smugglers. The States involved provided medical care and 
humanitarian assistance along the route as well as transportation and a 
number of provisional reception centers to accommodate the max influx 
of persons in transit. 
In the late summer of 2015, Germany decided to accept a large number 
of Syrian refugees and the European Commission as well as a number 
of European countries welcomed that decision. Although there was no 
clear basis for it in EU law, the countries along the Western Balkans route, 
with the support of human rights activists and international organiza-
tions, decided to form a passage and helped refugees transit through their 
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territory. Most of the refugees did not fill in the asylum applications in 
these countries as there was a silent agreement they would be ‘waved 
through’ to Germany.5 
This practice persisted for several months after Hungary had closed its 
borders, and basically involved an open-border policy with respect to 
refugees and migrants crossing into North Macedonia from Greece. How-
ever, restrictions on this manner of free movement were gradually 
imposed. Finally, after the EU–Turkey Agreement of March 2016,6 the 
Western Balkans route was completely “shut down”. 
As a result of this, the majority of refugees and migrants are no longer 
able to use this route to travel to those European countries perceived as 
countries of asylum. However, persons who do reach Serbia may still sub-
mit an asylum application there. 
When the Western Balkan route was shut down in March 2016, many 
questions about what would happen to the refugees taking this route 
remained unanswered. For example, around 7000 refugees remained 
stranded in Serbia. When the route closed, they did not seek asylum in 
Serbia, but rather remained there as irregular migrants in the hope that 
they would find their way to the EU. From their point of view, they were 
caught at an arbitrarily determined point, when the borders were open 
and when they closed down again.7 
The countries along the Western Balkan route at different points during the refugee crisis con-
cluded that the Dublin III Regulation (which outlines which EU country is responsible for indi-
vidual asylum claims) and other asylum and refugee-related EU Directives were not fully 
applicable during the 2015/16 refugee crisis. Some politicians, especially in Croatia, even said 
outright that they could not follow the EU legislation since it did not envision more than half a 
million of the refugees coming in such a short period and passing through the territories of 
these countries. At the peak of the refugee crisis in the autumn of 2015, Croatia did not consis-
tently fingerprint refugees passing through its territory as it was envisioned in the EURODAC 










While the European Commission welcomed such cooperation between 
EU States in September 2015, in the summer of 2017 the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) effectively ruled that such cooperation was 
not in line with EU legislation. The two relevant cases are A.S. v. Slovenia8 
and Jafari.9 The two CJEU judgments can be understood as an effort to 
strengthen the Common European Asylum System that has been shaken 
by the refugee crisis. They reinstate the legal boundaries that had become 
blurred due to massive non-compliance by Member States during the 
organized secondary movements through the Western Balkans corridor.10 
2. EU-Turkish Agreement 
On 18 March 2016, the European Commission and the Turkish govern-
ment concluded an agreement with respect to the influx of migrants from 
Turkey to Greece. The goals of the agreement were to break the business 
model of the people smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative to 
putting their lives at risk. The agreement consists of nine Action Points.11 
The first Action Point states that all new irregular migrants crossing from 
Turkey to the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey as of 20 March 
2016. The transfer of asylum seekers to a third country like Turkey is only 
permissible if there is an individual determination of claim, legal repre-
sentation, appeal and the prohibitions of collective expulsion and non-
refoulement should be taken into account. The latter is the prohibition 
to return (“refouler”) a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened. Last but not least, it is questionable 
whether Turkey can be considered a safe third country. 
However, it is stated in the agreement itself that the return of migrants to 
Turkey will be in full accordance with European and international law. It 
CJEU, Decision of 26 July 2017 in the Case 490/16, A.S. v. Slovenia. 










is required that there will be no collective expulsions and that the prohi-
bition of non-refoulement will be respected. According to the agreement, 
migrants arriving on the Greek islands will be duly registered and any 
application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek author-
ities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive and in cooper-
ation with UNHCR. Consequently, according to the text of the first Action 
Point, the application of the agreement will be in accordance with the 
Refugee Convention and European Asylum Law.12 
The Agreement stipulates that for every Syrian being returned to Turkey 
from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to an 
EU Member State. This provision, however, has been a subject of intense 
debate. It could be said that it was at odds with the prohibition of non-
discrimination based on country of origin laid down in article 3 of Geneva 
Convention. The ‘one in-one out’ resettlement approach is clearly a com-
plicated and worrying suggestion and one that is incompatible with EU 
law.13 
“The idea that one Syrian can be substituted for another is deeply inimical 
to established European traditions and norms in human rights, in which 
the individual circumstances of each person is the key factor. Moreover, 
a plan under which it is possible to penalise one Syrian for seeking to get 
to the EU and at the same time to privilege another who has not tried to 
do so is fundamentally incompatible with the human rights foundations 
of European integration.”14 
3. European solidarity on the test 
This unforeseen mass influx situation put European solidarity to the test, 
both amongst receiving and transit countries, as well as towards refugees 
RODRIGUES PETER, Migration and Security in times of the refugee crisis – Perspectives for Dublin 
and Schengen, in: KELLERHALS/BAUMGARTNER (eds.), New dynamics in the European integration 








themselves. Although the necessity of forming a common European 
response was recognized early on during the crises of 2015, a compre-
hensive common policy was not implemented.15 The response to the crisis 
has been characterized by an imbalance between solidarity and security. 
When faced with an unprecedented influx of people in 2015-16, the pen-
dulum swung sharply towards the latter, with the EU and its members 
concentrating predominantly on (mostly) ad hoc temporary solutions 
rather than systematic structural reforms.16 
The lack of intra-EU solidarity has been a major source of tension 
between EU countries, not only casting doubts over the future of Schen-
gen, but having a wider negative impact on cohesion within the Union. (…) 
“sharing the burden of refugee management is a litmus test for European 
solidarity.” 17 
EU governments have struggled to respond effectively to the crisis and 
still find it difficult to forge compromises because of deep differences of 
opinion between and within countries. It remains very difficult to recon-
cile the two basic camps: those who argue that Europeans have a moral, 
humanitarian and legal obligation to support those in need of help and 
refuge (so-called ‘solidarity’ camp) and those who argue that Europe must 
protect itself from the large numbers of people trying to reach the conti-
nent (so-called ‘security’ camp).18 
Closing the Western Balkans route and the 2016 EU-Turkey deal have par-
tially sealed Europe’s borders. Further steps towards a ‘fortress Europe’ 
would seriously undermine basic human rights and the Union’s interna-














IV. The Republic of Serbia as a Transit Country 
The Republic of Serbia has come into the international spotlight during 
the refugee crisis. It has been praised by the international media and 
stakeholders as a model of good and tolerant policies towards refugees 
and migrants. The Serbian authorities and citizens, as well, met the wave 
of refugees and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa with tol-
erance and hospitality. More than one million migrants have been regis-
tered in the territory of Serbia since the onset of the crisis. The country 
provided the necessary medical care and accommodation for all migrants. 
Serbian approach has become even more visible and positive in com-
parison to the attitude adopted by some EU countries which openly 
expressed hostility towards the increasing number of migrants. 
The Republic of Serbia is continuously working to improve and strengthen 
the system of migration management and the asylum system, both in a 
normative and operational sense. However, Serbia has still not been con-
sidered a safe third country. 
1. Serbia’s asylum system 
While the treatment of refugees and migrants in transit by authorities in 
Serbia was absolutely positive, Serbia remained a “transit country”. Ser-
bia has never been perceived by refugees and migrants as a safe country 
of asylum. Serbia’s asylum system has been described as poor and inca-
pable of providing effective protection. In support of this claim is also a 
fact that only few refugees and migrants decided to apply for asylum in 
Serbia. The rest of them accepted a provisional shelter that the authori-
ties provided before making their way towards those European countries 
that could provide them with a long-term protection. 
The context in which Serbia’s asylum system functions is influenced by its 
legal background as former federal units of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been one of 
the original States party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and being non-
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aligned, a major receiving country for refugees from the Eastern Bloc.20 
Post-World War II Yugoslavia guaranteed the right to asylum already in 
its 1946 Constitution.21  (…) After breakup of the country, its federal units 
began to develop their own asylum system. 
With respect to Serbia, in 2008 a general Law on Asylum entered into 
force.22 During the migration crises, many weaknesses of this law 
appeared. Taking into consideration these deficiencies on one hand, and 
the EU integration process on the other hand, the Republic of Serbia 
adopted a new Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection in 2018.23 
Unlike most European asylum legislation, Serbia’s system envisions a pro-
cedural difference between “expressing the intention to seek asylum” 
or “seeking asylum” and formally “submitting an application for asylum”. 
Speaking de jure, only persons who have done the latter are actually con-
sidered as having entered the asylum procedure.24 And this may have 
practical consequences for the position of asylum seekers (see below, 
V.1.c.). 
2. The new Law on Asylum and Temporary 
Protection 
The Serbian new Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection was adopted 
on 22 March 2018. This act brings about wide-ranging modifications to 
the Serbian asylum system as part of EU accession negotiations commit-
ments, mirroring the structure and procedures laid down in the EU asy-
lum acquis. 
KILIBARDA, Obligations of transit countries under refugee law: A Western Balkans case study, pp. 
215-216. 
Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Gazette of the FPRY, 31 Jan-
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Law on Asylum, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 109/2007, 
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The Asylum Office is now required to decide on asylum applications 
within 3 months, as opposed to 2 months prior to the adoption of the 
Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection. The 3-month deadline may be 
extended by a further 3 months in complex cases or at times of a large 
number of applications, while the Office may postpone the examination of 
the application in case of an uncertain situation in the country of origin. 
In any event, the processing of asylum applications can never exceed 12 
months, in contrast with 21 months under the recast Asylum Procedures 
Directive.25 The new Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection further 
introduces a set of special procedures including the accelerated proce-
dure, the border procedure, and formal inadmissibility grounds.26 
In accordance with this Law, an asylum seeker may be subject to different 
restrictions on freedom of movement, or even detention, under the same 
set of grounds. The Law sets out “grounds for limiting movement” which 
correspond to the grounds for detention laid down in the recast Recep-
tion Conditions Directive:27 (a) verification of identity or nationality; (b) 
determination of the main elements of the claim which cannot be done 
without such a restriction, in particular where there is a risk of abscond-
ing; (c) application made for the sole purpose to avoid deportation; (d) 
protection of national security or public order; and (e) decision, in a pro-
cedure, on the applicant’s right to enter the territory. 
According to the new legislation, the risk of absconding is assessed taking 
into account inter alia previous attempts of the applicant to irregularly 
leave Serbia, refusal to establish his or her identity and provision of false 
information on identity or nationality. 
However, the list of measures to restrict freedom of movement raises 
concerns. The prohibition on leaving the Asylum Centre, regular report-
ing to the police, assigned residence in the Asylum Centre under strict 
Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international pro-
tection, OJ L 180, 29. Jun 2013 
<https://www.ecre.org/serbia-new-act-on-asylum-and-temporary-protection-adopted/>. 
Directive 2013/33/EU laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international 





police supervision, assigned residence in a social protection institution 
for children under strict control, temporary confiscation of travel docu-
ments and detention in the Shelter for Foreigners that may be ordered if 
the asylum seeker does not comply with a prohibition on leaving the Asy-
lum Centre or regular reporting obligations. The prohibition on leaving 
the reception center amounts to deprivation of liberty regardless of its 
designation in the this Law, in line with European Court of Human Rights 
case law.28 
Restrictions on freedom of movement cannot exceed 3 months, subject 
to the possibility of a prolongation for another 3 months in the case of 
restrictions related to the determination of main elements of the claim or 
the protection of national security or public order. The asylum seeker can 
appeal the order of restriction on freedom of movement within 8 days.29 
Despite the fact that this new law has brought many improvements, prac-
titioners working with refugees and asylum-seekers in Serbia during past 
years argue that the position of Serbia as a transit country for refugees 
and migrants cannot be expected to change overnight. 
3. Serbia – “safe third country”? 
As it was explained above, the notion of safe third country refers to a pro-
cedural limitation on examining an individual’s asylum claim, introduced 
by certain countries, based on the fact that the individual entered the 
receiving country after having passed through one or more safe countries 
where they had the possibility of seeking and receiving effective interna-
tional protection. 
The United Nation High Committee for Refugees (UNHCR) has strongly 
advised against considering Serbia as safe third country and returning 
asylum- seekers there. Also, the European Court of Human Rights in its 






In its decision Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary30 from March 2017, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights found that Hungary violated several pro-
visions of the European Convention on Human Rights by returning two 
asylum seekers from Bangladesh (after carrying out the accelerated asy-
lum procedure in Röszke detention unit) back to Serbia in 2015. The Court 
found that the asylum seekers were unlawfully deprived of their liberty 
and that the conditions in which they were staying in the detention unit 
were inhumane and degrading. Hungary therefore had violated the Arti-
cles 5 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, 
since Hungary officially considers that Serbia is a safe third country, the 
refugees were returned to Serbia informally (without cooperation with 
Serbian police) following the asylum procedure. 
The Court found that the Hungarian authorities did not implement the 
procedure for returns in accordance with the EU Return Directive31 and 
that the refugees did not have any effective remedy at their disposal that 
could challenge the decision to return them to Serbia, which is a viola-
tion of Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The Court pointed out that the return of refugees to Serbia, the coun-
try which the UNHCR declared unsafe in 2012, creates the risk of fur-
ther return to Macedonia and Greece (chain refoulement) and exposure 
to treatment contrary to Article 3 of ECHR. According to Article 3 ECHR 
no one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. The Court noted that not only had the Hungarian author-
ities not considered whether there is an individual risk of inhuman and 
degrading treatment in the case of returning refugees to Serbia, but they 
even refused to take into account the reports submitted to them, basing 
the decision solely on the Regulation of the Government of Hungary from 
2015, which declares Serbia a safe third country.32 
ECHR, Decision of 14 March 2017 in the Case 47287/15, Ilias and Ahmed/Hungary. 
Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24 December 2008. 
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V. Application of Refugee Convention in Transit 
Countries 
Since the Republic of Serbia is not an EU Member States yet, it’s not 
bound by its asylum legislation. Therefore its principal source of oblig-
ations in this field remains The Geneva Convention. The present article 
seeks to determine the scope of obligations of Serbia regarding the treat-
ment of refugees and migrants in transition context, and more broadly, 
the obligations of other countries in similar situations. 
1. Regimes of refugee protection, asylum and 
subsidiary protection 
Although the terms refugee status and asylum may commonly be heard 
in the same context, they are not identical. Each has its own meaning 
and history in international law. So, understanding the difference is cru-
cial to establishing the obligations of transit countries. In this context, the 
notion of subsidiary protection is also important to be explained. 
a. Refugee status 
With respect to the international system of refugee protection, the main 
point of reference is the 1951 Refugee Convention. This Convention estab-
lishes an objective regime of refugee protection which is independent of 
the will of the receiving State Party – once persons meet the require-
ments for refugee status, they are to benefit from its protection, regard-
less of whether they have been granted asylum by any country. 
In accordance with the Geneva Convention: 
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall 
apply to any person who (…) as a result of events occurring before 1 Janu-
ary 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
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owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 33 
The Convention entered into force on 22 April 1954, and it has been sub-
ject to only one amendment in the form of a 1967 Protocol which removed 
the geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention. The 1951 Con-
vention, as a post-Second World War instrument, was originally limited 
in scope to persons fleeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and 
within Europe. The 1967 Protocol removed these limitations and thus gave 
the Convention universal coverage. It has since been supplemented by 
refugee and subsidiary protection regimes in several regions, as well as 
via the progressive development of international human rights law. 
As a rights-based instrument, the Convention is underwritten by three 
main fundamental principles: non-discrimination, non-penalization, and 
non–refoulement (non-expulsion). 
The most important element is the principle of non-refoulement 
expressed in article 33 of the Geneva Convention. It provides that: 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.” 34 
“The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to 
the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted 
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to 
the community of that country.” 35 
Art. 1, para 2 of the Geneva Convention. 
Art. 33, para 1 of the Geneva Convention. 





It is often forgotten that the principle of non-refoulment is not uncondi-
tional. On the other hand its importance is crucial. It gives minimum pro-
tection to a refugee. What is more, this is the only provision that has a 
chance of being defended as a part of customary law. In the other words, 
it is binding for states independently of their being or not being parties to 
the Geneva Convention.36 
The parties to it are under the entire set of obligations. They could be 
divided into two groups. One of them refers to the national principle. It 
means the obligation to grant a refugee the rights equal to the ones of a 
national (a citizen). The second group is connected with the most favor-
able treatment. In fact it is less favorable than the national one. It means a 
treatment equal to the treatment of foreigners being in the best position 
with the respect to given rights.37 
However, in reality, a receiving country cannot usually be expected to dis-
cern of its own accord whether or not a foreigner entering or already pre-
sent on its territory is, in fact, a refugee. Under regular circumstances 
(i.e. outside of the context of a mass influx situation), it must be up to the 
potential refugee to demonstrate his or her eligibility for the rights pro-
ceeding from refugee status. This is an argument used at times by gov-
ernments (see below V.2.). 
The Refugee Convention does not say anything in terms of the Refugee 
Status Determination procedure as such. With respect to rights guaran-
teed by the Convention, there is no explicit discrimination between rights 
to be awarded after asylum has been granted and those stemming already 
ipso facto from meeting the criteria for refugee status. However, certain 
PRZEMYSLAW SAGANEK, The refugee crisis – a few remarks from the perspective of a lawyer, in: 
KELLERHALS/BAUMGARTNER (eds.), Perspectives of Security in Europe – Current Challenges, EU 





provisions make references to different types of refugee presences in 
State Parties’ territories. This suggests that certain rights or obligations 
only exist with respect to refugees whose stay has been formalized.38 
b. Concept of asylum 
Understood as long-term protection, asylum remains separate and differ-
ent from the general obligations of States under the Refugee Convention. 
In fact, the Convention only mentions asylum in the Preamble, where it 
recognizes that the “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens 
on certain countries”. It is also foreseen that international cooperation on 
this issue is necessary. 
Regarding the United Nations system, the asylum is mentioned in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). However, the ”right to 
asylum” under UDHR was differentiated from the principle of non-refoul-
ment under International Refugee Law because it did not oblige States to 
actually grant asylum to refugees (this stands in distinction to the oblig-
ation of non-refoulment, which is absolute). This implies that States had 
undertaken an undisputed obligation to refrain from the forced return of 
refugees, but did not have a corresponding obligation to provide durable 
solutions for their situation.39 
The Declaration on Territorial Asylum was unanimously adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 1967. However, certain obligations, including 
those related to the principle of non-refoulment, were fleshed out to a 
much greater extent, yet an obligation to grant asylum never materialized, 
and remained confined in broad terms to documents which were not de 
jure binding. 
The difference between the regimes of asylum and the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention is important for establishing how the manner in which a State 
may choose to implement its international obligations may, at times, be 
KILIBARDA, Obligations of transit countries under refugee law: A Western Balkans case study, p. 
222. 




at odds with those very obligations. In general, providing an asylum sys-
tem for refugees is extremely beneficial, and may even go beyond what 
is strictly required by the Refugee Convention. However, conditioning the 
protection of the latter on requesting asylum can in practice undermine 
its implementation. Regardless of whether or not a State may grant per-
manent protection, individual rights as guaranteed by the Refugee Con-
vention must be respected as soon as the conditions for their application 
have been met – irrespective of whether or not a formal procedure has 
actually been followed. This final point is crucial to understanding the 
position of transit countries, which are not really “countries of asylum” 
but remain bound by refugee law nonetheless.40 
c. Subsidiary protection 
Across Europe, the National Refugee Status Determination procedure is 
referred to as the “asylum procedure”. While “asylum” is closely related to 
the notion of refugee status, the terms are not synonymous. Asylum may 
refer to the procedure of granting protection to a foreigner, as well as a 
protection itself. So, just as a refugee may not be a beneficiary of asylum, 
a person granted asylum may also not meet the criteria of the Refugee 
Convention for refugee status. 
As a result of developments in International Refugee Law, many countries 
have instituted subsidiary protection as a type of protection status 
granted specifically to persons who do not meet the definition of a 
refugee, but whose return to their country of origin would nonetheless 
be in violation of peremptory norms of International Refugee Law. When 
it comes to the Republic of Serbia, this country legally foresees the pos-
sibility of granting subsidiary protection to persons who are not refugees 
but who may nevertheless be at risk of serious human rights violations. It 
should be noted that beneficiaries of subsidiary protection do not enjoy 
the full spectrum of refugee rights.41 
Ibid., p. 224. 




2. Obligations of transit countries under refugee law 
It is reasonable to assume that, at least in terms of rights for which enjoy-
ment the Convention establishes no further conditions, the obligations of 
a transit country are no different from those of a destination country. 
In Serbia (as well as in other Western Balkan countries), however, several 
groups of arguments have been put forward asserting the contrary. They 
are of both a legal and a factual nature and may be heard, mutatis mutan-
dis, in the context of other transit countries as well. 
The most common argument is that persons who do not seek asylum 
are not, in fact, entitled to the protection of the International Refugee 
Law. When discussing the obligations of their respective countries, West-
ern Balkan leaders often highlight that they only have legal obligations 
towards persons requesting asylum. These statements further suggest 
that any assistance provided to refugees and migrants who do not request 
asylum remains a question of policy, rather than law, and represents a 
measure of countries’ “hospitality”.42 
Furthermore, Serbian leaders often argued that certain national groups 
travelling along the route come from countries where there is no armed 
conflict. Therefore, they cannot be refugees. The persons travelling along 
the route have already passed countries where they could have applied 
for asylum and are therefore not entitled to protection in other countries. 
Bearing in mind that the Refugee Convention continues to be applicable 
to refugees transiting through a particular country, the question remains: 
What rights are guaranteed by this treaty that such persons may benefit 
from? In the other words, what is the scope of minimal standards of pro-
tection applicable to refugees in transit? 
Even a brief look at the Convention is enough to realize that different 
provisions of the Convention provide different “criteria of entitlement”. 
Ibid, p. 225, FN 95. 42 
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Although the Convention’s consistency is questionable, three general cat-
egories may be distinguished: simple presence, lawful presence and lawful 
residence. 
With respect to rights granted to refugees simply present in the territory 
of the State party, there is no doubt that such rights are likewise owed 
to refugees merely transiting there. These rights include at least those 
guaranteed by Article 3 (non-discrimination), 4 (religion), 16(1) (access to 
courts), 20 (rationing), 27 (identity papers), 31 (exemption from penaliza-
tion for unlawful entry or stay) and most important 33 (non-refoulment). 
However, even this core of the Convention rights may be read as having 
a broader scope than simply being applicable to refugees in transit. For 
some of them it is obvious that some sort of initiative must be shown on 
the part of the refugee before the relevant provision can become applic-
able. Article 31 presents an example of such a right. Generally, it requires 
that in order to be exempt from punishment for unlawful entry or stay, 
refugees “coming directly” from their country of origin must “present 
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their 
illegal entry or presence”. As the provision sets a number of conditions to 
be fulfilled in order for the refugee to enjoy this right – although some 
domestic legislation actually opts to drop one or more of them – the crux 
of the matter is that it is generally not upon the authorities to determine 
the existence of such circumstances on their own initiative.43 
Hence, in a situation of mass migrations, States through which these 
people transit have the legal obligation to refrain from any manner of 
forced return. This holds true even of those persons who refuse to submit 
an asylum application on their territory, without undertaking a fair and 
effective determination of whether the return must lead to a violation 
of the individual’s rights. No discrimination is allowed with regard to a 
refugee. Transit countries also must provide basic shelter and supplies to 
all vulnerable migrants, regardless of their status. 
Ibid, 234. 43 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
Concluding remarks can be summarized on three levels: EU level, transit 
countries’ level and Serbia’s level. 
With respect to the European Union itself, to respond to future needs, EU 
countries should agree on a comprehensive and balanced human mobility 
strategy based on a holistic concept of migration management that com-
bines security and solidarity elements. In other words, Member States 
need to enhance the notion of a ‘protective Europe’ while avoiding the 
pitfalls of a ‘fortress Europe’.44 
As regards the position of transit countries, at present, positive interna-
tional law may place only very limited obligations on transit countries. 
In times of mass influx, International Refugee Law remains applicable to 
refugees in transit countries and regardless of whether they have actually 
requested protection in the receiving State. However, the scope of rights 
provided may remain limited to the prohibition of refoulement, non-dis-
crimination, non-penalization and humanitarian assistance. 
Finally, when it comes to Serbia, a proper response to the refugee and 
migrant movement needs to be organized on two parallel tracks. First, 
urgent short-term measures have to be taken to ensure that legal pro-
tection, as well as humanitarian assistance, is provided to refugees and 
migrants. One can say that Serbia is quite successful in accomplishing this 
task. And second, in order for transit countries to actually become des-
tination countries, long-term asylum sector reform with a focus on the 
integration of beneficiaries of international protection is required. In Ser-
bia, such reform is scheduled to take place as a part of EU accession. 
However, it is very important to highlight that establishing strong protec-
tion mechanisms at the national level presents a value as such, and should 
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I. Introduction 
1. Statement of problem 
Security is one of the widest and open-ended concepts. Each discipline 
focuses only on its particular aspects. Global constitutionalism recog-
nizes security as a public aim that justifies interference with constitu-
tional freedoms. At the same time security is a basis for broad discretion 
of governmental bodies. In constitutional adjudication, security is part of 
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the proportionality analysis, which requires to test the legitimacy of pub-
lic objectives. Most often, the security issues arise in “hard” cases con-
cerning the measures to combat terrorism, illegal migration, and other 
risks of the modern era. The proportionality principle itself has been 
studied in great detail1 and is being considered as evidence for the emerg-
ing global constitutionalism.2 At first glance the requirement of legitimate 
aim is a simple exercise for the courts and an easy test to pass for gov-
ernments especially for introducing security measures. Therefore, this 
sub-principle of proportionality didn’t receive proper attention in the 
doctrine.3 Security analysis as a legitimate aim could fill this gap and bring 
added value to the academic discussion. 
Although, how could the experience of the Russian Federation be useful 
in this context? Some doubts are cast upon it with regards to the explicit 
recognition of this country as a main threat of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in Europe. Russia has demonstrated during its transi-
tion period from a soviet system different models dealing with a balance 
between security and fundamental freedoms in constitutional adjudica-
tion. It evolved from taking a more liberal approach during the establish-
ment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the early 
1990s to a more conservative model in its modern case-law. The main 
argument of the paper was put in the title by rephrasing Dworkin’s famous 
metaphor on rights as trumps.4 Constitutional adjudication as a guiding 
institution of the Russian legal system is characterized by overestimation 
of weight, which is attached to public interests. Moreover, when being 
BARAK AHARON, Proportionality: constitutional rights and their limitations, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012; Jackson Vicki C./Thushnet Mark (eds.) Proportionality: new fron-
tiers, new challenges, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017; Francisco Urbina J., A 
critique of proportionality and balancing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
Stone Sweet Alec, Mathews Jud, Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism, 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2008, vol. 47, pp. 72–164. 
Gordon Richard, Legitimate Aim: A Dimly Lit Road, European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 7, 
2002, no. 4, pp. 421–427; Engel Christoph, Das legitime Ziel als Element des Übermaßverbots. 
Gemeinwohl als Frage der Verfassungsdogmatik, In: Brugger (hrsg.) Gemeinwohl in Deutsch-
land, Europa und der Welt, Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verl.-Ges. 2002, pp. 103–172. 






viewed as analogous to playing cards security is not even seen as a trump, 
but rather as a joker which is able to justify any wide interference with 
most fundamental individual freedoms. In this sense, the case-law of Rus-
sia can be relevant for the difficult strategic goal-setting of Europe itself, 
which faces such powerful internal enemies as right-wing populism and 
the denial of the fundamental values of liberal democracy. Thus, the aim 
of this paper is to provide an analysis of security as a legitimate aim in 
constitutional adjudication in Russia. 
2. Paper structure 
The structure of the paper is as follows. It starts in the second section 
with a short overview of the social context of security in Russia. Socialist 
tradition demonstrates that the overemphasizing of the importance of 
security and other public interests could lead to the serious violations of 
constitutional rights. The third section of the paper presents two method-
ological approaches to the balance between constitutional rights and 
security. The early case-law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation reflects rare examples of trumping constitutional rights for 
security reasons. In this section the author also argues that the modern 
case-law of the Constitutional Court could be described as trumping pub-
lic interest in general and security policies in particular over most funda-
mental individual freedoms. Finally, the forth section of the paper analyses 
different models of intensity of judicial review from minimum to maxi-
mum scrutiny. The core argument of this paper is that scrutiny of public 
aims should depend on several factors such as the need for ad hoc bal-
ancing in both an historical and social context; the status of the decision-
maker; the importance of the right concerned; the subject-matter of the 
dispute; the need for budget funding; fact-finding and burden of proof; 
decision-making in good faith. 
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II. Security in the Social Context of Russia 
Security, like any public aim justifying the limitation of fundamental 
rights, cannot be understood outside the social context of certain society. 
For analysis of security in Russia one should take into account the survival 
of the socialist legal tradition.5 For example, a recent public opinion sur-
vey conducted by the Levada Center, a major independent pollster 
showed that more than 70 % of Russian evaluate positively the historical 
role of Stalin who built policy by way of combating an “enemy of the peo-
ple”6 (Russian: vrag naroda). More specifically almost half of the citizens in 
2019 think that the human sacrifices that people suffered in the Stalin era 
were justified by the great goals and outcomes that were achieved in the 
shortest possible time.7 There are also the factors of the positive image 
portrayed of a bloody dictator who allegedly managed most challenges in 
internal and external security influences indirectly, the legal order, as well 
as constitutional adjudication. 
Public opinion polls also indicated that security issues were less valued 
than issues adhering to social welfare. The main complaints of the major-
ity of citizens (57%) regarding the current government is its failure to deal 
with rising prices and falling incomes. Only a small number of respon-
dents (9%) believe that the government cannot ensure the security of 
citizens and protect them from terrorist attacks.8 Therefore it can be 
deduced that citizens think government agencies are good at dealing with 
the main challenges to national security. 
Using the analogy with the well-known metaphor of R. Dworkin, security 
and other public interests in Russia could be considered as a trump card 
MANKO RAFAL, Survival of the socialist legal tradition? A Polish perspective, Comparative Law 
Review, 2013, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 1–28; Uzelac Alan, Survival of the Third Legal Tradition?, Supreme 
Court Law Review, 2010 (2d), vol. 49, pp. 377–396. 
GOLDMAN WENDY Z., Inventing the enemy: denunciation and terror in Stalin's Russia, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 








in their conflict with the private ones. Accordingly, the main argument 
here is that social context and the long-standing Russian tradition of 
deference to security measures presupposed the high priority of public 
interest in comparing the individual freedoms. 
III. Rights as Trumps vs. Security as Trump 
1. Rights as Trumps? 
In his book “Taking rights seriously” and a little bit later in a separate arti-
cle,9 R. Dworkin makes the powerful argument pro-western constitution-
alism of rights as trumps. “Rights, – in the view of legal philosophers, – are 
best understood as trumps over some background justification for politi-
cal decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole”.10 This argu-
ment is a reaction to the ideology of utilitarianism, which highlights the 
happiness and welfare of the community as a supreme goal of politics. 
From this point of view a communist system had tried both to utilize gen-
eral welfare and to neglect individual rights as the founder of utilitarian-
ism J. Bentham did.11 
Accordingly, as an antithesis to the complete neglect of individual liberty 
in soviet time the art. 2 Constitution of the Russian Federation from 
December 12, 199312 (Constitution) should be interpreted, which stated 
that “the human being, its rights and freedoms are the supreme value. 
The recognition, compliance with and protection of the human rights and 
freedoms of the citizen are the duty of the State”. This constitutional pro-
vision seems to be an idealistic declaration rather than a directly applic-
able rule, especially in the light of the very wide discretion given to 
DWORKIN RONALD, Rights as trumps, in: Kavanagg, Oberdiek (eds.), Arguing about law, London; 
New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 335 - 344. 
Ibid. P. 335. 
BENTHAM JEREMY, Anarchical Fallacies; Being An Examination of the Declarations of Rights 
Issued During the French Revolution, in: Bowring (ed.) The works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2, 
Edinburgh, London, 1843, pp. 489 - 534. 






the legislative power by general statutory clause (art. 55.3 Constitution). 
Under the latter “state security” among other public interests gives the 
power to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to limit consti-
tutional rights, although “only to the extent necessary”. 
Recognition of rights as trumps, particularly in the connection with 
national security, is extremely rare in Russian constitutional adjudication. 
One could find the application of such a liberal doctrine only in the early 
case-law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. An exam-
ple of such is the Judgment of 14 January 1992 no. 1-P-U which concerned 
the creation by Decree of the Russian President of the Unified Ministry of 
State Security and Interior. The Constitutional Court holds that the activ-
ities of those agencies “are at the same time associated with real restric-
tions of constitutional rights … separation and mutual deterrence of state 
security and internal affairs organs provides a constitutional democratic 
system and is one of the guarantees against the usurpation of power”.13 
Now the assessment of the constitutionality of the actions of the Russian 
President aimed at ensuring security does not even become the subject-
matter of constitutional proceedings. For example, in 2015 a resident of 
Sochi challenged a Presidential decree which, among other measures, 
prohibited rallying in order to protect security during the 2014 Olympic 
Winter Games. The Constitutional Court in its Decision of 17 February 
2015 No. 266-О rejected the petition on procedural grounds arguing that 
the Decree of the Russian President had already ceased its operation by 
the time of the opening of proceedings and could not affect the constitu-
tional rights of the applicant.14 
In summation, The Constitutional Court more often doesn’t trump the 
fundamental freedoms over the interests of security. More often it has 
utilized the ideology of judicial self-restraint giving significant deference 
to political decision-makers. 
Herald of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii]. 1993. no. 1. (in Russian). 




2. Security as Trump 
The most remarkable feature of constitutional adjudication in Russia in 
recent years is the exaggeration of the public interests over the con-
stitutional rights. A general observation regarding the increasing impor-
tance of public interests can be found in the dissenting opinion of judge 
A.L. Kononov (Judgment of 19 December 2005 No. 12-P). He pointed out 
what was clearly a negative point, “[a] tendency of excessively wide use 
of the term “public” as a justification for intervention of the government 
in freedom … [and other] spheres of personal interests of citizens and 
of corporations. A position when public grounds justify and cover any 
restriction of principles of freedom… poses doubtless threat for all indi-
vidual rights”.15 
Trumping security as public interests represents the so called Beslan 
Case (Decision of 19 February 2009 no. 137-0-0).16 The case involved the 
anti-terrorism legislation which prohibits the negotiations on the political 
claims of terrorists. The victims of terrorist attack of school no. 1 in Beslan 
in September 2004 argue that such a statutory rule limits the right to life, 
freedom and personal integrity. The Constitutional Court of the Russia 
holds that the prohibition of negotiations «aims at the prevention of ter-
rorism threats, and consequently at the protection of security and of the 
life of individuals, i.e. conforms with constitutionally recognized values 
and couldn’t be seen as violation of constitutional rights of applicants… 
assessment of legality, reasonableness and utility of actions of administra-
tive bodies and its officials during the anti-terrorist operation in particu-
lar the chosen strategy of combating a terrorist attack (the use of force or 
negotiations) as well as tactics for organization and conducting of nego-
tiations with terrorists are outside the jurisdiction of The Constitutional 
Herald of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii]. 2006. no. 1. (in Russian). 




Court”. This decision not only reaffirmed the paramount value of secu-
rity but also demonstrated the ideology of judicial self-restraint, which 
became a very popular technique in constitutional adjudication. 
3. Security as an abstract concept 
The Beslan case represents the abstract character of security. Due to self 
restraint the ideology of the Constitutional Court had issued only the 
decision on admissibility, but not the judgment on merits. The court gave 
in that decision no detailed interpretation of the security concept. The 
decision on such a terrible massacre of most unprotected group is only 3 
pages (1490 words). The Court also initially decided not to publish it in any 
officially periodicals. Of course, one could access the decision via the offi-
cial website of The Constitutional Court or via legal databases. However 
without proper transparency the vague content of security is unaccept-
able and could lead to the risk of serious constitutional rights violations. 
Quite an opposite approach was used for constructing the security con-
cept used for The European Court of Human Rights in сase Tagayeva and 
others v. Russia,17 which also involved the same Beslan tragedy. A Judg-
ment (on merits and just satisfaction) of 13 April 2017 included the detailed 
argumentation on more than 134 pages (89239 words). In addition to the 
interpretation of the security concept, the Court has also chosen the ide-
ology of judicial activism. 
IV. Intensity of Judicial Review 
The difference of methodology to security from earlier to late decisions 
of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, as well as the quite 
opposite approach to this public interest in the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, demonstrate the issue of the intensity of judicial 
review. There are varying degrees in reviewing the regulatory measures 
TAGAYEVA and Others v. Russia, nos. 26562/07 and 6 others, 13 April 2017, in: Reports of Judg-
ments and Decisions. 2017 (extracts). 
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in cases concerning national security. 
Levels of scrutiny have been found in the case-law of the US Supreme 
Court during Roosevelt’s “New Deal”.18 This era was connected with gov-
ernment intervention in various spheres of society. The US Supreme 
Court has pointed out some spheres where the scrutiny of governmental 
measures should be increased (for example, in the discrimination of vul-
nerable groups). The doctrine usually distinguishes three levels of 
scrutiny: a test of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict 
scrutiny.19 In other words, there is a  minimum, intermediate, and maxi-
mum intensity of judicial review. 
1. Maximum intensity of judicial review 
Maximum intensity of judicial review of regulatory measures has its 
source in the activist ideology of the courts. Such a kind of judicial review 
is used so that courts can scrutinize public policies chosen for security 
reasons. For example, in a landmark US case, decided in 1879 by The Cir-
cuit Court for the District of California, a so-called technique of smoking 
out of hidden legislative intent was used.20 Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan con-
cerned San Francisco regulations that allowed for the cutting of the hair 
of prisoners. Although a formal purpose of that regulation was sanitary 
security, the challenged rules were targeted only on immigrants from 
China. At that time Chinese men traditionally had to keep their hair long. 
The court holds the regulation unconstitutional and has smoked out de 
facto the discriminatory intent of San Francisco lawmakers trying to pre-
vent migration from China. 
Maximum intensity of judicial review is a rare technique for courts in Rus-
sia today. There are few cases in which the Constitutional Court used 
United States Supreme Court, decided April 25, 1938 “United States v. Carolene Products Co.”, 
In: United States Supreme Court Reports, 1938, vol. 304, p. 144. 
CHEMERYNSKI ERWIN, Constitutional law: principles and policies, New York: Aspen Publishers, 
2006, p. 477. 






purpose scrutiny. An example is the case of Avanov, which concerned the 
requirement for Russian citizens to apply for a travel passport only in 
place of their permanent residence but not in place of temporary resi-
dence.21 In the case of Russian citizen Avanov who has permanent resi-
dence in Tbilisi (Georgia), he tried to apply for travel passport in Moscow 
where he actually resided. The trial court rejecting the complaint of 
Avanov came to the absurd conclusion that Russian citizens should apply 
for travel passport outside of Russia, i.e. in the Republic of Georgia. The 
Constitutional Court had found that “the procedure of travel passport 
issuance only at a place of residence is discriminatory… Circumstances 
preventing a citizen’s exit from the Russian Federation are mainly exam-
ined by territorial internal affairs bodies at the citizen’s place of residence. 
It is determined only by the purpose of rationalizing their activities”. Con-
sequently, the Constitutional Court had recognized that the comfort of an 
administrative agency is an illegitimate aim for restricting constitutional 
rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights sometimes exercises scrutiny of the 
illegitimate aim of the Russian Government. In the Judgment from May, 19 
2004 «Gusinsky v. Russia» The Strasbourg Court found that criminal pro-
ceedings against Russian oligarch Gusinsky were a restriction of his right 
to liberty and were used for the illegitimate aim of the acquisition by a 
state-controlled corporation of the applicant’s private media company. As 
the European Court of Human Rights stated “it is not the purpose of such 
public-law matters as criminal proceedings and detention on remand to 
be used as part of commercial bargaining strategies … applicant’s prose-
cution was used to intimidate him”.22 It’s self-evident that scrutinizing the 
hidden intent of the public authorities required the independence of the 
court and judicial activism. 
<http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/1998 January 15 2-P.pdf> (In Eng-
lish). 




2. Minimum intensity of judicial review 
However, in the absolute majority of cases in The Constitutional Court of 
the Russian Federation, government bodies didn’t have any difficulty in 
the legal reasoning of the legitimacy of security policies. In particular in 
the Judgment of 19 April 2010 no. 8-P, concerning the abolition of the jury 
trial for persons accused of terrorism crimes, The Constitutional Court 
recognized the wide discretion of the legislative. The minimum intensity 
of the judicial review allowed security policies, despite the explicit textual 
basis in art.  20.1 of The Russian Constitution, to transform the possible 
participation of the jury in the cases of terrorists into a statutory right. In 
the view of The Constitutional Court the right to trial by a jury “is not one 
of the fundamental inalienable rights and belongs to everyone from birth 
… this right – unlike the right to an independent and impartial court or 
presumption of innocence is not included in the main scope (core) of the 
constitutional right of access to court”.23 
Another Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 28 June 2007 no. 8-P, 
concerning the legislative ban on returning to a family for burial a series 
of bodies killed during terrorist attacks, also showed considerable respect 
for the approaches of political organs to ensure national security.24 The 
Constitutional Court had stated that “…the interest in fighting terrorism, 
in preventing terrorism in general, in specific terms and in providing 
redress for the effects of terrorist acts, coupled with the risk of mass 
disorder, clashes between different ethnic groups and aggression by the 
next of kin of those involved in terrorist activity against the population 
at large and law-enforcement officials, and lastly the threat to human life 
and limb, may, in a given historical context, justify the establishment of 
a particular legal regime… Action to minimise the informational and psy-
Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation [Sobranie Zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federat-
sii] (SZ RF). 2010. no. 18. Item 2276 (in Russian). 




chological impact of the terrorist act on the population, including the 
weakening of its propaganda effect, is one of the means necessary to pro-
tect public security”. 
The concept of an enemy of the people who survived in public opinion 
since Stalin’s era seems to be decisive for the legislative stigmatization of 
NGOs which received financing from foreign governments or from inter-
national funds. The Constitutional Court in the Judgment of 8 April 2014 
no. 10-P agreed with the vague interpretation of the concept of political 
activity of groups, which, combined with its funding from foreign sources, 
leads to the special legal status of NGOs as a foreign agent. The Con-
stitutional Court held that “everyone’s right of association and freedom 
of activity of public associations are not absolute… realizing law-making 
powers belonging to him, the federal legislator must care about granting 
citizens maximum wide opportunities for use of the right of association 
and freedom of the activity of public associations guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of The Russian Federation and at the same time establish such 
rules that, not infringing upon its very essence, would make for attain-
ment, on the basis of the balance of private and public elements, of con-
stitutionally-significant goals, including the ensuring of public order and 
security”.25 
In this sense, security is no longer even a trump card, but rather a joker in 
a pack of playing cards. 
3. Factors of intensity of judicial review 
There are several factors that influence the intensity of judicial review. 
International tribunals sometimes list such factors. In the Judgment of 
26 May 1993, which dealt with emergency measures combating terrorism 
in Northern Ireland, it was stated that in exercising its supervision the 
European Court of Human Rights “must give appropriate weight to such 
relevant factors as the nature of the rights affected by the derogation, 
<http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/2014 April 8 10-P.pdf> (in English). 25 
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the circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the emergency situa-
tion” (para. 43).26 Hence, the intensity of judicial review over governmental 
actions will depend on the importance of the fundamental right con-
cerned, and the historical and temporal conditions of interference with 
this right. 
The factors that influence the intensity of judicial review can be found in 
case-law of national courts. In the decision of 22 February 2002, regard-
ing the measures taken to combat illegal migration, the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal pointed out such factors as: 1) greater deference is 
to be paid to an Act of Parliament than to a decision of the executive or 
subordinate measure; 2) unqualified rights due to their great importance 
require more scope for deference; 3) greater deference will be due to the 
democratic powers where the subject-matter at hand is within their con-
stitutional responsibility, and less when it lies more particularly within the 
constitutional responsibility of the courts; 4) greater or lesser deference 
depends on whether the subject-matter is within the expertise of political 
bodies (for example, macroeconomic policy) or courts (for example, the 
protection of human rights) (para. 83–87).27 Consequently, the intensity of 
judicial review depends on the branch of government that adopted the 
challenged instrument, the importance of the constitutional right con-
cerned, the assignment of the subject of the dispute to the prerogatives 
of a particular body, as well as the possibilities for expert assessment of 
the relevant facts. 
An example of a sliding scale in the intensity of a judicial review based 
on the difference in the subject-matter demonstrates the two cases of 
restricting the political rights of Russian citizens who have a stable rela-
tionship with foreign states. In the Decision of 4 December 2007 no. 
797-О-О, security reasons allowed The Constitutional Court to show def-
erence to the legislative deprivation of the electoral rights of Russian citi-
BRANNIGAN AND MCBRIDE v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, 26.05.1993 – 258-B. 
International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 




zen Kara-Murza, who is also a citizen of the United Kingdom.28 In a similar 
case, the unconstitutionality of the legislative restriction of participation 
in the work of election commissions to a citizen Malitsky, who had a res-
idence permit in Lithuania, was recognized. In the Judgment of 22 June 
2010 no. 14-P The Constitutional Court had emphasized the fact that ” the 
existence of a residence permit does not lead to the granting for its holder 
of the political rights of a citizen of a foreign state… Although even grant-
ing those persons a certain scope of political rights does not at all mean 
the inevitable change of their status in relation to the country of their cit-
izenship”.29 
V. Conclusions 
In summation, taking into account the above-mentioned case-law and the 
analysis of the decisions of The Constitutional Court of the Russian Fed-
eration, the following factors regarding the intensity of judicial review 
can be defined: ad hoc balancing between rights and security in historical 
and social contexts; the status of the decision-maker restricting consti-
tutional rights and its place in the separation of powers; the importance 
of the right in the hierarchy of constitutional values; the subject-matter 
of the dispute, including its attribution to the pure political or justiciable 
questions; the need for budget funding; fact-finding and burden of proof; 
decision-making in good faith, including the fair procedures and the qual-
ity of the reasoning. 
SZRF. 2007. No. 52. Item. 6533. (In Russian). 
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I. Introduction 
Cyber technologies have already changed our lives drastically. Nearly 
every area of social relations is currently being digitalized. We currently 
discuss not only Internet law, but also a digital economy, electronic gov-
ernance, electronic arbitration or justice, digital university etc. Changes 
are so drastic that they may be compared with the transfer from agrarian 
natural households to industrial systems of social relations. It is apparent 
that all of these changes are influencing the status of individuals a lot as 
well as affecting their rights in different areas. 
Cyber technologies, networks, and operations have all developed sub-
stantially in their current state. Individuals spend so much time online 
that it has already became common to speak about a cyber space,1 cyber-
threats and cyber-security. 
KULESZA, International Internet Law, Routledge, 2012, pp. 1–29. 1 
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In cyber space individuals or a groups of individuals may be very influen-
tial and very effective as concerns their impact to other individuals, legal 
persons, states or international organizations. This assessment becomes 
all the more logical in view of the recognized possibility also by a group of 
experts on the developments in the sphere of information and telecom-
munications (А/70/174 of 22.07.2015) and that the use of cyber means also 
by private persons may constitute a threat to the international peace and 
security (para. 3).2 
This process however, is not one-sided. Fundamental human rights 
including the right to life are also often infringed by activity in the cyber-
sphere. As a result protection of human rights in the cyber age has already 
been repeatedly considered at the UN level, in particular, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression and the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while coun-
tering terrorism.3 This issue, however, is hardly considered in Interna-
tional legal doctrine, but deserves the highest attention. 
II. Cybersecurity: Notion and Threats 
As mentioned above, the use of cyber means also by private persons may 
constitute a threat to international peace and security. Cyber security as 
well as activity constituting a threat to international peace and security 
have been repeatedly considered by the UN organs as well as by regional 
Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommu-
nications in the Context of International Security А/70/174 of 22.07.2015 <https://undocs.org/
en/a/70/174>. 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression A/HRC/35/22 of 6–23.06.2017. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/077/46/PDF/G1707746.pdf?OpenElement>; Report of the Special 
Rapporteur to the General Assembly on the temporary challenges to freedom of expression А/
71/373 of 6.09.2016 <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/373>; Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 





organizations. Every regional organization involved in the maintenance 
of international peace and security (NATO,4 CSTO,5 CIS,6 EU7) as well as 
states8 develop and adopt legal regulation in the sphere. 
Threats in the sphere of cyber security are formed by and conditioned 
by the following factors: IT forms/influences all aspects of contemporary 
life (as concerns individuals it affects civil, political, economic, social, cul-
tural rights, collective rights as well as new human rights that appear with 
The Internet); legal regulation in the sphere is either absent or insuffi-
cient, existing regulation of offline relations cannot always be applied to 
the online sphere; IT may currently be used in a way which prospectively 
threatens international peace and security, including the activity of pri-
vate individuals; fundamental human rights are changing in the cyber age; 
new rights are emerging; there is still a problem of limitation of existing 
rights, when exercised online; development of technologies do not always 
provide for the possibility of precise identification; attribution of activity 
of private individuals to states is also problematic. 
Cyber security is a multidimensional notion. It may include security of 
states v. cyber threats, security of IT infrastructure, security of critical 
Brussels Declaration on Transatlantic Security and Solidarity of 11.07.2018 
<https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180713_PR-
CP_2018_094-eng.pdf>. 
Declaration of the CSTO Council of Collective Security of 8.11.2018 <https://odkb-csto.org/
documents/statements/deklaratsiya-soveta/?sphrase_id=60995>. 
Concept of Cyber Security in Military Area of the CIS Member-States of 4.06.1999 
<http://www.e-cis.info/page.php?id=21396>. 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. Brus-
sels, 7.2.2013 <https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cyb-
sec_comm_en.pdf>. 
Concept of National Security of Belarus of 9.11.2010, views as a threat to national security «ille-
gal acts against individuals, expression […] of religious, ethnic extremism and racial hatered on 
the territory of Belarus» (para. 27), «development of tecnologies of information manipulation» 
(para. 42) and other activity against cyber infrastructure or involving dissemination of informa-
tion (para. 27, 34, 42) <http://www.pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=P31000575>; Concept 








infrastructure, security of information, including classified information, 
financial security, security of personal information, security of individu-
als.9 
International legal documents as well as state legislation are usually 
pretty silent on the security of individuals in the IT area. Concept of 
cyber-security of Belarus of 2019 provides a rare exception on this point, 
providing at least some regulation on humanitarian aspects of cyber secu-
rity (the right to access to information, freedom of conscience, the right 
to privacy, and the functioning of mass-media, para. 9–11). 
At the same time the number of human rights, including the profound 
human right the right to life, are infringed by activity that is threatening 
or is aimed at the maintenance of cyber security of states, on the first 
hand in the use of cyber-attacks as an armed attack, means or as methods 
of warfare. 
Agreement between member states of the ShCO on cooperation in the maintenance of inter-
national information security of 11.06.2009, Art. 2, Addenda 1, <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/
902289626>; Draft agreement of the CIS Member-States in the Sphere of Maintenance of 
Cyber Security, 2010, Art. 2 (not in force), <http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/
online.cgi?req=doc&base=EXP&n=532471&dst=100007#024307600430289777>; Cyber Defense 
Pledge of 08 Jul. 2016 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/offi-
cial_texts_133177.htm?selectedLocale=en>; Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union 
(footnote 7), pp. 2-3. 
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III. Cyber-Attack in the Law of International 
Security 
1. Cyber-attack as an armed attack /part of the 
armed attack 
It is frequently discussed in the international legal doctrine whether 
cyber-attacks can be qualified as an armed attack or as a part of it. It is 
generally recognized that any military conflict results in the violation of 
the right to life as cited by the HRC in the GC No 14 (para. 2).10 It may also 
be concluded that there results an emergence of an internal conflict due 
to the civilian disturbances as well as to any other internal disorder. All 
these facts and events are qualified as the threat or breach of the interna-
tional peace and security by the UN Security Council (resolutions 161(1961) 
of 21.02.19614; 775(1992) of 28.08.1992; 929(1994) of 22.06.1994; 940(1994) of 
31.07.1994 etc.). 
As soon as a cyber-attack is qualified as an armed attack, the attacked 
state in accordance with art. 51 of the UN Charter is entitled to self-
defense with the use of any conventional or any other means limited only 
by criteria of necessity and proportionality,11 and the full-scale interna-
tional military conflict appears. It is necessary thus to be very careful in 
this regard. 
To qualify a cyber-attack as an armed attack, it shall correspond to all cri-
teria listed hereafter. To be qualified as an armed attack a cyber-attack 
shall reach a level that endangers the very existence of a state,12 causing 
General Comment No. 14, HRC, 1984 <https://undocs.org/HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9(Vol.I)>. 
ROSCINI, World Wide Warfare – Jus ad bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, Max Plank Yearbook 
on the United Nations Law 2010, Vol. 14, p.119. 
WOLTAG, Cyber warfare, MPEPIL http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e280?rskey=eCCfoY&result=7&prd=EPIL&print; Dinstein 
Y. War, Aggression and Self-Defence. 3rd. edition, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 175–176; Frowein J.A., 
Legal Consequences for International Law Enforcement in the Case of Security Council Inac-
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the loss of human lives, destruction or damaging of property including 
critical infrastructure,13 or loss of the part of the territory.14 It is main-
tained in the legal doctrine that there shall also be a causal link between a 
cyber-attack and negative consequences and that consequences shall be 
immediate (seconds or minutes between the attack and its results).15 
Apparently the most dangerous types of cyber-attacks are so called 
“attacks over critical infrastructure” these are attacks over dams, nuclear 
electricity stations, interception of air defense system control,16 attacks 
over arms control systems, bank accounts and operations, gas and oil 
pipelines, electricity lines, and other critical infrastructure. Sometimes 
attacks over bank and taxation systems (Estonia), governmental servers 
and computer networks (Georgia, 2008), South Korea and the USA 
(2009)17 are also qualified by specific authors as such. It is believed here 
however that computers as well as computer networks and infrastructure 
are usually viewed as means for rather than as targets of the attack 
(exempting kinetic attacks over computer networks, espionage and dis-
tribution of propaganda online18,19) and cannot by themselves be qualified 
as an armed attack. 
When we speak about human rights dimension, it shall be taken into 
account that rights of individuals are infringed not only in the course of 
armed attack but by a broader number of acts committed with the use of 
SCHMIDT, “Attack” as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context in C. 
Czosseck, R. Ottis, K. Ziolkowski ed. 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, pp. 
287-288; Roscini (footnote 11), pp. 106-107. 
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cyber means. Any sort of attack over critical infrastructure which results 
in the loss of life constitutes a clear breach of the right to life also in the 
absence of the state of war. 
Attacks over cyber infrastructure, bank system etc. may result in the vio-
lation of economic and social rights. Any cyber-attack over critical infra-
structure resulting in the loss or damage to property is also infringing 
economic and property rights. Therefore, activity in cyber area may con-
stitute a threat to the security of the state (military, political or economic) 
and simultaneously infringe civil or economic rights of individuals. 
It is not the purpose of this article to explore in detail the very nature of 
state obligation to guarantee the scope of state responsibility to protect 
human rights also in the online era, it is believed here however that states 
are supposed to exercise due diligence and to take all necessary means to 
guarantee that their territory as well as cyber infrastructure at its terri-
tory are not used for activity which may undermine the security of other 
states as well as the human rights of individuals of this state or its own 
citizens. 
2. Cyber-attack as the means of warfare 
Another part of the problem is the use of cyber means in the course of 
military conflicts of both an international and a non-international char-
acter. International humanitarian law does not set the exhaustive list of 
the means and methods of warfare (Additional protocol I, art. 36.20) As it 
has already been shown above, cyber-attack over critical infrastructure 
may result in the loss of lives as well as in the destruction of property and 
therefore may be qualified as the means and method of warfare. 
Moreover in the contemporary world communication systems and infra-
structure gain strategic importance in the course of military conflict. The 
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection 




opinion is increasingly maintained such that they lose the status of civil-
ian objects and turn them into military ones, and therefore become legit-
imate targets in the course of military conflict [21, п. 14–16]. Attacks over 
these objects will result in the loss of life of civilian populations as long as 
employees of ITC infrastructure are not combatants. Military operations 
endanger the rights of this group of civilians more than the traditional 
hardships of war. 
Humanitarian concerns shall also be considered when looking at the 
objects of cyber-attacks. As mentioned above, cyber-attacks are primarily 
aimed at the critical infrastructure. However, attacks over the over-
whelming majority of this infrastructure will cause non-selective damage; 
some of them may also be qualified as “works and installations containing 
dangerous forces” in accordance with Art. 56(1) of Additional Protocol 
I (dams, dukes and nuclear electrical generating stations etc.), “which 
shall not be objects of attack even if these objects are military objectives, if 
such an attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequently 
severe losses among the civilian population”. Therefore cyber-attacks over 
these objects are strictly prohibited by international law and if they hap-
pen will constitute “grave breaches” of international humanitarian law in 
accordance with art. 85 of the Additional protocol I 1977 and are a clear 
violation of the right to life. 
The same situation exists for the use of autonomous systems in the 
course of military conflicts, in particular drones and robots, both individ-
ually or by swarms. Military assessment of the possibility of discloses the 
possibility to kill a substantial quantity of combatants (in the best case). 
International humanitarian law however, seeks to decrease the level of 
human suffering and the loss of life. Therefore military operations are to 
seek to disable combatants of the adversary, rather than precisely to kill 
him. Moreover, the use of autonomous systems does not preclude the 
possibility of mistaken identity when targeting specific individuals. 
WOLTAG (footnote 12). 21 
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Moreover, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights while countering 
terrorism in its report 34/61 of 21.02.2017 extensively criticizes an emerg-
ing practice to use drones for targeted killings of terrorist leaders when it 
happens outside the commission of the specific terrorist act. I would like 
to add here the opinion that this activity constitutes a clear violation of 
the right to life of the targeted person as well as people, which may hap-
pen to be nearby; no procedural guarantees are observed (ICCPR, art. 14) 
and the presumption of innocence (ICCPR, art. 14(2)) is also violated. In 
practice the use of drones for targeted killing in the considered situation 
could be qualified as the death penalty exercised without any guarantees, 
that is a clear violation of the international legal standards also as con-
cerns the commission of international crimes including war crimes (art. 3 
common for all Geneva conventions 1949, Additional protocol I, art 75(4)). 
It shall also be noted that in the absence of proper regulation and in a view 
of repeated violations the UN General Assembly calls on states to observe 
procedural guarantees as well as other Human rights and IHL norms also 
while countering international terrorism (resolution 68/178 of 18.12.2013, 
para. 6, 17; HRC resolution 35/34, para. 8 – 9, 11; UN SC resolution 2178 
(2014) of 24.09.2014, preamble). It can thus be concluded that the use of 
autonomous systems for targeted killings constitutes a clear violation of 
the rights to life (see also Additional protocol I 1977, Art 75(2a(i))). 
3. Cyber-attack as the method of warfare 
It is also believed here that IT could be qualified as a method of warfare. 
In this case cyber means are used as a means to transfer information eas-
ily to apply psychological pressure over populations and combatants22 by 
cutting off internet access, distribution of hostile information or propa-
ganda, incitement of racial, religious, social hatred, acts of terrorism.23 
Decision of the International Rwanda Tribunal (Case No. ICTR-99-52-A) 
CHAINOGLOU, Psychological warfare, MPEPIL, <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e385?rskey=CEUI1l&result=15&prd=EPIL>, para. 3. 





may be cited as a good example of such a case. Founders of the TV and 
radio companies as well as editor-in-chief of the newspaper Kangura have 
been recognized as guilty for “instigated genocide through matters pub-
lished” or ‘clearly and effectively disseminated through RTLM and Kan-
gura”,24 which resulted in mass killings with the “intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group”.25 
It shall also be considered that the distribution of this specific information 
is by itself considered to be a grave violation of international humanitarian 
law. In particular, Additional Protocol I in art. 40 clearly prohibits to 
threaten an adversary “to an order that there shall be no survivors”. 
These sorts of activities enhance the intensity of the conflict, constitute 
a violation of international humanitarian law as well as a number of rights 
in the human rights law. 
IV. Cyber-Attack and State Security in the 
Peace-Time 
When one speaks about peace-time the use of cyber means may still 
threaten security and stability of the state and constitute a violation 
of human rights. Besides the attacks over critical infrastructure, which 
infringe political and economic security of the state, it is necessary to 
assess the influence of the transferal of information over the security of 
states and individuals. Special attention shall be paid in this regard to the 
right to privacy (ICCPR, Art. 17) and to the freedom of opinion and expres-
sion (ICCPR, art. 19, 20). 
SCORDAS, Mass media? Influence at international relations, MPEPIL, <http://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/
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Apparently due to the easiness of distribution of any sorts of information 
via the Internet, the high level of anonymity, attribution problems as well 
as an insufficient level of legal regulation, the treatment of information 
and consequently the legal regime of the freedom to hold opinions and 
expression needs special regulation in the cyber world without changing 
the system as such. It is thus necessary to adapt the rules to provide the 
possibility to “apply online the same rules as are applied offline”. 
It is repeatedly noted that abuses of freedom of expression (in particular, 
distribution of hostile propaganda, incitement of overthrow of govern-
ments, racial, national, religious or other hatred, involvement into terror-
ist activity26) may have resulted in really serious negative consequences, 
including civilian disturbances and the emergence of hostilities. 
Theoretically the situation is rather clear from the legal standpoint. In 
accordance with article 20 of the ICCPR, “any propaganda for war, as well 
as any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by 
law”. Article 19 (3) provides for the possibility to impose under certain 
conditions restrictions necessary “for respect of the rights or reputations 
of others; For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals”. The same approach was taken 
by the CCPR in General comments No 3427 (see also report 66/290 of 
10.08.2011, para. 24–30, 46.28) In General comments 11 the CCPR insisted 
that the introduction of any restrictions imposed by law in accordance 
with art. 19, 20 of the ICCPR “are fully compatible with the right of free-
dom of expression”. The CCPR insists on the existence of the obligation 
for states to «adopt the necessary legislative measures” prohibiting activ-
de BRANBANDERE (footnote 23). 
General comment 34, Article 19, Freedom of opinion and expression CCPR /C/GC/34. 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf>. 
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ity referred to in art. 20.29 Constitution of International Telecommuni-
cation Union provide for the possibility to stop “the transmission of any 
private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of the State 
or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency” (art. 34).30 Genocide 
convention 1948 imposes obligation over states to criminalize “direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide” (art. 3).31 
At the same time the UN Special Rapporteur on the freedom of opinion 
and expression (hereafter, Special Rapporteur) points out that instances 
of incitement of hatred take place in all regions of the world (report 67/
357 of 7.09.2012, para. 24–29.32 It is not also possible to interpret limita-
tions too broadly or arbitrarily because it will result in the violation of the 
of the freedom of opinion and expression. 
Therefore, states face an uneasy dilemma. From one side they are obliged 
to take all necessary measures to protect individuals within their territory 
against threats and challenges (involvement in terrorist or extremist 
activity encouragement of suicides, racial incitement, social and other 
sorts of hatred, commission of crimes via internet etc.). Any of these acts 
infringe security and the rights of individuals and therefore undermine 
the security of the state. On the other hand states shall impose limitations 
bona fidae to avoid violation of the freedom of opinion and expression, 
and right to privacy. 
V. Conclusion 
The contemporary world is characterized by the use of cyber technolo-
gies in all areas of public life and also in international relations. 
General comment No. 11:  Article 20. <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treaty-
bodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT/CCPR/GEC/4720&Lang=en>. 
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the freedom of opinion and expression 67/357 of 
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The activity of states and individuals in the cyber area may constitute a 
threat to international peace and security and under certain conditions 
may even reach the level of an armed attack that will result in the full-
scale international military conflict that undoubtedly will constitute the 
enormous violation of the right to life. It is very important thus to be very 
careful when qualifying cyber-attacks as armed attacks. Cyber-attacks 
may only be qualified as the latter if all criteria of an armed attack are 
observed. 
Cyber-attacks over critical infrastructure in peace-time may cause a 
severe threat to the military, political and economic security of the state 
and simultaneously may violate a broad scope of civil and economic rights 
of its inhabitants. 
Use of cyber means as the means of warfare could only be allowed under 
very strict limitations. The use of autonomous drones and robots for tar-
geted killing constitutes a clear violation of the right to life regardless of 
them being specifically targeted or applied as a swarm in a non-selective 
way. Attacks over critical infrastructure shall not include such types of 
critical infrastructure as installations containing dangerous forces. These 
attacks if they happen will constitute a grave violation of international 
humanitarian law. Active use of cyber infrastructure for military purposes 
turns it into legitimate military goals that will endanger the lives of civil-
ians working there. 
In the peacetime cyber-attacks over critical infrastructure may also con-
stitute a threat to the political or economic security of states. When one 
speaks about the transfer of information via The Internet, it may only be 
stated that the balance between the obligation of states to exercise due 
diligence to guarantee security of individuals as well as their rights on one 
hand and freedom of opinion and expression and the right to privacy on 
the other, is not found yet. The exercising of the freedom of expression 
shall not override the limitations of art. 19 and 20 of the ICCPR. Simul-
taneously human rights shall not be arbitrary and unnecessarily limited 
under the slogan of being for the common good. 
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I. Introduction 
Five years have passed since the Russian Federation annexed the Crimea. 
The annexation of the Crimea by the Kremlin turned out to be the most 
serious breach of European borders since the Second World War. Russia 
violated the fundamental principles of international law, its international 
obligations and bilateral agreements with Ukraine. The annexation has 
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sharply increased instability of the European security environment, cre-
ated new dividing lines and greatly enhanced the risk of the destruction 
of the existing world order. A proper understanding of how the annexa-
tion of the Crimea affected Europe’s policy and shaped its response can 
provide essential insights to measure the effectiveness of its approach to 
ensuring the European security. 
The following paper will assess how the annexation of the Crimea affected 
the EU and its member-states policy. By taking an interdisciplinary and 
critical look at the impact the annexation of the Crimea made on Europe, 
the paper aims to provide answers to the following questions: 
1) How coherent and effective is the non-recognition and sanction-based 
policy of the EU? 
2) How has the annexation of the Crimea impacted the narrative and 
political decisions in security field adopted by Russia understanders and 
Russia opponents among the EU member states? 
3) How do the EU response and the EU member states’ position con-
tribute to the European security? 
At the end of the paper particular recommendations on how to ensure 
Europe’s own political, energetic and informational security are pre-
sented. 
II. The Annexation of the Crimea: Background and 
Implications 
The strategic importance of the Crimean peninsula was realized thou-
sands of years ago. Its geopolitical location almost in the centre of the 
Black Sea between the Caucasus and Southern Europe as well as the 
wealth of natural resources makes its strategically important. A signifi-
cant portion of Russia’s navy stationed in Sevastopol and the ethnic diver-
sity of the Crimea with the largest population of ethnic Russians within 
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Ukraine and a strong Muslim minority of the Crimean Tatars turned it 
into the most sensitive issue in Ukraine-Russia relations which could eas-
ily explode. 
At different times the Crimea was owned by the Tauris, Cimmerians, 
Greeks, Scythians, Romans, Huns, Goths, Bulgarians, Tatars, Slavs and 
other peoples. Its history as part of the Russian Empire started in 1783 
when Catherine the Great annexed it from the Ottoman Empire. In 1921, 
the Crimea became the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 
part of the Soviet Union. Thirty-three years later, in 1954, Nikita 
Khrushchev transferred the Crimea to Ukraine in a move hailed as a 
“noble act on behalf of the Russian people. When Ukraine held a referen-
dum in December 1991, 54 % of the Crimean residents favoured the inde-
pendence from the Soviet Union. It was a majority, but the lowest one 
found in Ukraine. Thus the Crimea became part of independent Ukraine 
with significant autonomy including its own constitution and parliament. 
In 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed a bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Coop-
eration and Partnership, which formally allowed Russia to keep its Black 
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. From 1997 to 2014, the sitation in the Crimea was 
considered under control. 
However, the second decade of the XXI century has marked a shift in 
Russian military mindset. A refusal to accept Western dominance along-
side with a more active form of resistance has been deeply embedded in a 
new doctrine articulated by Chief of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasi-
mov in his article “The Value of Science is in the Foresight”.  Based on 
the lessons of the Georgia conflict, he described a framework of the new 
operational concept as the role of “Non-Military Methods in the Reso-
lution of Interstate Conflicts”.1 According to V. Gerasimov, Russia heavily 
relies on proxy forces, both paramilitary and cyber, supported by media 
institutions and companies, Spetsnaz and Cossack fighters to conduct 
different types of operations, like unconventional, information, psycho-
GERASIMOV VALERY, The value of Science is in the Foresight, Военно-Промышленный Курьер 
of 26 February 2013 <www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>. 
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logical  and cyber operations, as well as security forces assistance and 
strategic communication. Due to the fact that the proxy forces consist of 
a mixture of Russians and ethnic Russians abroad, Russia not only exploits 
social conditions, but also cultural and linguistic factors in former Soviet 
states and at home to create proxy forces.2 The open use of forces often 
under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation is resorted to only 
at a certain phase, primarily for the achievement of final success in the 
conflict. Altogether, the new generation warfare concept by V. Gerasimov 
has six phases which proved to be a successful approach in taking over 
the Crimea from Ukraine. 
Main part in the Russian operation was the media campaign to gain sup-
port in the Crimea and Russia and to isolate the government of Ukraine. 
Television and the Internet were the dominant news media in Ukraine. 
The Russian information campaign started with the comparison of the 
Ukrainian government and their Western allies to Nazis, gays, Jews and 
other groups of people that Russia claimed were part of the conspiracy.3 
Russia showed swastikas on billboards and in the media to compare the 
government to Nazi Germany. Russian media used past events to empha-
size how aggressive NATO and the West were and how these powers vio-
lated agreements on NATO expansion restrictions into Eastern Europe. 
The annexation of the Crimea has serious implications for Ukraine and 
Europe in all areas. In the economic area, the annexation of the Crimea 
and further Russia’s military actions in Donbas led to the displacement of 
1.5 million registered Ukrainians, who have become a challenge not only 
for Ukrainian economy but also for the neighbouring EU member-states. 
In the energetic area, the annexation of the Crimea led to the break-
down of energetic ties between Ukraine and Russia which might pose a 
SELHORST TONY, Russia's Perception Warfare, Militaire Spectator of 22 April 2016. 
<https://www.militairespectator.nl/thema/strategie-operaties/artikel/russias-perception-
warfare>. 
YUHAS ALAN, Russian Propaganda over the Crimea and the Ukraine: How Does it Work?, The 





challenge to the energy security of the other European states benefitting 
from transit routes via Ukraine’s and their territory. In the military area, 
Russia can now block the Black Sea Straits in the South-West strategic 
direction, using forces located on the Crimean peninsula. In the geopo-
litical area, the annexation of the Crimea demonstrated that European 
states security might be also challenged by Russia. Although the Crimean 
scenario is unlikely to be repeated in other European countries, Russia’s 
efforts to interfere in their internal affairs (especially in those countries 
which either have Russian-speaking population or common energetic and 
economic interests) via disinformation campaigns with the purpose to 
destabilize the situation and challenge the unity of the EU will be more 
unwearying. That actualizes the search for a proper response of the EU to 
the Kremlin’s actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity. 
III. The EU’s Response to the Annexation of the 
Crimea 
1. EU Non-recognition policy 
The EU has demonstrated its strong commitment to support Ukraine 
since 2014. The EU conclusions, high-level statements and declarations 
have been used to address actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 
human rights violations and the infringement of navigational rights in 
Ukraine’s territorial waters. 
The situation in the Crimea was first addressed by the EU during the 
extraordinary meeting of the EU Heads of State on 6March, 2014. In the 
joint statement, the EU leaders condemned Russia’s unprovoked violation 
of the Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and called on Russia 
to immediately withdraw its armed forces and allow immediate access for 
international monitors.4 




The violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity has 
become the key message in the numerous EU conclusions, high-level 
statements and declarations especially when the attention of the inter-
national community shifted from the Crimea to Eastern Ukraine. How-
ever, since the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine, the EU has been rather 
vocal in its support of any negotiating format in regard to the conflict in 
Donbas, whereas the issue of the Crimea remains non-negotiable. In this 
regard there are serious doubts as to the consistency of the EU’s posi-
tion towards the annexed peninsula as “the EU insists on dividing the two 
issues, Donbas and the Crimea” and omitting “the Crimean case from the 
current discussions”.5 
The human rights violations have also been a topic of consistently keen 
interest. Since the Russian attack against the Crimea, the European Par-
liament has paid close attention to the situation of the Crimean Tatars. 
Meanwhile, the European Parliament resolutions adopted in 2014 only 
vaguely addressed the human rights-related activities. The rapidly devel-
oping territorial conflict overshadowed other concerns. Five years on 
from the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, the High Represen-
tative Federica Mogherini on behalf of the EU adopted the Declaration 
on the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol 17 
March 2019 which states that the human rights situation in the Crimean 
peninsula has significantly deteriorated. Residents of the peninsula face 
systematic restrictions of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of 
expression, religion or belief and association and the right to peaceful 
assembly. The Declaration also confirms the grave violations of rights of 
the the Crimean Tatars through the shutting down of the Crimean Tatar 
media outlets, the banning of the activities of the Mejlis, their self-gov-
erning body, and the persecution of its leaders and members of their 
IVASHCHENKO-STADNIK KATERYNA, PETROV ROMAN, RIEKER PERNILLE, RUSSO ALESSANDRA. Implemen-





community.6 Unfortunately, the Declaration contains nothing but the EU 
expectations that Russia will reverse its decisions and end the pressure 
on the Crimean Tatar community. 
The infringement of navigational rights in Ukraine’s territorial waters has 
also appeared to one of the topics in the declarations and resolutions ini-
tiated by the EU. On 24 October 2018, the European Parliament adopted 
the Resolution which expressed its very serious concern about the very 
volatile security situation in the Sea of Azov and condemned the excessive 
stopping and inspection of commercial vessels, including both Ukrainian 
ships and those with flags of third-party states.7 The resolution had no 
effect on further Russia actions in the Sea of Azov and did not stop Krem-
lin from using of force a month later when Russian forces fired on and 
seized two Ukrainian gunboats and one tug after the Ukrainian vessels 
tried to pass under the Kerch Strait Bridge. 
In December 2018, following the events of 25 November, the European 
Parliament adopted the resolution on the implementation of the EU Asso-
ciation Agreement with Ukraine. It strongly condemned the deliberate act 
of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine on 25 November 
2018 in the Kerch Strait and called on the EU and its Member States to 
close access to EU ports for Russian ships coming from the Sea of Azov 
if Russia did not re-establish freedom of navigation through the Kerch 
Strait and in the Sea of Azov.8 
Declaration by the High Representative Federica Mogherini on behalf of the EU on the 




European Parliament resolution {2018/2870(RSP)) on the situation in the Sea of Azov of 24 
October 2018, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/
RC-8-2018-0493_EN.html>. 
European Parliament resolution (2017/2283(INI)) on the implementation of the EU Association 






On 17 June 2019, the Council adopted the Conclusions on the Black Sea 
confirming again that the EU policy decisions and its non-recognition 
policy on the illegal annexation of the Crimea are fundamental to the EU’s 
approach to regional cooperation in the Black Sea area.9 However, the 
document remains silent on what exactly the EU is willing to do about 
Russia’s unlawful actions in the Kerch Strait. 
2. EU Sanctions Policy 
The non-recognition policy is rather seldom introduced in isolation from 
other foreign policy instruments such as restrictive measures. Since 
March 2014, the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures 
against Russia in response to the annexation of the Crimea. The first set 
of restrictive measures was imposed against 21 Russian and Ukrainian 
officials responsible for actions threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity. 
The same year the EU adopted a package of targeted economic sanctions 
which included a ban on imports of goods originating in the Crimea 
or Sevastopol unless they have Ukrainian certificates; a prohibition to 
invest in the Crimea, a ban to buy real estate or entities in the Crimea, 
finance the Crimean companies or supply related services, a ban to invest 
in infrastructure projects in the following sectors: transport; telecom-
munications; energy, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral 
resources; a ban on providing tourism services in the Crimea; a ban on 
exporting transport, telecommunications and resources to the Crimea; a 
ban on providing technical assistance, brokering, construction or engi-
neering services related to infrastructure in the Crimea. 
In late November 2018, a new Crimean crisis challenged the international 
community. Russian coast guard ships opened fire on a group of vessels 
of the Ukrainian Navy in international waters as they were leaving the 




Kerch Strait.10 However, it took the EU almost 4 months to renew sanc-
tions over actions on 15 March 2019 to add eight Russian officials to the 
list of those subject to restrictive measures in respect of actions under-
mining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and indepen-
dence of Ukraine.11 On 20 June 2019, Council prolonged the restrictive 
measures introduced in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimea 
and Sevastopol by Russia until 23 June 2020. 
However, there are particular weak spots in the sanctions regime. The 
EU is not expected to only condemn the party of the conflict but rather 
demonstrate how much pain can be tolerated. According to Paul 
Kalinichenko, the EU sanctions in response to the actions threatening 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and Russia’s countersanctions have frozen 
negotiations and consequently have not achieved anything.12 The sanc-
tions have neither stopped the annexation nor restrained Russia from 
taking further aggressive steps. 
Besides, tighter implementation is required. In 2015 and 2016, Siemens 
sold gas turbines to Russia, four of which were later installed in Russia-
annexed the Crimea. In May 2018, the construction of Nord Stream 2, 
which will deliver gas to Europe from northern Russia’s Yamal Peninsula, 
started. Vessels from several EU member states have repeatedly infringed 
the sanctions by docking in the Crimean ports. The sanctions remain 
rather soft and thus fail to destroy the relations between the EU and Rus-
sia in such areas as energy, investments and manufactured goods trade. 
Ukraine urges EU to impose new sanctions on Russia over attack near Kerch Strait, UNIAN of 
26 November 2018,  <https://www.unian.info/politics/10351809-ukraine-urges-eu-to-
impose-new-sanctions-on-russia-over-attack-near-kerch-strait.html>. 
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Last but not least, most sanctions have been imposed in regard to such 
violations of international law as actions against Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity, although breaches of human rights have been present so far. 
The EU addresses human rights violations by adopting particular conclu-
sions and declarations rather than deploying restrictive measures. Hope-
fully, after the adoption of the EU Global Human Rights Act further 
sanctions in response to human rights violations in the Crimea will be 
considered. 
IV. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the 
EU Member States 
There is a clear gap in geopolitical orientations and political dynamics 
between those member-states that do see the security threat from 
annexation of the Crimea, and those who put greater weight in the role 
of Russia as a security provider or economic partner. However, there is 
still no consent among experts on the composition of both camps (Russia 
accusers and Russia understanders). 
According to Andrey Makarychev and Stefano Braghiroli,13 there are four 
groups of “Russia understanders” in Europe. The first group is pragmatic; 
mostly its members dominate in Germany, France, Italy, and Finland. 
Members of this group are associated with the economic and political 
interests of businesses seeking new opportunities in Russian markets. 
The second group includes those that have a political identity, largely 
based on ethnic and / or civilizational affinity with Russia. They are most 
common in places like Latvia and Estonia, as well as Bulgaria and Greece. 
The third group includes some leftist, neo-Marxist and communist par-
ties in Western Europe, such as the left party in Germany and the Ital-
ian and French communists. They view the struggle between Russia and 
the West as one of two competing hegemonies. They tend to give prefer-
BRAGHIROLI STEFANO, MAKARYCHEV ANDREY, “Russia and its supporters in Europe: a trans-ideol-
ogy a-la-carte?” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Volume 16, Issue 2, March 2016. 
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ence to the Crimean citizens in their alleged fight against “fascism”. The 
fourth group includes the far-right parties, such as the National Front 
in France, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Jobbik in Hungary, Attaka in Bul-
garia, the National Democratic Party in Germany, the Northern League 
and Forza Nuova in Italy, the Freedom Party in Austria, the Golden Dawn 
in Greece and the British National Party. 
According to the Kremlin Watch Report 2017,14 there are three states that 
act Kremlin-friendly (Greece, Italy, Cyprus) and two governments that 
are using the Russian card for domestic reasons (Slovakia, Hungary). The 
authors of the report also specifies the group of 14 countries clearly con-
cerned with Russian aggression but at the same time missing a leader 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, United Kingdom, Denmark Finland, 
Sweden, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Germany, Croatia, Romania, Bul-
garia) . 
The present study will focus on evaluating public statements and actions 
taken by Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Visegrad Group and Baltic States 
with the aim to assess the impact of annexation of the Crimea on their 
security policies and the level of their alignment with the official Brussels 
course. 
1. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the 
Security Policy of Germany 
The official rhetoric of Berlin so far has been critical towards Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine. White Paper on German Security Policy and the 
Future of the Bundeswehr (2016) stresses that Russia is openly calling 
the European peace order into question with its willingness to use force 
to advance its own interests and to unilaterally redraw borders guaran-
teed under international law, as it has done in the Crimea. This has far-
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reaching implications for security in Europe and thus for the security of 
Germany.15 Besides, Germany has been engaged in mediation efforts in 
cooperation with France over the situation in Ukraine. No less impor-
tantly, Germany has taken a leading role in implementing the EU sanc-
tions against Russia. 
However, the implications of Russia’s unlawful actions against Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity for Germany’s security (and also European one) should 
be mainly assessed in the energy area. Russia is Germany’s largest energy 
supplier. Germany imports nearly 40% of its natural gas from Russia and 
around a third of its oil and coal as well. Since September 2015 when Rus-
sia, Germany and a consortium of Western companies signed an agree-
ment for the implementation of Nord Stream 2 project, it has turned into 
a sensitive issue as, on the one hand, it meets EU need in diversification 
of its routes but, on the other one, weakens the position of such transit 
countries as Ukraine, Poland and Slovakia. The German government has 
repeatedly claimed that the project should not be politicized. According 
to German government spokeswoman Ulrike Demmer, Nord Stream-2 is a 
commercial project.16 However, to regard Nord Stream 2 as a commercial 
project would be to ignore its repercussions. It is obvious, that while con-
struction is a matter for Gazprom and its European partners, it is up to 
Germany and the EU to address the repercussions which might be quite 
serious not only for Berlin’s future energy security but also other Euro-
pean countries which will lose their staus as transit ones. 
According to the Kremlin Watch Report 2017, there are two concepts for 
Germany’s approach towards Russia – one considers Russia to be Ger-
many’s strategic partner and makes reference to Ostpolitik, the other 
doubts the significance and sees Russia as a state with a substantial 










potential for destructive action. Generally speaking, the first concept is 
popular amongst Social Democrats, the Left Party and Alternative for 
Germany; while the second amongst Merkel’s Christian Democrats and 
the Greens. The two concepts find their supporters among ordinary cit-
izens. Thus 60% of Germans are for closer ties between Russia and the 
EU.17 However, only 13 % of Germans are not worried about Russia’s mil-
itary threat.18 Obviously, German political establishment and public opin-
ion is highly divided into those who treat Russia positively and those 
who regard Russia as a threat. That will also “demotivate other EU Mem-
ber States from being tougher on the Russians, who will be increasingly 
pleased by the lack of a clear red line to their expansionist policies in the 
region”.19 
2. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the 
Security Policy of France 
Before the annexation of the Crimea, French diplomacy had been working 
at developing the political, economic, and even military relations with 
Russia. The sale contract of French warships, the Mistral, was the main 
achievement of French-Russian cooperation. However, in 2014 after the 
annexation of the Crimea, F. Hollande announced the suspension of the 
sale. In September 2015, the French National Assembly approved the can-
cellation of the sale of the Mistral warships, which had been negotiated 
Russia and Europe: Rapprochement or Isolation. The results of a representative survey con-
ducted by TNS Infratest Politikforschung in Germany and Russia, March 2016, 
<https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/mediathek/
pdf/2016/Survey_Russia-in-Europe.pdf>. 
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directly with Russia beforehand.20 In 2014, French president François Hol-
lande was among the first who condemned Russia’s annexation of the 
Crimea, declaring in a statement that France does not recognise a new 
status for the Crimea.21 
Russia’s actions against territorial integrity of Ukraine constituted not 
only a security challenge for Paris but also opened the window of oppor-
tunity for French diplomacy. In June 2014, the new Ukrainian president 
P. Poroshenko was invited by the French president F. Hollande to the 
commemoration ceremony of the 1944 Normandy landing.22 This invita-
tion is seen as the first attempt at getting the warring parties Ukraine 
and Russia together whereas France played a key role in creating contacts 
between Ukraine and Russia. This initiative can be considered as the main 
accomplishment for French diplomacy as it led to the formation of the 
Normandy format, a diplomatic quartet of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and 
France. Although Paris has managed to become a diplomatic power in 
Europe, there is still little effectiveness of the negotiations in the Nor-
mandy format. Besides, the issue of the Crimea has not been by the par-
ties. 
The new French President Emmanuel Macron has taken a harsher stance 
against Russia than his predecessors. While Macron held a cautious view 
of Russia throughout the Presidential campaign, his view has hardened 
after the election. The fact that E. Macron experienced Russian meddling 
during his campaign made the new president more concerned about the 
issue how to effectively counteract Russia’s disinformation. For this pur-
pose in January 2018, President Macron proposed an anti-fake news elec-
tion law. 
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Five years after the annexation of the Crimea, France issued a statement 
which states that it does not recognize and will not recognize the illegal 
annexation of the Crimea, and remains firmly committed to the full 
restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.23 
Condemning all cases of discrimination based on belonging to an ethnic 
or religious community, France called for the release of all persons who 
were detained in violation of international law, as well as for preservation 
and protection of the historical and cultural heritage of the Crimea. 
Although the new President is much tougher on Russia, the public opinion 
in France remains more open to Russian narratives on Ukraine. Two 
important political forces, the Republican Party under its presidential 
candidate Francois Fillon and the far-right extremist National Front and 
its leader Marine Le Pen, fiercely criticized the EU’s sanctions policy and 
called for rapid normalization of relations with Russia.24 
The series of the latest events, such as the announcement about Marine 
Le Pen’s visit to Yalta in February 2019, publishment of the map with the 
Crimea as part of Russia by Agence France Presse and the visits of the 
members of the French Parliament to the Crimea at the event on the 
occasion of the fifth anniversary of the annexation of the Crimea, demon-
strate the real degree of ambiguity in French society on Russia’s actions 
against Ukraine’s territorial integrity. 
3. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the 
Security Policy of Italy 
Italy’s internal and external policy after the annexation of the Crimea does 
not fit into the overall EU approach. According to the Kremlin Watch 
France Issued a Statement in Connection with the Fifth Anniversary of the Annexation of the 
Ukrainian the Crimea, 19 March 2019, <https://qha.com.ua/en/novosti-en/france-issued-a-
statement-in-connection-with-the-fifth-anniversary-of-the-annexation-of-the-ukrainian-
crimea/>. 
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Report 2017, the “partnership” between Italy and Russia is based on the 
precondition that neither Russia nor Italy Italy’s only real interest in East-
ern neighbourhood is to avoid the most dangerous scenario of the NATO 
involvement in Ukraine – something that could have disastrous conse-
quences for Italy’s relations with Russia. 
In 2015, the Italian Ministry of Defence issued a White Paper on Inter-
national Security and Defence. A document of this strategic level was 
prepared for the first time in 30 years. In general, the rhetoric of the doc-
ument advocates a militaristic approach to guaranteeing national secu-
rity. What is interesting, Russia was not mentioned in it at all.25 At the 
same time, according to Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 44% of Italian citi-
zens believe that Russia is a threat to neighbouring countries. Italy is also 
a fierce opponent of the idea of supplying weapons to Ukraine, and in this 
issue the position of the Italian government completely coincides with the 
mood of voters: 65% of Italian citizens oppose such a decision, and only 
22% are in favour of it.26 
Besides, Italy has strong economic interests in trade with Russia. Not sur-
prisingly, Italy is the most ardent opponent of the sanctions among all 
the EU Member States. First, it has become the first EU Member State 
which made lifting of sanctions against Russia part of its coalition agree-
ment. Vice Prime Minister Matteo Salvini did not miss the opportunity 
to emphasize the damage of sanctions, as well as the need to lift them, 
having paid two visits to Moscow since he took his post in late May 2018. 
According to the Italy’s Ministry of Economic Development, in 2018, Italy 
was the sixth supplier country of Russia. After 2013, Italian exports to 
Russia decreased by three billion euros per year. However, in 2017 there 
was a change: Italian exports to Russia grew by 19.3%, and investments 
increased from 27 to 36 billion euros. This positive trend is due to the 
White Paper for International Security and Defence 2015 <http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/
Documents/2015/07_Luglio/White%20book.pdf>. 
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fact that, because of the need to adapt to the system of sanctions, many 
Italian companies began to export to countries such as Serbia or Belarus, 
which then sell their products to Russia.27 In addition to this, in 2016, dur-
ing the St. Petersburg forum, Italy signed agreements worth over one bil-
lion euros with Russia, and in 2017, cooperation in the power industry led 
to the conclusion of agreements between Enel and Rosseti on innova-
tive solutions for high-tech electrical networks. In 2018, important agree-
ments were concluded in the energy sector, wind energy infrastructure 
(between Eni and the Stavropol Territory), research (between Eni and the 
Russian railways, between Rosneft and the Polyclinic Institute of Turin) 
and technological development. Furthermore, in September 2018, during 
the first official visit of Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte to Moscow, 13 
agreements were signed for an amount of about 1.5 billion euros.28 
Although Italy has never adopted any official document which will rec-
ognize the actions of Russia in the Crimea as legitimate, there have been 
repeated statements made by the Italian officials which put Rome at odds 
with both Kyiv and Brussels. In 2018, the Vice Prime Minister and Minister 
of the Interior of Italy Matteo Salvini, in an interview with the Washing-
ton Post, called the occupation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation 
legitimate.29 This approach shows ambiguity and does not benefit either 
European unity or Italy’s credibility as a reliable international partner for 
Western allies. 
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4. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the 
Security Policy of Greece 
In the context of the Crimea annexation Greece reluctantly takes sides 
with the larger EU states, while simultaneously lobbying in favour of 
removing sanctions and renewing dialogue with Russia. Presenting the 
priorities of the Greek EU Council presidency for the first half of 2014, 
neither Eastern Partnership nor Ukraine was on the list. When the annex-
ation of The The  the Crimea took place, Foreign Minister Venizelos vis-
ited Ukraine and supported sanctions as well as expressed support for 
the Ukraine’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty.30 In the 
most turbulent times Greece was aligned with the European line. 
The turn in Greek foreign policy took place when SYRIZA formed a gov-
ernment, full of Eurosceptic and pro-Russian politicians in 2015. On Janu-
ary 26, 2015, his first day as Prime Minister, Tsipras met with the Russian 
ambassador to Greece Andrey Maslov.31 In June 2015 Greece and Russia 
examined the possibility of extending the Turkish Stream project to 
Greece through a South European pipeline, but the discussions have 
remained stagnant. There has even been an attempt to investigate the 
intentions of Russia on the prospect of a loan, while the possibility of 
Greece’s participation in the New Development Bank is currently under 
examination. Before the July 2015 referendum on memorandum, Tsipras 
had asked Putin for a $10 billion loan so that Greece could return to 
drachma.  In return, Russia only suggested $5 billion before the construc-
tion of the Greek branch of the Turkish Stream.32 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos’ presentation of the Hellenic Presi-
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In 2016, Greece signed a defence partnership treaty with Russia. The 
Greek government claimed it was necessary to prevent the collapse of the 
country’s defence industry.33 Besides, Greek vessels repeatedly violated 
the Ukrainian legislation and international sanctions and docked at the 
ports of the occupied the Crimea.34 
Greece is among the countries that has repeatedly raised the question of 
unproductivity of sanctions against Russia and their negative effect for 
the national economy. Imposed sanctions were extremely badly perceived 
in Greek society. Greek farmers say the embargo has already dealt a dev-
astating blow to the country’s agricultural economy. The left-wing Greek 
MEP Manolis Glezos wrote a letter to President Putin pleading not to 
impose counter sanctions on Greek food imports to Russia.35 
After the September re-election and the dissolution of the most radical 
Left faction from SYRIZA, Greece began to concentrate more on migra-
tion problems, the reunification of Cyprus, creating its own zone of influ-
ence in the Balkans. Radically pro-Russian deputies and ex-deputies, and 
some heads municipalities regularly visited the Crimea or Russia spon-
sored conferences and symposiums of radical European right and left 
without the further influence on country’s policy or bilateral relations. 
With this relative moderation, the traditional stance on Greek-Russian 
relations came back into play, although prime-minister Tsipras continued 
to stress that he was to conduct innovative multidimensional diplomacy.36 
Russia’s actions in Crimea only fostered the rapprochement between 
Greece and Russia. It is not surprising, Russia has historically served for 
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Athens as a counterbalance to the threat Turkey poses and the pressure 
exerted by such institutions as the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Ahens understands 
its own security by the capacity to diversify risks and maneuver between 
several security providers. This approach weakens the EU’s capacity to 
act coherently to ensure its internal and external security. 
5. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the 
Security Policy of the Visegrad Group 
The situation in Ukraine has been in the focus of the V4 Prime Ministers’ 
attention since the very beginning. Thus in March 2014, the Prime Min-
isters of the Visegrad Countries adopted their statement expressing their 
deep concern “about the recent violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity 
and the fact that the Russian parliament had authorized military action on 
Ukrainian soil against the wishes of the Ukrainian government”.37 
Poland has been at the forefront of the European response to Russia’s 
aggression. Unlike other Visegrad countries, condemnation of Russian 
actions against territorial integrity of Ukraine is seen on an all-country 
political scale, drawing criticism from the right, left, and centre. The 
annexation of the Crimea increased fears towards Russia that have always 
been very strong in Poland. Naturally, Poland has shown full support to 
sanctions against Russia and non-recognition policy. The annexation of 
the Crimea has also affected Poland’s internal policies and its perception 
of Europe’s security system. 
Poland has been firm on abandoning Russian natural gas imports in favour 
of alternative import sources from Denmark and Norway. The LNG ter-
minal focused on the imports from Qatar, Norway and the United States 




was put into operation in 2016. In 2018, Poland announced plans to revive 
the Baltic Pipe Project – construction of an underwater pipeline in order 
to pump Norwegian North Sea offshore gas.38 
Poland has also increased its military spendings from 1,6% GDP in 2013 to 
2,2% in 2015. As a part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, American soldiers 
have been deployed in Poland along with tanks and heavy equipment39 
serving as a response to the militarization of Kaliningrad Oblast. Since the 
annexation of the Crimea Polish state leadership has redoubled efforts to 
convince their partners and allies in the West that the enhancement of 
NATO Eastern flank is a very urgent need. Polish diplomacy instigated a 
demarche oriented toward persuading the leading NATO powers that the 
cheapest and easiest manner to deter potential future Russian invasion on 
the Transatlantic Alliance is to deploy additional troops to the most sus-
ceptible to invasion countries.40 
However, there are certain politicians from the Visegrad countries, who 
are sympathetic towards the behaviour of the Russian Federation. Pres-
ident of the Czech Republic Milos Zeman and Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban are the key political allies of the Kremlin who promote the 
narratives used to justify Russia’s occupation of the Crimea. The recent 
rise of populist and extremist political forces, directly or indirectly sup-
ported by Russia, and the spread of toxic content via “alternative” pro-
Russian media and social networks has also become a serious issue in 
Slovakia. 
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Fight against Russian informational influence has become a topic of regu-
lar discussions in the states of the Visegrad group. However, the political 
response depends above all on the political will of the ruling elites. Pro-
Russian orientation of the Hungarian government causes the absence 
of decisions in this field.41 Slovakia does not consider Russian influence 
a threat, therefore, does not securitize disinformation campaigns and 
does not give a priority to strategic counter-measures. Besides, a “prag-
matic” approach of Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico who regards Russia as 
an inevitable, unavoidable partner upon which Slovakia’s economic devel-
opment is dependent does not contribute to take adequate steps in com-
batting Russia’s propaganda. 
The Czech and Polish governments are more active in this area. In the 
Czech Republic, several documents have been adopted to address the 
issue of Russian disinformation. The Security Strategy of the Czech 
Republic adopted in 2015 warns against efforts of “some states to revise 
the international order while using hybrid warfare including propaganda 
using traditional and new media, disinformation intelligence operations, 
cyber-attacks, political and economic pressures, and deployment of 
unmarked military personnel.”42 
In 2016, the National Security Audit presented particular suggestions for 
strengthening the resilience of the Czech Republic such as the establish-
ment of the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (CTHH) within 
the Ministry of Interior, creation of a system of education for public offi-
cials to make them more resilient towards foreign influence, launching 
active media strategies for important democratic institutions or measures 
concerning media law.43 
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However, concerning the practical steps, there are a lot of gaps and 
insufficiencies. Although the existing documents describe the threat well, 
they are not focused enough on practical measures. The establishment of 
CTHH is the only recommendation which has been implemented so far. 
In 2015, Poland started to draft the Doctrine of Information Security as 
a response to the increase in hybrid threats, propaganda, disinformation, 
and psychological influence operation. The Doctrine is supposed to be 
the key document clarifying the scope of responsibilities and the mode of 
cooperation and coordination between the government, private institu-
tions, and citizens. The document is still in the drafting phase 
The Concept of Defence of the Republic of Poland adopted in 2017 consid-
ers the “aggressive policy of the Russian Federation, including the use of 
such tools as disinformation campaigns against other countries” as one of 
the main threats and challenges. However, the Concept does not contain 
any precise developments or tasks regarding information security. Mean-
while, the same year Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced the 
creation of a department of cyber security within the Chancellery of the 
Prime Minister.44 
Taking into account the fact that cyber security management remains 
centralized in all Visegrad group countries and the engagement of private 
stakeholders has been so far underdeveloped, one can hardly expect a 
common approach to tackling the disinformation campaigns and Russia’s 
aggressive foreign policy in the near future. 
6. Impact of the Annexation of the Crimea on the 
Security Policy of the Baltic States 
Since 2014 all three Baltic states have repeatedly demonstrate their sup-
port to Ukraine. All three countries share the position that the sanctions 




against Russia in connection with the illegal annexation of the Crimea 
should remain in force until Russia returns to the principles of interna-
tional law. 
On 25 June 2019, all three Baltic states voted against the decision to give 
back Russia’s voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe. Besides, Latvia and Lithuania were the first European Par-
liaments which recognized the crimes committed by the Soviet Union 
against the Crimean Tatar people in 1944 as genocide. 
However, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea has not only made the Baltic 
States mobilize their support of Ukraine but also created a chance for 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to take measures to enhance their own 
security and strengthen the military sector. 
In 2014, the Latvian parliament added amendments to the Law on 
National Security as part of the efforts to update the competence of 
the top state officials according to which the Latvian President will be 
required to immediately request help from NATO in case of a military 
attack.45 
In 2015, Estonia adopted a new national defence act with its focus on 
new challenges in the security sphere, both in peacetime and during war. 
It provides for the role of the prime minister and the government to be 
strengthened in managing the state’s defence, and is intended to facilitate 
the decision-making process concerning emergency situations.46 
Lithuania has also joined in the preparations for a possible hybrid war. The 
law on the use of arms in peacetime was drafted as a new legal solution 
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and adopted on 16 December 2014. According to it, the country’s Presi-
dent would be entitled to sign a decree introducing martial law if foreign 
military troops appear on Lithuanian territory.47 
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea has made the Baltic states think about 
changes in the language policy. Thus, in April 2018, Latvian President 
Raimonds Vējonis signed amendments to the education law that would 
effectively put an end to all Russian-language schooling in the country by 
2021. In July 2018, a new set of amendments to the Law on Institutions 
of Higher Education was announced banning Russian-language education 
programs in private universities and colleges. Previously, this restriction 
concerned only state universities.48 
In order to counter disinformation among population of Latvia and 
Lithuania, their governgments have also taken legal measures to ban 
Russian media providers.  In March 2016, the Latvian authorities initiated 
the shutdown of Sputnik after an investigation established a “clear link” 
between Sputnik and Dmitry Kiselev, the Director of Russia’s RT media 
empire who was facing targeted EU sanctions after Russia’s illegal annex-
ation of The Crimea.49 
The events in Ukraine escalated the concerns of the Baltic states about 
their own security. Altogether, since Russia’s annexation of the Crimea the 
three Baltic countries have managed to adopt a comprehensive approach 
to security and foreign policymaking. 
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The annexation of the Crimea by the Kremlin has become a test for the 
EU unity. So far the EU has managed to develop a non-recognition and 
sanction-based approach towards Russia’s actions in the Crimea. How-
ever, there are certain doubts whether this response is really an effective 
means of deterrence. So far it has neither led to the return of the Crimea 
to Ukraine nor stopped Kremlin’s further aggressive actions in the Sea of 
Azov.  The only consideration that occupies the minds of the EU officials 
is how to save the face and keep on implementing ambitious energy pro-
jects in collaboration with Russia. Therefore the declarative non-recogni-
tion policy of the EU and sanctions which can be easily circumvented is 
the furthest the EU can reach today. That reveals a number of weaknesses 
and hidden reputational risks in the EU’s response to the security chal-
lenges in its nearest neighbourhood. 
When the member states act in the Council of the EU, they continue to 
follow a “coherent” line. At the same time, each state has managed to 
develop bilateral cooperation policies based on their historical relation 
with Russia. Most western and southern European countries see Russia’s 
threat as less imminent. Terrorism and migration constitute bigger chal-
lenges to their own security. Besides, in Western and Southern European 
countries, we can often see a divide between national security profes-
sionals and the majority of the political class, which sometimes adopts 
an appeasement position towards the current Kremlin actions. Eastern 
Europe and Baltic states, on the other hand, are more vulnerable but feel 
in relative isolation as their narrative about Russia as the most direct 
threat to Europe’s security cannot gain traction across Europe. Such dif-
ference in priorities is only beneficial for Moscow, which focuses on 
bilateral relations with particular EU states and actively seeks to exploit 
differences between them. 
Time does not play in favour of Ukraine. Leaders of the European states 
change, some of them tend to value the economic benefits of increased 
trade with Russia more than the principles of international law. Besides, 
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since March 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimea, Europe’s attention 
has shifted to other crises such as Syria and rise of Euroscepticism which 
allowed Russia to only strengthen its regime on the peninsula. There is no 
guarantee that in several years the European states will not reconcile with 
the annexation of the Crimea following the US decision to recognize the 
Golan heights as part of Israel. 
The return of the Crimea to Ukraine seems impossible in the nearest 
future as there is currently no framework to discuss the future of the 
peninsula. Moreover, such framework is unlikely to appear before the end 
of Putin’s rule. The latest decision to give back Russia’s voting rights in 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe together with the 
complete absence of any changes in Russia’s position (and ignoring the 
order of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on the release of 
the captured Ukrainian sailors and vessels) but in return to pay budgetary 
contributions to the Council of Europe demonstrates Europe’s willingness 
to turn the page of this sad chapter without drawing certain lessons nec-
essary mainly for Europe’s future security. 
VI. Recommendations 
The annexation of the Crimea concerns the most basic principles of 
Europe and therefore should be considered in a much broader context as 
a test of endurance for it. The challenge for the EU member states is how 
to secure its nearest neighbourhood and ensure Europe’s own political, 
energetic and informational security. This task is not easy but therefore, 
the most important thing is to make sure that all the EU member-states 
follow the Brussels-based course. 
Firstly, Europe should draw certain red lines in relations with Russia 
and make it clear that their trespassing will not be tolerated. Secondly, 
the European states should have a common position and vision of what 
should happen to have sanctions lifted. Besides, the EU member states 
should consider the application of additional sanctions on Russia in 
response to human rights violations in the Crimea and reputational sanc-
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tions for others who support Putin’s aggressive behaviour. Thirdly, there 
should be more awareness on the need to cooperate in order to counter 
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I. Introduction 
The use of energy as a foreign policy instrument can serve different and 
often contrasting objectives, sometimes termed petro-carrots and petro-
sticks, which respectively reward or punish countries for their behavior 
(NEWNHAM 2011). Energy can be used to draw countries closer by creat-
ing a long-term perspective for improved political relations. At the same 
time, energy can be applied as a conflict-enhancing tool, predominantly 
as a means of retaliation, through “punitive” price increases and supply 
disruptions (NEWNHAM 2011; SHAFFER 2013). 
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Indeed there are many examples for the interlinkages between foreign 
policy and energy often used through sticks and often though carrots. For 
example, US foreign policy carrots toward Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
countries have been providing security and political support to oppres-
sive regimes in exchange for reliable and affordable energy trade (GLASER 
2013). At the same time, foreign policy can also turn energy into an 
instrument for the attainment of non-energy related goals. In the 1973 
Oil Shock, OPEC countries used energy as a stick to change Western 
countries’ positions in the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the 2008–2011 Egypt-
ian-Israeli natural gas trade was driven by the rationale that deepening 
economic interests would cement political relations (SIMMONS 2005). 
If energy can be used as a “carrot” and as a “stick” by similar countries, 
what determines the choice of the policy option? In a world where 
approximately 80% of known gas and oil energy resources are state-
owned (ORRTUNG 2009), a better understanding of the causal mechanisms 
and conditions which transform energy resources into political power is 
becoming increasingly imperative, particularly for policy-making. Such an 
understanding is significant for tailoring appropriate responses, which 
can harness energy trade into a cooperative platform and reduce a possi-
ble adverse bias towards conflict. 
Although much scholarly attention had been devoted to the study of 
energy and foreign policy, the link to energy trade has so far been limited, 
confined to the Russian-German case study, and leaving much to be 
desired with regard to providing a consistent theoretical explanation 
(VICTOR et al .2006; YERGIN 2006; SHAFFER 2013). Hence, explanations of the 
link between the use of energy as foreign policy and its peace and con-
flict consequences are limited and fall short of establishing a coherent 
and consistent account. 
In this chapter we seek empirical and theoretical contributions that 
address the link between energy trade and foreign policy, including the 
role played by non-state actors and the private sector and civil society. 
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The chapter first presents energy dependency as the source of being able 
to use energy as a foreign policy tool.  It then proceeds to examine what 
shapes energy dependency. Following this it uses the Israeli- Palestinian 
case study to exemplify how dependency relations become a forging pol-
icy tool. Finally, it draws some general conclusions that can set the basis 
for further research. 
II. Energy as a Punitive Measure: A Dependency 
Perspective 
Underlying these questions is the issue of energy resource availability, 
a factor in countries’ economic and political development trajectories. 
Energy availability shapes the nature of inter-state dependency in inter-
national energy relations and extends beyond a simple division between 
countries naturally endowed with energy resources and countries lacking 
these resources. The effects of energy dependency on economic devel-
opment, domestic politics and foreign policy cut across developed and 
developing economies throughout the world. Energy dependency origi-
nates from two major reasons which go beyond the natural scarcity phe-
nomenon. First, the global energy market structure is characterized by 
interdependency. Energy exporting countries depend on revenues from 
energy exportation, while importing economies depend on affordable and 
reliable energy supplies. Such supply and demand relations are price 
volatility sensitive (MAÑÉ-ESTRADA 2006), with transit nations also playing 
an important role in making energy trade possible (PASCUAL 2008). Sec-
ond, as energy supply often entails permanent infrastructure involving 
high sunk costs,1 dependency arises from the need to ensure long-term 
commitments as well as stable political and market environments. 
As the sine qua non of industrialization and digitalization, energy depen-
dency becomes an important foreign policy asset in the hands of energy-
Construction of permanent infrastructures such as pipeline networks and drilling platforms 
are significant sunk costs without which energy trade cannot take place. 
1 
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rich countries. These countries can utilize energy trade and supply 
relations with energy-scarce countries to seek a multitude of foreign pol-
icy advantages (KALICKI AND GOLDWYN 2005; PASCUAL AND ELKIND 2009; 
NEWNHAM 2011). Thus, energy is also an important element in setting the 
international balance of power. Transit countries also harness energy as 
a foreign policy tool, exploiting their pivotal position within the energy 
trade supply chain. 
Reflecting differential advantages and vulnerabilities, energy dependency 
is intrinsic to foreign policy and international relations (PERCEBOIS 2007; 
SHAFFER 2013; ZIEGLER 2013). 
III. The Sources of Energy Dependency: A Demand 
Supply Ratio 
We already know that the level of dependency between states is mainly 
determined by their level of demand and supply of resources. There is 
vast literature arguing that increasing global demand for energy makes 
countries more dependent on oil imports, which, in turn, increases the 
probability for war over the control of major oil-exporting regions (KLARE 
2002). Yet, it is not only the importing country that becomes dependent 
on energy, but the exporting country that seeks new markets.  Hence 
the “Energy Demand and Supply Gap” variable captures both the energy 
shortage and energy surplus that contribute to energy dependency. The 
next paragraphs outline the main factors that shape this ratio. 
Environmental change: One factor that can affect the demand-supply 
relation is environmental change. Extreme changes in temperature, 
including prolonged and hard winters or especially hot summers, usually 
lead to a sharp rise in gas, coal and electricity consumption, thus elevating 
the demand for energy. In addition, since hydroelectric power plants are 
sensitive to the volume and timing of stream flows, extreme weather has 
a crucial effect on them as well, possibly reducing the energy supply. 
130
Market structure: At the domestic level, energy availability and its pricing 
are conditioned by the structural necessity for a natural monopoly to set 
up the required infrastructure for energy supply. Thus, excessive costs 
related to infrastructure set-up prevent the development of market com-
petition for infrastructure. As a consequence, infrastructure is likely to be 
developed only by a natural monopoly, whether private or governmen-
tal. This demand and supply gap is often aggravated due to regulatory 
capture which occurs when government bureaucrats, regulators or pub-
lic sector agencies fail to serve the collective public interest and instead 
serve the private sector. This capture has already been documented in 
relation to the marine energy regulator in Israel that has become cap-
tured by government–industry association. 
Physical and spatial characteristics: Finally, the energy literature has 
already indicated that the physical and spatial characteristics of countries 
have a profound effect on the demand and supply ratio. For example, 
regional energy grids, which can offset demand and supply, require 
economies of scale. In contrast, countries surrounded by sea and having 
no political relations with adjacent countries are considered energy 
islands. These countries find it harder to address a gap between demand 
and supply. 
Adaptive Capacity: A country’s level of adaptive capacity plays a crucial 
role in determining whether dependency is formed. Adaptive capacity is 
usually defined as the ability or potential of a system to respond suc-
cessfully to variability and change and to reduce vulnerability. The forces 
that influence the ability of the system to adapt are the drivers or deter-
minants of adaptive capacity. Lack of adaptive capacity is often referred 
to as “second order scarcity” while “first order scarcity” relates to the 
lack of physical availability of resources such as energy. This implies that 
adaptive capacity (second order scarcity) is often the technological and 
institutional adaptation available that can compensate for “first order 
scarcity” – the scarcity of the physical resource itself. 
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Some determinants of adaptive capacity are mainly local while others 
reflect more socio-economic and political systems. Adaptive capacity is 
context-specific and varies from country to country and from commu-
nity to community while changing over time. Although the vast majority 
of the literature focuses on the effects of the environment and climate 
change on social systems and their capability to respond to these effects 
by means of adaptive capacity, here we situate the role of adaptive capac-
ity of countries in terms of how it affects the demand and supply energy 
ratio of a country and hence its dependency. 
In energy systems, adaptive capacity implies the capability of a country 
to foster demand management and to diversify energy resources through 
alternative ones. The role of diversification and localization of energy sys-
tems, through alternative energy sources, as a means for increasing adap-
tive capacity and hence for reducing dependencies on the importation 
of fossil fuels, has already been documented (PASCUAL AND ELKIND 2009). 
This nexus between adaptive capacity and dependencies has underlined 
the motivation of scholars to call for incentives which will stimulate social 
innovation capacity at the expense of industrial access to natural 
resources. 
Sunk Cost: Sunk cost is a cost that has already been incurred and thus 
cannot be recovered. The degree of sunk cost that energy supplier or 
consumer states have invested in an energy infrastructure that makes 
trade possible has a direct effect on the level of dependency between 
them. The vast majority of energy during the 20th century was trans-
ported by tankers in the global market. Direct contact between the pro-
ducer and the consumer was not required, allowing flexibility and 
frequent changes in destination for both sides of the trade. From the 
beginning of the 21st century, pipelines have emerged as a major means of 
energy supply, especially of natural gas. Trading energy through pipelines 
involves high sunk costs, since it links suppliers and consumers in a long-
term relationship that is difficult to end due to the nature of its hard 
infrastructure (SHAFFER 2009). 
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An important element that may have an effect on the level of sunk cost a 
country is willing to incur is the existence of trust between the countries 
in bilateral relations.  Indeed recent energy studies have already pointed 
to the role of trust in delivering sustainable energy systems and in making 
the right technology choices around energy. The higher the level of trust 
between countries, the higher the probability that these countries will 
be inclined to be connected with permanent energy pipelines, associated 
with high sunk cost. Hence we can expect that under conditions of lack 
of trust, countries will avoid shared energy infrastructure that is based on 
high sunk cost that makes them more dependent on neighboring coun-
tries (SHAFFER 2009). 
The next section exemplifies the role of dependencies in the use of 
energy as an instrument in the Israel’s and Palestine’s relations 
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IV. Energy and Israel’s Foreign Policy Towards the 
Palestinians: The Case of Gaza 
1. From the occupation of Gaza to the first 
Palestinian Intifada (1967–1987) 
Following the 1967 war between Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, Israel 
gained hold of the WB and Gaza and enacted a military regime over the 
occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). Through the issuance of several 
military ordinances, energy and other infrastructure in the OPT came 
under the responsibilities of the Civil Administration, a unit within the 
Ministry of Defense coordinating civil affairs and executing government 
policies.2 
In the aftermath of the 1948 War and prior to 1967, Gaza was an occupied 
territory of Egypt. Nevertheless, in contrast to the Jordanian annexation 
of the West Bank territory, Gaza was not annexed by Egypt. This legal 
status implied that according to international law, legal rights prevailing 
prior to 1948 were not abolished. Israel Electrical Company (IEC) ‘s legal 
rights were entrusted with the Egyptian Custodian of Absentees because 
its British mandate franchise included the City of Gaza before 1948, and at 
the same time IEC was absent from the territory following the war. 
During their occupation, the Egyptians expanded IEC’s old electricity grid 
with new lines, and supplemented it with a local power plant to meet 
the City of Gaza’s growing demand. Other towns in the Gaza Strip served 
their citizens using diesel generators, with electricity being produced and 
distributed as a municipal service.3 Electricity tariffs in Gaza considerably 
exceeded those in Israel. 
Established in 1981 as a sub-unit of COGAT, the Civil Administration carries out many bureau-
cratic activities in the OPT. 
KAPLAN, Electricity Tariffs According to Jerusalem Franchise in Eastern Jerusalem and other 
Territories, Israel Electricity Company (IEC Archives, 1967); IEC, Meeting Protocol Electricity 




Although IEC explored the possibility of regaining its franchise in Gaza 
immediately after the end of the 1967 War, it had no genuine economic 
interest in Gaza. Gaza’s electricity consumption constituted a mere 
0.075% of the total Israeli consumption at the time, making it a non-prof-
itable addition to IEC’s market share given the costs of needed infrastruc-
ture investments. 
However, electricity provision to Gaza was a government and army inter-
est. Both sought to establish political and military control over the ter-
ritory, and therefore requested that IEC provide electricity despite its 
reluctance. For the government and army, having IEC as electricity sup-
plier would provide energy security for the army and a carrot for the 
local population. In order to ensure energy reliability, the army ordered 
IEC to set up a bulk electricity connection that would serve army bases 
and newly established Jewish factories and connect with Gaza’s electricity 
grid, and then be distributed to the population of the municipality.4 The 
rationale guiding this policy was that equalizing the electricity tariff and 
providing reliable electricity were essential policy carrots in controlling 
the territory. Through the issuance of several military ordinances, the 
decision was made that Gaza Strip municipalities would be allowed to 
continue with their existing electricity provision, and that the IEC would 
connect new consumers by demand in places where electricity was not 
yet provided. 
2. First Intifada to the Oslo Accords (1987–1993) 
The first Palestinian Intifada broke out at the end 1987. Lasting from 
December 1987 until the Madrid Conference of 1991, the intifada was a 
Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territo-
ries. It represented a change in Israeli–Palestinian relations and a rise in 
local Palestinian leadership.5 
KAPLAN, Meeting Protocol on Electricity Provision in the Gaza Strip 03-11-1967 (IEC Archives, 
1967). 




In Gaza, the usage of electricity cutoffs was similar to that in the West 
Bank. It was limited to several hours at a time as part of military curfews. 
However this policy in Gaza differed with regard to Palestinian electricity 
debt to IEC. As the debt soared, Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, 
instructed the IDF’s Civil Administration to cover the existing Palestinian 
debt. This carrot was possible because of the relatively smaller share of 
Gaza within the total Palestinian debt to IEC. At the same time, its signif-
icance was stronger than in the WB, because the debt relief had a greater 
welfare effect on Palestinian consumers than lowering electricity prices 
did. 
Hence, economic and foreign policy objectives were more aligned in Gaza 
then in the WB. In Gaza, because IEC sold and distributed electricity 
directly to the majority of individual consumers, electricity could be cut 
off for non-paying consumers, rather than for political purposes. It was 
agreed that following the debt relief, the IEC in Gaza would be able to 
cut electricity to consumers accumulating new debts, and army person-
nel would assist IEC staff, bypassing the need to impose collective pun-
ishment as was occasionally done for political reasons.6 
3. Impact of the Oslo Accords (1993-2000) 
The first Intifada gradually declined between the Madrid Conference of 
1991 and the signing of the first Oslo Accords on 13 September 1993.7 The 
Oslo Accords marked the beginning of the Oslo Process, based on Israel’s 
recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and 
the PLO’s recognition of the State of Israel. The peace process led to two 
agreements and the creation of the Palestinian Authority, which received 
limited self-governance over the West Bank (WB) and Gaza. The interim 
KATZ, “Statement,” IEC Board of Directors Meeting, number 939, August 5, 1993 (IEC Archives, 
1993). 




period established by the Oslo II Accords en-route to the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian state ended in May 1999, without achieving 
its goal.8 
A specific energy track was created as part of the Oslo I Accords negoti-
ations. Several issues dominated the agenda. First, Israelis and Palestini-
ans had to decide on the future of their shared electricity grid. The final 
issue was the future control over the production and transmission seg-
ments of the electricity chain. Israel saw electricity as a future foreign 
policy instrument, and wanted to control the production and transmis-
sion processes in order to preserve Palestinian dependence on Israel, 
even after its independence.9 
This concept of electricity as a weapon can be seen as an attempt to hold 
the stick at both ends. At one end was the threat of a “hard” electric-
ity cut off, and at the other was the control of a “soft” financial sanction. 
Although negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on 
energy resumed in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, they were unsuc-
cessful in bridging the differences between the parties. In the absence of 
agreement, the responsibility for energy provision to Gaza remained in 
the hands of Israel.10 
The collapse of the energy negotiation track and ensuing uncertainty led 
the parties to promote various initiatives. The Palestinians interpreted the 
disagreement on the future status of electricity relations as an opportu-
nity to increase their electricity independence from Israel. To that end, 
they put forward the idea to develop a floating electricity power plant 
offshore of Gaza, with excess production capacity to be sold to Israel.11 
They also promoted creating an electricity grid that would connect the 
MATTHEWS, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Parallel Discourses (Oxon: Routledge, 2011). 
AMRANI, Interview, June 17, 2014. 
REISNER, Interview. 
MACISAAC, “Atlantic Seaboard Industries Wins Palestine Power Deal,” The Globe and Mail, May 
28, 1994.; Cohen, “Statement,” IEC’s Committee for the Peace Process Meeting number 2, 






WB and Gaza, viewing it as a sign of sovereignty.12 Israel officially refused 
to allow such connection between the WB and Gaza, as this would have 
transformed Israel into a transit country. Israel also rejected the idea of 
buying Palestinian electricity and possibly developing energy dependence 
on Palestinian provision.13 IEC adopted a policy of minimum investment 
in infrastructure, resulting in decreasing ability to serve rising Palestinian 
demand for electricity.14   In 1999, British Gas discovered Gaza Marine, a 
natural gas reservoir of some 35 billion cubic meters, 36 kilometers off-
shore Gaza. As Israel and Palestine were, prior to the discovery, resource-
poor economies, dependent on the import of energy resources, the Gaza 
Marine finding clearly added a new resource layer to existing energy rela-
tions. Given its size, Gaza Marine would not only transform Palestin-
ian dependence on Israeli energy provision, but also allow Palestinians 
to export gas.15 However, the Oslo II Agreement gives Palestinians eco-
nomic rights only for the first 20 nautical miles offshore of Gaza, and 
Israel can furthermore restrict offshore activities for security purposes; 
any development of the Gaza Marine field thus would depend on Israeli 
consent.16 Since elevating energy scarcity was an important motivation 
for Israelis and Palestinians alike, and given the failure of the Oslo Accords 
to motivate the parties to a permanent peace solution, a resource conflict 
was expected. Nevertheless, in a trust-building gesture to Yasser Arafat, 
Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Ehud Barak, Israel’s Prime Minister, 
HILLEL, Multilateral – Workshop on Electricity Grids Interconnection in the Middle East, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs (IEC Archives, 1994). 
COHEN, “Statement,” March 2, 1995; Tamir, “Statement,” IEC’s Committee for the Peace Process 
Meeting number 3, March 2, 1995 (IEC Archives, 1995). 
PELED, “Statement,” IEC’s Committee for the Peace Process Meeting number 1 February 9, 1995 
(IEC Archives, 1995); Tamir, “Statement,” IEC’s Committee for the Peace Process Meeting num-
ber 2, March 2, 1995 (IEC Archives, 1995). 
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D.C.: World Bank, 2007); BOERSMA AND SACHS, Gaza Marine: Natural Gas Extraction in Tumul-
tuous Times? (Washington: Brookings, 2015). 
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bequeathed Gaza Marine to the Palestinians,17 despite opposition of the 
security establishment and several domestic energy firms claiming mar-
ket rights.18 
4. Second Intifada to the Gaza Disengagement 
(2000–2005) 
In July 2000 the United States convened a summit at Camp David in an 
attempt to reinvigorate the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. The Sec-
ond Intifada erupted two months later, following the break of negotiations 
and the failure to achieve a final settlement between the parties. The 
new uprising could have led to massive sabotage of the transmission and 
electricity grid, yet the potential detrimental effects to the infrastructure 
servicing both Palestinians and Israelis provided a safety net from acute 
destruction. Nevertheless, local harm to the joint infrastructure, attacks 
on IEC personnel working to repair the grid, and Israeli threats to cut off 
supply or allow its degradation propelled IEC and the Palestinian Author-
ity to work together to delink energy provision from politics. In 2003, IEC 
and the Palestinian Authority signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
according to which “the Parties declare that the supply of electricity and 
that the maintenance and flow of the supply will continue to be outside 
the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict”.19 This agreement shows that the “elec-
tricity weapon” carried more weight in the perceptions of both Israelis 
and Palestinians than it had in practice. The agreement to delink energy 
from the conflict was put to the test when, in 2004, Palestinian electric-
ity debt peaked to 200 million shekels, distributed equally between Gaza 
HENDERSON, Natural Gas in the Palestinian Authority; Boersma and Sachs, Gaza Marine: Natural 
Gas Extraction in Tumultuous Times?. 
HENDERSON, Natural Gas in the Palestinian Authority; For an alternative account suggesting 
corruptive behaviour, see: Caspit Stealther: The True Story of Ehud Barak (Or YEHUDA, KINNERET 
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and the WB.20 The debt, which has been growing ever since,21 led to a con-
sultation between Israeli Minister of Energy Joseph Paritzky and Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon, in which the latter refused to cut off the energy of 
non-paying customers over fear of international condemnation from the 
likely ensuing crisis in Palestine.22 
The gradual decline of the Second Intifada facilitated the flow of inward 
foreign investment and donor money for the restoration of Palestine. 
Investments were made in building a new small-scale power plant in 
Gaza, which began operating in 2002.23 Although the power plant reduced 
Palestinian dependence on Israeli electricity production, it required the 
importation of fuels from Israel.24  When the new power plant failed to 
meet Gaza’s electricity demand, the Palestinian Authority requested that 
Israel construct an additional high-voltage transmission line. The Israeli 
government, wishing to maintain supply to Gaza, decided to approve the 
Palestinian request despite continuation of the conflict and the growing 
debt.25 
5. Disengagement until today (2005–2014) 
While Israel negotiated and engaged with the Palestinian Authority in the 
WB, it did not recognize or legitimize Hamas; and hence bilateral rela-
tions with Gaza following its takeover by Hamas were either violent or 
conducted via third parties and public statements 
In August 2005, Israel executed its disengagement plan from the Gaza 
Strip, following a decision made a year earlier to completely separate 
from Gaza. As part of the disengagement, Israel completely withdrew its 
RAZON, “Statement,” IEC Board of Directors Meeting number 1149, October 21, 2004 (IEC 
Archives, 2004). 
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RAZON, “Statement,” IEC Board of Directors Meeting number 1145, September 2, 2004 (IEC 
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troops from Gaza, removed all settlements, and unilaterally transferred 
civil responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority, although it retained con-
trol over Gaza’s borders, airspace, and territorial waters. In a letter 
exchange with US President George W. Bush, Sharon committed Israel to 
not dismantling any electricity infrastructure existing in the Gaza Strip 
and to continuing Israeli electricity and fuel provision in exchange for full 
payment.26 
Oddly enough, despite the disengagement and Israel’s disbelief in Pales-
tinian partnership for peace, Israel continued negotiating the possibility 
of purchasing gas from Gaza Marine through its franchise holder, British 
Gas. The negotiations ended when hostilities broke out in late 2005, with 
rockets being launched at Israel from Gaza.27 In an attempt to end the 
bombardment, Israel threatened the Palestinian Authority that it would 
cut off electricity supply to Gaza,28 a threat was made despite consider-
able opposition from many policy-makers in Israel.29 Following the kid-
napping of an Israeli soldier, Israel led a large-scale ground operation into 
Gaza and bombed its electricity power plant. Although Israel justified the 
attack as an act of self-defense, the consequences were devastating. The 
absence of electrical power caused a humanitarian crisis affecting water 
provision, medical care, and sanitation.30 Fearing international political 
consequences, Israel enhanced its electricity provision to Gaza to com-
pensate for the deficit created by the destruction of the power plant.31 
Government Secretariat, Ammended Disengagement Plan, 1996 (State of Israel, Prime Minis-
ter’s Office, 2004); Sharon, Letter from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to US President George W. 
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In June 2007, as part of internal Palestinian conflict between the Fatah 
and Hamas, the latter took Gaza by force and overthrew the Palestinian 
Authority, leading to the de facto parting of the OPT into two separate 
political entities. 
While Israel was constrained from reducing or cutting-off electricity, it 
decided in September 2007 to reduce the supply of fuel to Gaza, justi-
fying it as a necessary step in its war against Hamas’ terrorism.32 Israel’s 
decision to limit fuel supply was challenged in the Supreme Court, which 
upheld the government’s right to restrict energy supply as long as supply 
sufficiently meets vital humanitarian needs.33 Since then, and given Pales-
tinian on-going cash flow difficulties, Gaza has suffered from a chronic 
shortage of fuel, reducing the capacity of its power plant electricity gen-
eration.34 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
The role of energy in foreign policy seems to fall between the cracks.  On 
the one hand energy is often perceived as the domain of physicists and 
engineers while on the other hand the discipline of international rela-
tions ignores the importance of energy in foreign policy in most cases. 
As a result, despite the numerous cases where energy has been instru-
mentalized for foreign policy goals, this topic seems to go under the radar 
of academics. Therefore, energy practitioners are often not exposed to 
proper training in mitigating energy conflict. In addition, it has already 
been established that energy trade across boundaries often faces many 
geopolitical bottlenecks that hinder the establishment of cost-effective 
energy markets (ref). The limited regional electricity grids in many places 
(such as Europe, South America and Africa) are one indication of the need 
Government Secretariat, Israel’s Policy towards Gaza (Military and Civil), Decision Bet/34 
(State of Israel, 2007); United Nations, Gaza’s Electricity Crisis. 
Supreme Court of Justice, Ruling Concerning Decision of Israeli Authorities to Reduce or Limit 
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to incorporate the political dimension into energy studies. Hence, this 
chapter is one of the first attempts to transcend the disciplinary bound-
aries of energy studies and to integrate the material/physical element of 
energy with its geopolitical dimension into a rigorous approach. While 
this contribution may appear theoretical it bears practical significance for 
policy makers. 
The Israeli–Palestinian case study demonstrates how dependencies 
translating to forging policy wither in the form of sticks or carrots.  These 
sticks or carrots exemplify a strong causal relation between foreign pol-
icy considerations and energy policy. Foreign policy shapes energy policy 
and makes use of it to advance non-energy related goals.  The Palestin-
ian dependency on Israel for energy, particularly electricity provision, is 
used as a foreign policy instrument in diverse ways. Some are used for 
either cooperative (carrots) or conflictive (sticks) means. These instru-
ments include preferential pricing; integration and separation of infra-
structure; financial sanctions and rewards; electricity cut-offs and supply 
disruption. Yet, many of these sticks are restrained by the reverse depen-
dency of Israel on the Palestinians as Israel is often sensitive to how it is 
portrayed in the world. 
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I. Introduction 
The challenges, threats, and risks for security in Europe are numerous 
and very diverse. They are not limited to crime, but encompass various 
145
other areas of economic, social and environmental policy. The multi-
focus approach taken by the organisers of this conference is to be 
applauded. From cyber security and terrorism, NATO and the European 
Security and Defence Union to the impact of climate change on security, 
many different but all the more relevant aspects are being addressed. The 
subject of my contribution is the area of crime, specifically the cross-
border cooperation to fight terrorism and transnational organised crime. 
Due to the wide range of perspectives taken into account in this confer-
ence and the resulting mixed expertise of the participants, I was asked to 
keep my contribution more general and deliver an overview on the differ-
ent forms of cooperation existing to combat serious crime in Europe. 
When evaluating the maintenance of security in Europe through cooper-
ation in criminal matters various entities come to mind, such as the EU, 
the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, to name some. The most exten-
sive and comprehensive cooperation to target organised and cross-bor-
der crime exists between the Members of the European Union, as the 
EU has supranational legislative power regarding cooperation in crimi-
nal matters.1 Therefore, the focus of this contribution will be on the EU’s 
fight against organised and cross-border crime. The action taken by and 
within the EU is very broad and diverse. It ranges from initiatives to har-
monise the substantive criminal laws of the Member States, to achieve 
uniform definitions of the relevant crimes such as terrorism, terrorism 
financing or corruption in order to prevent loopholes;2 to legal instru-
ments that enhance cooperation between the judicial authorities in the 
Member States, such as the European Arrest Warrant and the European 
Investigation Order,3 and legal instruments that enhance police coopera-
Art. 82 TFEU; MURSCHETZ VERENA, in: Mayer/Stöger (eds.), EUV/AEUV, Art. 82 AEUV, para 1 f. 
Art. 83 TFEU; see EUV/AEUV-Murschetz, Art. 83 AEUV, para 1; Directive (EU) 2017/54 on com-
bating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Council Deci-
sion 2005/671/JHA, OJ L 88 of 31 March 2017, 6; Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against 
fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ L 198 of 28 July 2017, 29. 
Art 82 TFEU; Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L 190 of 18 July 2002, 1; Directive (EU) 






tion, such as the legal framework for Joint Investigation Teams. Further-
more, the EU has established a multitude of specialised agencies, which 
play a crucial role in supporting judicial and police cooperation, such as 
Eurojust, Europol, CEPOL, Frontex, as well as networks such as the Euro-
pean Judicial Network. Last but not least a prosecuting body on the EU 
level, the European Public Prosecutor (EPPO), is being established.4 This 
paper will commence with a short evaluation of the threats posed by seri-
ous crime and then focus on the legal frameworks for judicial and police 
cooperation as well as the EU agencies and networks established to sup-
port these forms of cooperation. 
II. Threats to Security by Terrorism and 
Transnational Organised Crime 
The present danger posed by terrorism does not need to be demon-
strated, as it is evident. The attacks are unpredictable events that have far 
reaching consequences not only for social but also for political and eco-
nomic life.5 Terrorist attacks on citizens and society are neither limited to 
specific areas in the world nor to specific groups of perpetrators or vic-
tims. They are carried out by different groups for different reasons with 
networks operating all over the world. Transnational organised crime also 
has a massive economic and political impact and happens not only in 
states that have historically been known for this specific problem, but 
throughout Europe. The increased digitalisation and mobility of the pop-
ulation has facilitated serious crime. Especially within the EU the abo-
lition of the internal borders has led to the free movement of workers, 
goods, services and capital to an easier movement of criminals. The EU 
Commission estimated, when it announced the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor, that every year at least 50 billion euro of 
Art. 85 TFEU; Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced 
cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L 
283 of 31 October 2017, 1. 





revenue from VAT are lost on national budgets all over Europe through 
cross-border fraud. According to the Commission transnational organ-
ised crime is making billions in profit every year by circumventing 
national rules and escaping criminal prosecution.6 The criminal struc-
tures facilitating the success of such crimes take advantage of the fact 
that they operate in different states without borders but different laws, 
different police and prosecution capacities, if there is no cooperation 
between those capacities. Therefore, cross-border cooperation in crimi-
nal matters is crucial. As cross-border cooperation infringes fundamental 
rights of the individuals involved, it has to be accompanied by sufficient 
safeguards protecting these rights. 
III. Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Transnational 
Organised Crime Through the EU 
1. Judicial cooperation 
a. Legal instruments 
i. Introduction 
Especially since the effectuation of Schengen, the Union’s main focus has 
been the facilitation of a closer cooperation between the judicial authori-
ties of the Member States in criminal matters. The European Union today 
understands itself as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 
and to implement and maintain this area many security related measures 
facilitating judicial cooperation have been drafted. All of them are based 
on the principle of mutual recognition. The most notable and prominent 
measures of judicial cooperation are the pre-Lisbon Framework Decision 
on the European Arrest warrant and the post-Lisbon Directive on the 
EU Commission Press Release on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office 
from 8 June 2017. 
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European Investigation Order.7 The European Arrest Warrant was the first 
and most striking example of the principle of mutual recognition put into 
practice.8 
Mutual recognition requires one Member State to recognise and enforce 
judicial decisions by another Member state on the understanding that, 
while legal systems may differ, the results reached by all EU judicial 
authorities should be accepted as equivalent. The principle of mutual 
recognition, the so called “cornerstone” 9 of judicial cooperation between 
Member States, had not been created to facilitate cooperation in criminal 
matters but had originally been developed to facilitate the single market 
through enhancing the fundamental freedoms by limiting the Member 
States’ power to interfere. Therefore, in the EU’s single internal market 
the individual is mostly the subject of free movement rights claimed in 
national courts against State authority. The individual in the AFSJ on the 
other hand is the object of the free movement of state authority arranged 
between the states.10 The principal of mutual recognition in criminal mat-
ters enhances the free movement of criminal investigations, prosecu-
tions and sentences across the Union and, therefore, ensures the security 
aspect of the AFSJ. In fact, for a long time, the EU’s legislation focused 
on security related measures only.11 At that time the freedom aspect of 
OJ L 190 of 18 July 2002, 1; OJ L 130 of 1 May 2014, 1. 
OJ L 190 of 18 July 2002, 1; concerning its implementation into Austrian Law, see MURSCHETZ 
VERENA, Die Übergabe eigener Staatsbürger nach dem Rahmenbeschluss über den Europäis-
chen Haftbefehl und dem EU-JZG, Newsletter Menschenrechte 2016 Vol. 3, p. 163. 
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the AFSJ had been understood as a negative term, defined as the absence 
of threats from crime, which again is closely connected to the notion 
of security. The positive understanding of freedom on the other hand, 
granting the individual procedural safeguards, fundamental rights, legal 
protection and remedies, an EU-wide defence mechanism, had not been 
realised for a long time, even though such protections are particularly 
essential in cases where the individual is the subject of judicial coopera-
tion in criminal enforcement measures.12 This security-focus has shifted 
at least to some extent in the last years and has led to the establishment 
of minimum standards regarding the right to an interpreter, access to a 
lawyer, legal aid, and more.13 
ii. European Arrest Warrant 
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was the first legislative act based on 
the principle of mutual recognition in the field of cooperation in crim-
inal matters.14 As the name suggests, it deals with the arrest and trans-
fer of a person to conduct a criminal prosecution or execute a custodial 
sentence or detention order. Outside the legal framework of the EAW, 
arrest and surrender are facilitated by the law of extradition. The EAW 
provides a simplified and much speedier system of surrender compared 
to the traditional extradition regime which it replaced within the EU and 
which still exists in the relation with third countries: According to the 
legal framework of the EAW the judicial authority in one Member State 
“issues” an EAW and based on the principle of mutual recognition the 
Art. 6 Vienna Action Plan: Freedom must also be complemented by the full range of fundamen-
tal human rights; SCHÜNEMANN BERND, Bürgerrechte ernst nehmen bei der Europäisierung des 
Strafverfahrens! Strafverteidiger 2003, pp. 116-122, p. 119; SCHÜNEMANN BERND, Europäischer 
Haftbefehl und EU-Verfassungsentwurf auf schiefer Ebene, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 2003, 
pp. 185-189, p. 187; LÖÖF ROBIN, Shooting from the Hip: Proposed Minimum Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout the EU, European Law Journal 2006 Vol. 12, pp. 421-430, p. 423. 
Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, 
OJ L 280 of 26 October 2010, 1; Direcitve 2016/1919/EU on legal aid for suspects and accused 
persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant pro-
ceedings, OJ L 297 of 4 November 2016, 1. 





judicial authority in the other Member State recognises and “executes” 
the warrant by arresting and surrendering the person. The decisions on 
the warrant are made by judicial authorities alone, with no political con-
siderations involved. Traditional extradition on the other hand requires 
the final decision on the surrender to be a political one, which of course 
prolongs the decision-making period significantly. This political level has 
been completely removed in the EAW scheme, as the inclusion of polit-
ical considerations within the EU’s association of states was considered 
not only superfluous but also improper.15 Apart from that, another central 
principle of traditional extradition law, which can result in the denial of 
the extradition request, has been partially removed in the EAW scheme: 
Traditional extradition requires “double criminality”, which means that 
the conduct, the request for extradition is based on, must be criminal 
in both states, the requesting and the requested country.16 This double 
criminality requirement has been removed regarding a list of 32 “cate-
gories” of offences, including terrorism, money laundering, corruption, 
drug and weapons trafficking etc.17 In those cases, it is irrelevant if the 
specific act also constitutes an offence in the executing country, which 
is the country that is supposed to arrest and transfer the suspect. The 
list of 32 offences gives rise to surrender without verification of double 
criminality. If the issuing judge ticks the box labelled for instance “terror-
ism” in the EAW, the executing judge should not establish if the act would 
also constitute an offence under national law.18 The main factor respon-
sible for the acceleration of the surrender-process, besides the removal 
of the political decision, was the introduction of very strict time limits,19 
ROHLFF DANIEL, Der Europäische Haftbefehl, 1. edn., Frankfurt 2003, p. 41. 
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within which a member state must take the decision on the execution of 
the EAW, and also within which the person requested actually has to be 
surrendered. The EAW-scheme does not require an automatic surrender, 
though. It does not amount to automatic mutual recognition of the other 
judge’s decision, but the grounds for refusing the execution of an EAW 
are very limited, much more limited than in traditional extradition law. 
For instance, the continental European principle of non-extradition of 
nationals does not apply in the EAW-scheme.20 Also the framework deci-
sion does not expressly foresee a proportionality check or a ground for 
refusal on the basis of fundamental rights violations, even though both are 
necessary limitations prescribed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(CFR):21 As the CFR is part of primary law, the interpretation of the EAW, 
which is secondary law, has to be consistent with the fundamental rights 
requirements set out in the Charter.22 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
has, after many decisions indicating otherwise, finally accepted a ground 
for refusal based on fundamental rights violations though.23 This was an 
important step towards a more balanced regime of judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, which respects the rule of law. In summary, the EAW 
facilitates the effective prosecution of criminals because it simplified and 
expedited the procedure for getting a hold of them and bringing them to 
person requested must be surrendered as soon as possible on a date agreed between the 
authorities concerned, and no later than 10 days after the final decision on the execution of the 
European arrest warrant. 
See MURSCHETZ (footnote 16), p. 215. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000/C 364/01, OJ C 364 of 18 Decem-
ber 2000, 1. 
Critical with regards to both, see MURSCHETZ (footnote 16), pp. 347 ff; SCHALLMOSER NINA, The 
European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental Rights, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice 2014 Vol. 22, pp. 135-165, p. 140. 
ECJ, Judgement of the Court of 5 April 2016 in the Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198; Judgement of the Court of 25 July 2018 in the case 
C‑216/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586; OUWERKERK JANNEMIEKE, Balancing Mutual Trust and Funda-
mental Rights Protection in the Context of the European Arrest Warrant, European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2018 Vol. 26, pp. 103-109; VAN DER MEI ANNE PIETER, 
The European Arrest Warrant system: Recent developments in the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2017 Vol. 24, pp. 882-904, pp. 898 ff; 






justice. That is also the reason why the United Kingdom wishes to con-
tinue to take advantage of the EAW after Brexit, which is not a likely sce-
nario.24 
iii. European Investigation Order 
Besides the EAW, the other main instrument which enables judicial cross-
border cooperation based on the principle of mutual recognition is the 
European Investigation Order (EIO).25 It facilitates the transnational col-
lection of evidence, which is of major importance for the prosecution of 
transnational (organised) crime. The EIO replaces the existing quite com-
plicated and also fragmented legal framework for requesting and sharing 
evidence for criminal investigations and prosecutions.26 The complex-
ity of the prior normative frame was mainly due to the special nature 
of evidence in general, as evidence is the result of procedural activity 
governed by very specific rules regarding the collection and admission 
within one particular domestic judicial system, which is supposed to 
strike a balance between the necessity of intrusive measures and suffi-
cient safeguards for fundamental rights. Transnational evidence gather-
ing and admission mixes different standards and can therefore interfere 
with this balance, which in consequence bears the danger of infringing 
upon fundamental rights. Hence, the implementation of adequate safe-
guards for the protection of fundamental rights of the parties involved 
into the new legal framework has been a major concern in the drafting 
For instance, the principle of non-extradition of nationals will pose a problem: in many conti-
nental European countries it is constitutionally required, and the exceptions drafted to imple-
ment the EAW are limited to EU-citizens. 
OJ L 130 of 1 May 2014, 1. 
Such as the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and its 
Additional Protocol (ETS no. 30 of 20 April 1959 and ETS no. 99 of 17 March 1978), the EU Con-
vention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union (OJ C 197 of 12 July 2000, 3), the Schengen Convention (OJ L 239 of 22 September 2000, 
19) and the European Evidence Warrant (OJ L 350 of 30 December 2008, 72); MANGIARACINA 
ANNALISA, A New and Controversial Scenario in the Gathering of Evidence at the European 
Level: The Proposal for a Directive on the European Investigation Order, Utrecht Law Review 





process.27 The EIO enables judicial authorities in one EU country, the 
“issuing state”, to request that evidence be gathered in and transferred 
from another EU country, the “executing state”, based on the principle 
of mutual recognition. The EIO applies to almost all investigative mea-
sures,28 such as searches and seizures, observation, electronic surveil-
lance and wiretapping. According to the EIO polish prosecutors could ask 
their counterparts in Germany to conduct a house search or a phone 
interception on their behalf and the request should in general be exe-
cuted. Same as the EAW the EIO contains a double criminality exception 
and strict time limits for the decision on the request and the enforcement 
of the requests to obtain evidence, in order to expedite the proceedings. 
It also limits the grounds for refusal to execute the request. Other than 
the EAW though, it expressly requires a proportionality check and con-
tains a ground for refusal on the basis of possible fundamental rights 
violations.29 Hence, the issuing judicial authority has to check if the 
requested investigative measure is necessary and proportionate. To avoid 
forum shopping the issuing authority also has to examine if the measure 
could have been ordered under the same conditions in a similar domestic 
case.30 In general the executing authority shall recognise an EIO and exe-
cute it as if the investigative measure concerned had been ordered by 
ARMADA INÉS, The European Investigation Order and the Lack of European Standards for Gath-
ering Evidence, New Journal of European Criminal Law 2015 Vol. 6, pp. 8-31, p. 8; MANGIARACINA 
(footnote 26), p. 113; ALLEGREZZA SILVIA, Critical Remarks on the Green Paper on Obtaining Evi-
dence in Criminal Matters from one Member State to another and Securing its Admissibility, 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 2010 Vol. 9, pp. 569-579, p. 573; GARCIMARTÍN 
MONTERO REGINA, The European Investigation Order and the Respect for Fundamental Rights in 
Criminal Investigations, eucrim 2017 Vol. 1, pp. 45-50, pp. 45 f. 
ARMADA (footnote 27), p. 8. 
This major difference in human rights protection foreseen in the EAW and the EIO, the two 
main judicial cooperation tools based on mutual recognition, can be attributed to the stronger 
role of the European Parliament since the entry onto force of the Treaty of Lisbon. While it is 
now given the part of a co-decision maker, it only had very limited consultation rights when 
the EAW had been negotiated. Regarding the necessity of a fundamental rights clause, see 
DANIELE MARCELLO, Evidence Gathering in the Realm of the European Investigation Order, New 
Journal of European Criminal Law 2015 Vol. 6, pp. 179-194, pp. 184 ff; regarding the open ques-
tions and deficiencies in the application of the clause, see Armada (footnote 27), pp. 24 ff. 






an authority of the executing State, unless grounds for non-recognition 
or non-execution of the order exist, such as the lack of proportionality 
or human rights considerations.31 If the investigative measure indicated 
in the EIO does not exist under domestic law of the executing State, or 
would not be available in a similar domestic case, the executing author-
ity may use an investigative measure other than that indicated in the 
EIO.32 The same applies if another investigative measures would achieve 
the same result by less intrusive means than the one indicated in the EIO. 
The issuing authority may expressly request specific procedures and for-
malities to be followed when carrying out the investigation measure and 
the executing authority shall comply with them, provided that such for-
malities and procedures are not contrary to the fundamental principles 
of the law of the executing State.33 Open questions relate to the necessity 
for dual legal assistance in the issuing and executing state, as well as the 
necessity for transnational exclusionary rule to name some.34 The dan-
ger also exists that the possibility of introducing foreign standards of evi-
dence gathering might lead to lower national standards for some Member 
states.35 In summary the EIO, which has entered into force in 2017, has 
clearly simplified and expedited the transnational collection of evidence 
within the EU. 
iv. Other instruments facilitating cross-border cooperation in 
criminal matters 
Of course a multitude of other instruments have also been put into effect 
to facilitate cross-border cooperation such as the Directive on the freez-
Art. 9 (1) EIO-Directive. 
This does not apply regarding a list of basic investigation measures, which should be available 
in all Member States, such as hearing of witnesses, experts etc and other non-coercive inves-
tigative measures: Art. 9 (2) EIO-Directive. 
Art. 9 (2) EIO-Directive. 
Criticizing the disproportionate attention paid to fundamental rights in the EIO, see GARCI-
MARTÍN MONTERO (footnote 27), p. 47; ARMADA (footnote 27), pp. 22 ff, 29. 







ing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime,36 which 
lays down common rules for Member States with regard to freezing and 
confiscating the proceeds from certain crimes as well as property that 
appears to be derived from criminal conduct, the Framework Decision on 
the supervision order,37 the Framework Decision on the transfer of pris-
oners38 as well as the European Criminal Records Information Exchange 
System (ECRIS), which facilitates the exchange of information on criminal 
records throughout the EU.39 There are new initiatives regarding the 
cross-border access to e-evidence and many more; too many to address 
them all.40 
Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of 
crime in the European Union, OJ L 127 of 29 April 2014, 39. 
Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA on the application, between Member States of the 
European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures 
as an alternative to provisional detention, OJ L 294 of 11 November 2009, 20. 
Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures 
involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, OJ 
L 327 of 5 December 2008, 27. 
The ECRIS establishes electronic interconnections between Member States and puts rules into 
place to ensure that information on convictions as contained in the criminal records system of 
the Member States can be exchanged through standardised electronic formats, in a uniform 
and speedy way, and within short legal deadlines; Counsil Decision 2009/316/JHA on the 
establishment of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of 
art. 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA, OJ L 93 of 7 April 2009, 33. 
The proposal on e-evidence consists of two strongly interconnected proposals: the Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, COM (2018) 225 final of 17 
April 2018, and the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council lay-
ing down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of 
gathering evidence in criminal proceedings, COM (2018) 226 final of 17 April 2018. The draft 
Regulation provides new forms of judicial cooperation, the European Production Order and the 
European Preservation Order, which will allow EU judicial authorities to issue a mandatory 
order for the preservation and production of electronic evidence directly to a service provider 
active in the European Union or to its legal representative, regardless of the location of data. 
To ensure that all service providers are subject to the same obligations, the draft Directive 
requires them to appoint a legal representative in the European Union for the receipt of, com-
pliance with and enforcement of decisions and orders issued by competent judicial authorities 
(Council of the European Union, 12133/18, COPEN 294.s), for a critical evaluation, see TOSZA 
STANISLAW, The European Commission’s Proposal on Cross-Broder Access to E-Evidence, 







v. Bodies and networks aiding judicial cooperation 
Besides the legal instruments introduced to facilitate judicial cross-bor-
der cooperation in criminal matters the EU has also established support-
ing agencies and networks. Eurojust is the EU’s judicial cooperation unit.41 
It consists of the College, which is formed by mainly prosecutors sec-
onded from each Member State. Eurojust facilitates the coordination and 
cooperation between national authorities in many areas such as terror-
ism, drug trafficking, money laundering, environmental crime and many 
more. It coordinates investigations and prosecutions, provides opera-
tional, technical and financial support to cross-border operations and 
investigations and also aids in the application of the judicial cooperation 
mechanisms, such as the EAW and the EIO, to name some of the func-
tions. The European Judicial Network (EJN) on the other hand is a net-
work of contact points in the 28 Member States who also aids in the 
facilitation of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, without the insti-
tutional dimension Eurojust has.42 The national Contact Points are active 
intermediaries who assist with establishing direct contacts between com-
petent authorities and by providing legal and practical information neces-
sary to prepare an effective request for judicial cooperation or to improve 
judicial cooperation in general. The EJN is aimed at helping national 
judges and prosecutors carry out cross-border investigations and prose-
cutions. In general, the EJN is competent for simple, bilateral cases that 
require the speeding up of mutual recognition requests such as EAW, 
while Eurojust aids in more complex or Multi-State cases.43 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 
on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and replacing and 
repealing Council Decision 2002/187/JHA. 
Council Decision 2008/976/JHA on the European Judicial Network, OJ L 348 of 24 December 
2008, 130. 
Regarding the relationship between Eurojust and the EJN, see WEYEMBERGH ANNE/ARMADA 
INÉS/BRIÈRE CHLOÉ, Competition or Cooperation? State of Play and Future Perspectives on the 
Relations Between Europol, Eurojust and the European Judicial Network, New Journal of Euro-





2. European Public Prosecutor 
Apart from the cooperation bodies and networks mentioned above, 
cross-border cooperation in criminal investigations and prosecutions will 
move to the next level with the institutionalisation of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which is a prosecuting body on the EU level.44 
The EPPO is expected to start operating by the end of next year or by the 
beginning of 2021. It will not be operating in all Member States though, 
as not all have agreed on the founding regulation.45 As of now 22 Mem-
ber States will be participating, with only the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Denmark, Hungary, Poland and Sweden not joining. The EPPO will be an 
independent prosecution office of the European Union, with the compe-
tence to investigate and prosecute crimes against the EU-Budget in the 
Member States. The novelty is the power of the EPPO to independently 
carry out the operational tasks of investigating and prosecuting crimes 
in front of the national courts. The EPPO is not competent to prosecute 
all cross-border crimes, but only those crimes which affect the financial 
interests of the EU, such as fraud, corruption, or serious cross-border 
VAT fraud. However, the competence of the EPPO can be increased.46 In 
fact, last year the commission launched the initiative to extend the man-
date to cross-border terrorist crimes,47 which has received support from 
some politicians and academics.48 
OJ L 283 of 31 October 2017, 1. 
It has been established within the framework of enhanced cooperation according to Art. 86 (1) 
TFEU. For an evaluation of the enhanced cooperation procedure, see WEYEMBERGH ANNE, 
Enhanced Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Past, Present and Future, in: Kert/Lehner (eds.), 
Vielfalt des Strafrechts im internationalen Kontext, FS Frank Höpfel, Wien/Graz 2018, pp. 
605-624, pp. 605 ff. 
According to Art. 86 (4) TFEU by unanimous decision of the European Council after consulta-
tion of the Commission and the Parliament, see also DI FRANCESCO MAESA CONSTANZA, Repercus-
sions of the Establishment of the EPPO via Enhanced Cooperation. EPPO’s Added Value and the 
Possibility to Extend its Competence, eucrim 2017 Vol. 3, pp. 156-160, p. 156. 
COM (2018) 641 final of 12 September 2018. 
See the many references in GIUFFRIDA FABIO, Cross-Border Crimes and the European Public 







3. Police Cooperation 
a. General remarks 
Besides judicial cooperation, the fight against terrorism and organised as 
well as cross-border crime also requires efficient assistance and coopera-
tion between police authorities. The European Union has already accom-
plished high levels of assistance and cooperation in policing, starting with 
the Trevi group in 1975,49 the implementation of the Schengen acquis 
and parts of the Treaty of Prüm.50 EU specialised agencies have been 
established to support operational cooperation between Member States’ 
law enforcement authorities, especially through improved information 
gathering and exchange along with the creation of large databases, such 
as Europol, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training 
(CEPOL), Frontex, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), and the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO). They contribute to the assess-
ment of common security threats, help to define common priorities for 
operational action and promote and facilitate cross-border cooperation 
and prosecution. 
b. Europol and CEPOL 
An important step towards an increased cooperation between police 
forces of the Member States was the creation of Europol, today the EU 
agency for law enforcement cooperation.51 It is considered the focal point 
for cooperation activities in the Member States regarding organized and 
For an evaluation of the importance of the establishment of TREVI in 1975 for police coopera-
tion in the EU, see FIJNAUT CYRILLE, The Internationalization of Criminal Investigation in West-
ern Europe, in: Fijnaut/Hermans (eds.), Police Cooperation in Europe, Lochem 1987, pp. 32-56, 
pp. 37 ff. 
MURSCHETZ (footnote 11), pp. 109. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 





serious cross-border crime, such as terrorism, fraud, drug-trafficking and 
many more. Europol’s tasks include threat assessment, the collection, 
analysis and transfer of data to and from the Member States, for which it 
has been labelled as a mega-search engine.52 It also coordinates actions 
of law enforcement agencies and can support operational actions carried 
out jointly with Member States’ authorities. Europol has the power to 
request the initiation of investigation and can also take part in Joint Inves-
tigations Teams.53 Europol is not competent though to carry out opera-
tional tasks independently in the Member States, therefore, it cannot be 
considered a European FBI. Europol’s expertise is crucial to analysing the 
information collected by the national law enforcement agencies, to iden-
tifying targets and also links between them and is very important in coor-
dinating national authorities to carry out investigations and gather the 
relevant evidence. 
CEPOL, the European Police Academy, functions as a network in a double 
sense. It coordinates a network of the Member States’ training institu-
tions for law enforcement officials at leadership level and facilitates a kind 
of informal networking among police leaders from different EU countries. 
They meet at the events organised by the agency in order to establish 
trust, as trust is closely related to police integrity. As long as police offi-
cers have institutional trust in the integrity of other police agencies and 
personal trust in the police officers involved, they will be willing to share 
information.54 
c. Joint Investigation Teams 
Operational police cooperation is a crucial element of effective investiga-
tion and prosecution of serious cross-border crimes. In complex transna-
WEYEMBERGH/ARMADA/BRIÈRE (footnote 43), p. 261. 
See WEYEMBERGH/ARMADA/BRIÈRE (footnote 43), p. 272. 
ADEN HARTMUT, The Role of Trust in the Exchange of Police Information in the European Multi-
level System, in: Delpeuch/Ross (eds.), Comparing the Democratic Governance of Police Intel-
ligence. New Models of Participation and Expertise in the United States and Europe, 





tional cases information needs to be exchanged quickly or concerted 
investigative action is required in two or more Member States.55 For that 
matter the legal framework for Joint Investigation Teams (JIT) has been 
established.56 A JIT is a team of law enforcement officers and judicial 
authorities, such as prosecutors and judges from two or more Member 
States, who jointly investigate cross-border and international crime in 
one or more Member States. It is established by a mutual agreement 
between those authorities for a limited time and for a specific investiga-
tion.57 It can also be established with non-Member States. One of the ben-
efits of setting up a JIT is the fact that it allows seconded58 members to ask 
competent authorities in the participating Member States to undertake 
investigative measures without any formal request. The request is rather 
handled as if it was presented in a national case with no additional checks 
for grounds for refusal. Gathered information is directly available to the 
JIT, therefore, results can be used by all members of the team no matter 
where they are situated.59 The members are entitled to be present during 
investigative measures unless the team leader decides on the contrary.60 
The right of seconded members of the team to themselves carry out 
SPAPENS TOINE, Joint Investigation Teams in the European Union: Art. 13 JITS and the Alterna-
tives, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2011 Vol. 19, pp. 239-260, p. 
247. 
The EU legal framework for setting up JITs between Member States can be found in art. 13 of 
the 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance as well as in the Council Framework Decision 
2002/465/JHA on joint investigation teams, OJ L 162 of 20 June 2002, 1, for an explanation 
regarding the dual legal bases, see MURSCHETZ (footnote 11), p. 124; JAVORSZKI TAMAS, Joint Inves-
tigation Teams as a Specific Form of Mutual Assistance, Studia Iuridica Auctoritate Universi-
tatis Pecs Publicata 2013, pp. 47-60, p. 47. The model JIT can be found in the Council Resolution 
2017/C 18/01 on a Model Agreement for setting up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT), OJ C 18 of 19 
January 2017, 1. 
Regarding the modalities of setting up a JIT, see REBECCHI MARIA CECILIA, Joint Investigation 
Teams: A Reachable Solution to Catch Unreachable Criminals, Queen Mary Law Journal 2016 
Vol. 7, pp. 95-108, pp. 97 ff. 
Members of the JIT from Member States other than those in which the team operates are 
referred to as being “seconded“ to the team. 
Art. 13 (7) of the Convention on Mutual Assistance; MURSCHETZ (footnote 11), p. 124, RIJKEN 
CONNY, Joint Investigation Teams: principles, practice and problems. Lessons learnt form the 
first efforts to establish a JIT, Utrecht Law Review 2006 Vol. 2, pp. 99-118, p. 103. 








investigations on another Member State’s territory is subject to national 
regulations and is the decision of the team leader.61 Some Member States 
have included this possibility in their national law, others have excluded 
it in general, others limit it to non-coercive measures.62 While the JITs 
had set off on a very slow start, they have grown into a widely estab-
lished, very efficient and effective cooperation tool. It enables the coor-
dination of investigations and prosecutions conducted parallel in several 
States and the easy collection of evidence, which is then available to all 
members. They can be funded by Eurojust or Europol.63 
d. Police and Customs Cooperation Centres 
Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCC) are also considered 
successful institutions facilitating regional cross-border cooperation 
through information exchange and the coordination of joint operations.64 
They bring together law enforcement authorities of different Member 
States on one site. The EU supports the growing number of PCCCs with 
co-funding to exchange experience and best practices. 
e. Data exchange measures introduced by the Treaty of Prüm 
Additionally, the fight against cross-border crime calls for functioning 
data exchange between the involved countries. For that matter the Treaty 
of Prüm65 had been signed by like-minded Member States outside of the 
Both Member State and Seconding Member State have to approve. 
RIJKEN (footnote 59), p. 104; REBECCHI (footnote 57), pp. 100 f. 
In 2018 Eurojust’s budget allocation for JIT‘s amounted to 1.5 Million, in 2015 it was 1 Million 
(Report on Budgetary and Financial Management Financial Year 2018). 
They find their legal basis in Art. 39 of the Convention implementing the Schengen agreement 
(OJ L 239 of 22 September 2000, 19) and additional agreements for which the Schengen Con-
vention explicitly leaves room. Austria for instance, has co-established four PCCs since 2003, 
three of which are bilateral and one is trilateral: Öffentliche Sicherheit 2008 Vol. 7/8, p. 65. 
It was signed on May 25th 2005 by Austria, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg, 
France and Spain; additional signatories are Slovenia, Italy, Finland, Portugal, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Greece and Sweden. On the Treaty, see Hummer Waldemar, Der Vertrag von Prüm – 
“Schengen III”? EuR 2007 Vol. 4, pp. 417-534, p. 517; PAPAYANNIS DONATOS, Die Polizeiliche 







EU-legal-Framework but because of its success has been integrated into 
EU-aquis in 2008 by the two Prüm Decisions.66 It not only requires the 
Member States to collect and store data but also authorises the auto-
mated access to national DNA and fingerprint databases through a hit/no 
hit system. Hit/no hit approach means that DNA profiles or fingerprints 
found at a crime scene in one EU Member State can be compared auto-
matically with profiles held in the databases of other EU States. Mem-
ber States also grant each other access to their vehicle registration data, 
which is exchanged through national platforms that are linked to the 
online application “EUCARIS”. The Prüm framework also allows for joint 
patrols and other joint operations, enabling designated police or cus-
toms officers to participate in interventions on foreign territory. It also 
provides a legal basis for assistance in connection with mass gatherings, 
disasters and serious accidents (crowd and riot control) by dispatching 
officers.67 
In this context it is worth mentioning that last year nine of the Contract-
ing Parties of the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe 
(PCC SEE) signed a Prüm-inspired legal framework for the automated 
exchange of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data.68 The Police 
Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe is a multilateral treaty rat-
ified by the respective parliaments of five EU and six non-EU Member 
States, which serves as a legal basis for cross-border law enforcement 
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly 
in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210 of 6 August 2008, 1; Council Decision 
2008/616/JHA on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-
border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210 of 6 
August 2008, 12. 
Art. 24 of the Treaty of Prüm. As an example for a “crowd control” event the UEFA Euro 2008 
can be mentioned, where police officers from various European countries, provided with full 
intervention power, officially supported the national police forces of Austria and Switzerland 
(Art. 26). 
„Agreement between the Parties to the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe 
on the Automated Exchange of DNA Data, Dactyloscopic Data and Vehicle Registration Data“ 
and its „Implementing Agreement“, signed by Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia, on the occasion of the ministerial conference 





cooperation modelled on EU good practices, such as joint threat analysis, 
liaison officers, hot pursuit, witness protection, cross-border surveil-
lance, controlled delivery, undercover investigations, Joint Investigation 
Teams, and mixed patrols along the state borders. 
IV. Conclusion 
Cross-border cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organised 
crime is widely established and effective within the European Union. In 
the last decade major achievements and improvements in police and judi-
cial cooperation have enhanced the free movement of criminal investiga-
tions, prosecutions and sentences across the Union. What should not be 
forgotten are the possible downsides of this development. The transfer of 
information, data, evidence, and persons are repressive measures which 
touch upon all kinds of fundamental rights and there is always a high risk 
of abuse. Therefore, the safeguards to protect individual rights, data, and 
to guarantee equivalent standards for procedural rights need to be just as 
efficient and effective. The development of the legal frameworks to cre-
ate an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice within the EU had, for a very 
long time, been solely security related, focusing on repressive measures 
to enable trans-border investigations and prosecutions only. This focus 
has changed significantly in the last years, but there is still work to be 
done. 
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Since the Industrial Revolution, the growth of human population and 
activity has caused dramatic changes to the planet, justifying claims that 
we are living in the Anthropocene. Huge amounts of fossil fuels were 
released and contribute to environmental pollution, global warming, and 
species extinction. Complex chains of effects and instability of global 
problems are associated with insecurity, violence and war. With the end 
of the Cold War and increasing globalization, the concept of security has 
been extended to encompass ecological dimensions. 
I. Resource Scarcity, Environmental Degradation 
and Violent Conflict 
Global environmental problems undermine the natural foundations of 
life and human security around the world. This includes the degradation 
of natural resources, climate change, threats to biodiversity or over-
fishing of the oceans. Natural resources are becoming scarce and their 
use unevenly distributed. Local and short-term changes usually have a 
more direct influence than global and long-term phenomena with aggre-
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gate and indirect effects. They burden social systems, promote economic 
decline, weaken state authority and increase tension between social 
groups, with possible conflict effects.1 
Resource scarcity: Population growth, increasing demand and unequal 
distribution affect the availability of natural resources (such as water, soil, 
food, energy, forests, biodiversity and raw materials). This may concern 
the overuse of renewable resources and environmental depletion as a sink 
for waste and pollution, or even the structural deterioration of the func-
tioning and stability of ecosystems, with their services to humanity. Lack 
of resources can lead to economic problems, and undermine the capac-
ity and legitimacy of governments. If human basic needs can no longer 
be satisfied with degrading resources, the potential for conflict tends to 
increase. 
Resource access: Often it is not the scarcity of natural resources that dri-
ves conflict but its abundance that can lead to a resource curse. For 
example, the revenue from the extraction of raw materials (such as dia-
monds) cannot only be a major source of conflict, but can also be used to 
feed the drivers of conflict (weapons, soldiers, equipment) by rebel groups 
or private security services. 
Ecological marginalization: Unequal distribution of resources contributes 
to underdevelopment and impoverishment. The loss of vital resources 
such as agricultural land leads to economic decline, weakens institutions 
and provokes conflicting pressures. 
Environmental migration and conflict: Environmental problems and nat-
ural disasters contribute to the displacement of people. If they emigrate 
in large numbers, especially into ecologically fragile and conflict-affected 
regions, this can enhance conflict. 
Other conflicts concern center-periphery conflicts between rich urban 
centers and impoverished peripheral areas, conflicts over ethnic differ-
SCHEFFRAN JÜRGEN, Globaler Klimawandel und Gewaltkonflikte, in: Brzoska/Kalinowski/
Matthies/Meyer (eds.), Klimawandel und Konflikte, Nomos, Baden Baden 2011, pp. 27-50. 
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ences, and long-distance conflicts due to transboundary linkages of risk 
factors such as climate change, radioactive pollutants or prices on global 
resource markets. 
The extent to which environmental risks actually lead to conflicts 
depends on the societal framework, in particular conflict history, group 
identities, incomes, institutions, organization and equipment of conflict 
parties, as well as the degree to which resources can be instrumentalized 
for group interests. Whether a latent resource conflict becomes manifest 
depends on the power and interest of the actors as well as on the access 
and type of resource, whether is it renewable or not, close or distant, dif-
fuse or point source. The impact of the environment on violent conflict 
is difficult to demonstrate and often one of several conflict factors, espe-
cially in fragile regions. Environmental problems can also lead to more 
cooperation, for example in agreements on shared water use. Some 
examples show the complex relationships between environmental change 
and violent conflicts: 
• In the Middle East, water was not only the target of military opera-
tions but also the subject of negotiations in the peace process. Water 
supply and dams on large rivers (Nile, Jordan, Euphrates and Tigris) 
are controversial. 
• In Central Asia, water shortages have created disparities between 
Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, and increased the need for regional water manage-
ment. The salinization and dehydration of the Aral Sea due to the 
overuse of the tributaries is an ecological disaster with consequences 
for the economy, society and health of many people. 
• The environment of Pakistan and India is affected by high population 
growth, soil erosion, lack of water, deforestation and loss of agricul-
tural land. Many people migrate to the cities or areas endangered 
by natural disasters. There are protests and violent clashes between 
ethnic groups. 
• In Mexico, there are conflicts among dissatisfied farm workers, 
which, in addition to the consequences of globalization and the unfair 
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distribution of land rights, are also due to the scarcity of agricultural 
land. One consequence is exodus to irregular settlements on the edge 
of large cities and the United States. 
II. Climate Change as a Conflict Factor and Risk 
Multiplier 
Global warming caused by land use change and the burning of fossil fuels 
is becoming a risk multiplier which imposes stress on natural resources, 
induces and connects environmental problems in diverse geographic 
areas (oceans, coasts, polar regions, and other eco-zones) from local to 
global levels. Climate change also threatens social systems and under-
mines the functioning of critical infrastructures and supply networks for 
health, wealth and services, as a result provoking production losses, price 
increases, and financial crises.2 Increasing uncertainties and risks arise 
from storms, floods, droughts, and other weather extremes that manifest 
as natural disasters, from California forest fires to the possible evacuation 
of island states as a result of sea-level rise. 
Related social and economic upheavals are a threat to human security and 
can trigger or exacerbate conflicts. In the wake of the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007, 
a debate on the security risks and conflicts of climate change evolved. The 
fifth IPCC Assessment report dedicated a chapter to the impact of climate 
change on human security.3 Whether societies can cope with the impacts 
and constrain the risks depends on their vulnerability, which is a function 
of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity to climate change. Adaptive 
capacity depends on the economic, human and social capital of a society 
which is influenced by access to resources, information and technology, 
SCHEFFRAN JÜRGEN, From a Climate of Complexity to Sustainable Peace, in: Brauch/Oswald-
Spring/Grin/Scheffran (eds.) Handbook on Sustainability Transition and Sustainable Peace, 
Springer, Berlin 2016, pp. 305-347. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 




and by the stability and effectiveness of institutions. The most vulnerable 
are poor communities in high-risk areas and developing countries with 
low adaptive capacities. Societies with a strong dependence on agricul-
ture and ecosystem services tend to be more vulnerable to climate stress. 
With the increasing impact of climate change, it becomes challenging to 
absorb the consequences, in particular for tipping elements and cascad-
ing events, including the potential loss of the Amazon rainforest, a shift in 
the Asian monsoon, the disintegration of the West-Antarctic ice sheet or 
the shutdown of the North-Atlantic circulation.4 
In the most affected regional hot spots, global climate change and local 
environmental degradation can contribute to poverty and hunger; under-
mine human security, social living conditions and political stability; and 
aggravate migration movements and conflict situations.5 Particularly crit-
ical is the situation in fragile and failing states with social fragmentation, 
in adequate governance and management capacities. The impact of cli-
mate change could weaken the ability to solve problems and could dis-
solve state structures. 
Possible linkages between climate and conflict have been analyzed in a 
number of studies with different research designs, datasets and meth-
ods, resulting in divergent findings although there is wide agreement that 
climate variability and change have some influence on the risk of vio-
lent conflict. As agreed in an expert assessment, the climate has affected 
organized armed conflict within countries and future climate change will 
increase the conflict risk, but with large uncertainties and low ranking 
of climate as an influential conflict driver.6 While  climate variability and 
change are estimated to have substantially increased risk across 5% of 
conflicts to date (on average with large variation among experts), this is 
supposed to increase to 13% probability for a  2 °C warming scenario and 
STEFFEN WILL et al., Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, PNAS 2018, 8, pp. 
8252-8259. 
SCHEFFRAN JÜRGEN et al. (eds.), Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Chal-
lenges for Societal Stability, Berlin, Springer, 2012. 





to 26% under 4 °C warming.7 Four drivers were identified as particularly 
influential for conflict risk to date: low socioeconomic development, low 
capabilities of the state, intergroup inequality (e.g. ethnic differences) and 
the recent history of violent conflict. Causal factors most sensitive to cli-
mate are much less influential to the risk of conflict, such as economic 
shocks and resource dependency which are affected by climate-related 
hazards and their impact on agricultural productivity, food prices or long-
term socioeconomic development. 
III. Regional Climate Hot Spots 
A synopsis of different case studies shows that there are violent conflicts, 
especially in regions with large population growth, low levels of develop-
ment, low economic growth, a moderate level of democracy, and politi-
cal instability, violence and war in the vicinity. Whether climate change 
leads to violent conflicts depends on political and socio-economic con-
ditions that are influenced by globalization processes. This also applies 
to climate change itself, which is not an independent statistical variable. 
When violence and other societal problems around the world are attrib-
uted to climate change, political elites can downplay their responsibility 
for these issues and ignore other causes. Climate-conflict linkages play a 
role in climate hot spots around the world. 
The African continent is strongly affected by environmental problems 
(lack of water and soil, erosion, desertification, deforestation), exacer-
bated by global warming.8 Millions are moving to cities and neighboring 
countries where they can aggravate social problems and conflicts. In the 
Horn of Africa, different drivers of forced displacement (war, oppression, 
hunger, drought) have destabilized the political situation, leading to for-
eign interventions. The Darfur conflict was called the first climate war 
Ibid., p. 194. 
For a review see: SCHEFFRAN JÜRGEN/LINK P. MICHAEL/SCHILLING JANPETER, Climate and conflict 





as nomadic and peasant peoples were under pressure from expanded 
arid zones. The exploitation of oil resources had a direct bearing on con-
flict escalation as well as the failed policies of the Sudanese govern-
ment which used climate change as an excuse. A major humanitarian 
crisis has emerged in the Lake Chad region aggravated by rainfall vari-
ability, droughts, and declining water and arable land. Climate change 
acts as a risk multiplier and crisis catalyzer, fueling the region’s fragility 
and vulnerability of people, aggravating unemployment, poverty, hunger 
and livelihood risks, leading to tensions between farmers, pastoralists and 
fishers. A challenge is to address the root causes of the crisis, improve 
water and food supply, humanitarian assistance, prevention of violence, 
deradicalization and reintegration of former fighters. 
Widely discussed are the linkages between climate change and the Arab 
Spring since 2011. The series of protests and uprisings, from Tunisia to 
Libya, Egypt, Syria and other countries, were multiplied by electronic 
media and social networks. Some studies argued that the political crisis 
was aggravated by weather events, like the 2010/2011 drought in China, 
which affected the international market price of wheat and food availabil-
ity,9 together with other factors, including oil price, bioenergy use and 
stock market speculations. The consequences of low income, resource 
imports and high spending on food contributed to political unrest in con-
junction with socio-economic and political drivers specific to each coun-
try. This illustrates how in an interconnected world complex chains of 
events and overlapping stressors can affect international stability. 
This is particularly relevant in the Syrian conflict, where a major drought 
has been considered as one of several factors contributing to migration 
and violence. In the years before the civil war, Syria suffered devastating 
droughts hitting the main growing areas, driving many from rural to 
WERRELL CAITLIN/FEMIA FRANCESCO (Eds.) The Arab Spring and Climate Change, Center for 
American Progress, Stimson Center, Washington, D.C. (February 2013). 
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urban areas and reducing the number of people in agriculture by half.10 
This was one of many drivers leading to an escalation of this conflict, 
rooted in economic, social and demographic conditions, political failures 
of and dissatisfaction with the Assad regime as well as the US invasion in 
Iraq 2003, the Arab Spring, regional power rivalries and the emergence of 
the Islamic State. Apparently, these conflict factors were likely more sig-
nificant than climate. 
The Mediterranean region, including Southern Europe, the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), is a complex crisis landscape with intercon-
nected socio-political, economic and ecological processes.11 Global warm-
ing poses additional stress on the region where agriculture, forestry, 
fishery and the water-food-energy nexuses are particularly vulnerable to 
heatwaves, droughts and forest fires. The shrinking resource base under-
mines living standards and development opportunities for a growing pop-
ulation. Climate change interacts with the region’s other challenges, such 
as unemployment, poverty, economic recession, dependence on agricul-
ture and weak governance, leading to unstable political regimes, mass 
migration, riots and violence, particularly in vulnerable MENA countries. 
Multiple crises resulted in migration, from Afghanistan and Iraq to the 
Sahel. When these movements reached Europe across the Mediterranean 
and the Balkan route in 2015, the EU was unable to jointly handle this sit-
uation. In the emerging “refugee crisis”, nationalism provoked tensions. 
Media coverage of boat people and refugees reinforced threat percep-
tions and the securitization of migration. 
Another hot spot is South Asia and the Himalayan region which is par-
ticularly exposed to climate change. Shifting monsoon patterns, sea-level 
rise and melting glaciers have a considerable influence on the supply and 
KELLEY COLIN P. et al., Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent 
Syrian drought, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (2017),112(11), pp. 3241–3246; 
SELBY JAN/DAHI OMAR S./FRÖHLICH CHRISTIANE/HULME MIKE, Climate change and the Syrian civil 
war revisited, Political Geography (2017), 60, pp. 251-252. 
SCHEFFRAN JÜRGEN/BRAUCH HANS GÜNTER, Conflicts and Security Risks of Climate Change in the 
Mediterranean Region, in: Goffredo/Dubinsky (eds.), The Mediterranean Sea: Its History and 




distribution of water, food and energy. Billions of people can be affected 
by destabilizing the Himalayan ‘water tower’, extreme weather events and 
sea-level affecting river systems and coastal regions across borders. The 
geopolitical and socio-economic implications pose significant risks and 
complexities, not only aggravating tensions over dwindling resources and 
forced displacement but also the need for cooperation among affected 
communities and countries.12 With a high population density, Bangladesh 
is particularly vulnerable to flood risks, adding to the millions of people 
who already migrated from Bangladesh to neighboring areas of India and 
contribute to local unrest. 
In the Arctic region, permafrost and sea ice melting, changing ocean cur-
rents, increasing heat absorption and the release of greenhouse gases 
could trigger global tipping points. On a local scale, there are significant 
impacts on soils and vegetation; ecosystems and biodiversity; human 
livelihood and natural resources. A warming polar region creates new 
challenges for the EU and its neighbors in the Northern hemisphere and 
opens new opportunities for shipping, food and energy production as well 
as security and conflict issues over the exploitation of fossil reserves, 
claims for transportation, pipelines and national borders, protests by 
indigenous people and civil society. The complex linkages between global 
and local issues in the Arctic region challenge the balance of power and 
potentially trigger arms races between the USA, Canada, Europe, Russia, 
China and Japan. On the other hand, opportunities for increased cooper-
ation and new partnerships can arise between private and state actors for 
sustainable Arctic development.13 
SCHEFFRAN JÜERGEN, Climate Change and Security in South Asia and the Himalaya-Region: Chal-
lenges of Conflict and Cooperation, in: Aneel/Haroon/Niazi (eds.) Sustainable Development in 
South Asia: Shaping the Future, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, 2013. 





IV. Governance of the Climate-Security Nexus: 
Contexts and European Perspectives 
Multiple interconnected crises continue to drive the world towards 
socio-ecological instabilities and crises endangering peace and the con-
ditions for sustainable development. Conversely, violence and war stand 
in the way of sustainable development. Thus, the danger exists that the 
negative interaction of environmental destruction, underdevelopment 
and violence will drift the world into a self-reinforcing vicious cycle with 
multiple losses. Then, risk and conflict management become more impor-
tant. 
Interest in the climate-security nexus has increased and contributed to 
the “securitization” of the climate discourse, pushed by a number of think 
tanks and advisory panels.14 The EU High Representative and the Euro-
pean Commission suggested in 2008 that, “climate change acts as a threat 
multiplier, worsening existing tensions in countries and regions which are 
already fragile and conflict-prone”.15 In its adaptation strategy presented 
in 2014, the Pentagon similarly saw climate change as a threat multi-
plier that combines food and water shortages, pandemic diseases, dis-
pute over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural disasters.16 
This includes possible effects on the military which has to adapt to new 
tasks, changes in operational practices and supply problems and has been 
involved in humanitarian operations, disaster management and coastal 
protection. 
An expert assessment of the climate-conflict literature shows that poli-
cies and investments can significantly reduce conflict risk. Experts esti-
mated that climate-conflict risk can be reduced with a 67% probability 
HARDT JUDITH N., Environmental Security in the Anthropocene, Routledge, London 2018. Schef-
fran Jürgen & Battaglini Antonella, Climate and conflicts—The security risks of global warming, 
Regional Environmental Change (2011), 11 (Suppl. 1), pp. 27–39. 
EU, Climate Change and International Security, Paper from the High Representative and the 
European Commission to the European Council, Brussels, March 14, S113/08. 






through investments addressing known drivers and to 57% for a 4 °C 
warming scenario with its more severe climate change effects.17 Similar 
factors determine vulnerability to both climate change and armed con-
flict, and potential synergies between the reduction of conflict risk and 
climate adaptation. Specific measures advance sustainable development 
and human security, interlinked with the quality of governance. Consid-
eration of climate could be incorporated into conflict mediation, peace-
keeping operations and post-conflict aid and reconstruction efforts. 
Climate change combines with a shifting political climate and security 
environment between Russia and the West as well as instabilities in the 
EU and the transformed transatlantic relationship with the Trump admin-
istration. It is widely acknowledged that global warming is a threat to 
human security, but it is also criticized to present it primarily as a national 
security threat requiring military responses. In the environmental sphere, 
the military can support climate policy to minimize damage, but not 
prevent climate change or its risks. Environmental and climate conflicts 
could become a self-fulfilling prophecy when fears lead to counterpro-
ductive actions, such as military countermeasures that consume 
resources, pollute the environment, provoke conflict and prevent peace-
ful solutions. 
In April 2007, for the first time, the United Nations Security Council 
discussed the security risks of climate change at the initiative of Great 
Britain. Under the German Presidency, the Security Council in July 2011, 
led by OECD countries and small island states, expressed concern that 
climate change posed a threat to peace and security, but Russia, China 
and many G77 countries rejected a mandate of the Security Council on 
climate change. At the Berlin Climate and Security Conference on June 
4, 2019, the German Foreign Ministry called for climate prevention and 
adaptation as an issue for the UN Security Council. A Call for Action 
suggested more risk-informed foresight and planning, enhanced capacity 
MACH et al. (footnote 6), p. 196. 17 
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for action and improved operational responses on climate and security 
in affected regions, aligned with sustainable development, security and 
peacebuilding in all UN programmes.18 
A new phase of the climate-security discourse was entered with the pub-
lication of the 2015 G7 report “A New Climate for Peace” 19 and the Plan-
etary Security Initiative (PSI) which has held several conferences and 
related activities since 2015:20 
At the 3rd PSI conference in 2017 the Hague Declaration on Planetary 
Security suggested an institutional home for climate security and sup-
ported joint risk assessments in climate hot spots. 
The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy initiated a 
high-level event on climate and security that was held on 22 June 2018 in 
Brussels, to address the destabilizing effects and risks of climate change. 
Six points for further action were suggested to elevate the climate-secu-
rity nexus to the highest political level in national, regional and multilat-
eral fora. 
In the same month, the report “Europe’s responsibility to prepare” sug-
gested the scaling of responses to climate threats across EU bodies, and 
to routinely include them into EU institutions at a senior level and along 
“traditional” security issues like terrorism and nuclear threats. 
The EU Foreign/Defense Ministers in early 2019 identified climate change 
as a global threat and a threat multiplier, called for action in early warning 
and for geopolitical analysis, capabilities to respond to weather-related 
disasters, situational risk assessments, and resource and carbon footprint 
of military activities. In May 2019, a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council 
addressed climate-related security issues. 
See <https://berlin-climate-security-conference.de>. 
RÜTTINGER LUKAS et al., A New Climate for Peace. adelphi, International Alert, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, European Union Institute for Security Studies. 





The EU can support economic and social capabilities to mitigate impacts 
and strengthen long-term adaptation to minimize outbreaks of violence 
and conflict. In many regions there is a lack of cooperation, and a number 
of dialogues coexist with little interaction, e.g. at the Euromed, NATO 
and OSCE levels. The new challenges need to be addressed in a multilat-
eral and cooperative way, including policies and institutions on climate 
impacts, adaptation and mitigation, and in particular in energy security 
based on renewables. Whether climate stress triggers cycles of risk and 
violence or rather favors a transition towards cooperation, resilience and 
sustainability depends on human and societal responses. 
The challenge is to anticipate and avoid risky pathways by counteracting 
forces that slow down and change course towards a more sustainable, 
peaceful and viable world. Integrative and interdisciplinary knowledge 
help to avoid dangerous pathways and interventions. Concepts of antici-
pative and adaptive governance strategies focus on cooperation and con-
flict resolution, reduce vulnerability to environmental and climate 
change, and strengthen adaptation and resilience.21 The question is how 
to make the transition from conflicting fossil fuels to a more peaceful and 
sustainable low-carbon energy supply, without opening up new environ-
mental pressures and areas of conflict, such as land-use conflicts in the 
introduction of renewable energy. This requires a comprehensive pack-
age of measures aimed at saving energy, increasing efficiency, promoting 
sustainable renewable energies, adhering to natural and social guidelines, 
equity and cooperation, dialogue and participation. Instead of promot-
ing a “clash of civilizations”, a “culture of peace” is needed that further 
develops the instruments of sustainable peacekeeping and environmental 
peacebuilding. 
A positive linkage between sustainability, development and peace 
requires common investments and institutions between the Global North 
and the Global South to reduce the economic gap and unfair distribution 
BRAUCH HANS GÜNTER ET AL. (eds.), Handbook of Sustainability Transitions and Sustainable 
Peace, Springer: Berlin 2016. 
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in the world. This requires appropriate governance structures, institu-
tions and conflict resolution mechanisms, within the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Treaty. One prerequisite is 
that the basic needs for all people are guaranteed and the material basis 
of peace is secured. 
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I. Introduction 
This article provides an overview of legislative measures to combat 
increasing cybercrime. Particular challenges in the fight against cyber-
crime arise from the cross-border nature of these activities. A uniform, 
globally recognised legal framework does not yet exist. After all, the 
Budapest Convention of the Council of Europe, which currently has 63 
members, has given important impetus to the standardisation of the 
criminalisation of various Internet offences and to their prosecution. 
II. Cybercrime as a Growing Challenge 
The fight against cybercrime poses a particular challenge. Increasing 
connectivity is creating more and more new targets. New forms of crim-
inality often have a cross-border nature. And due to the technology 
involved, criminal prosecution requires new instruments and knowledge. 
1. Connectivity Revolution 
Since the breakthrough of the Internet as a mass medium for professional 
and private purposes, we have experienced a connectivity revolution. 
Various trends have led to cybercrime as a mass phenomenon1 with 
immense damages:2 The number of Internet users is rapidly growing:3 
According to estimates by the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), more than half of the world’s population already has access to the 
Internet and the number of users is growing. Meanwhile, the use of the 
Internet covers almost all areas of business and private life and generates 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 
Chapter one, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/
UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf>. 
US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Internet Crime Complaint Center, Internet Crime 
Report 2018, available at: <https://pdf.ic3.gov/2018_IC3Report.pdf>. 







data which documents all of our activities. The consequences are new 
vulnerabilities and targets for criminals. Thus, new forms of crime such as 
the spread of hate speech and fake news, identity theft and cyberbullying 
could become mass phenomena. 
The use of cloud solutions for various digital applications is growing: 
Cloud solutions describe external storage units for mass data which are 
managed by third parties. Cloud solutions enable access to data via the 
internet from everywhere and prevent data loss due to malfunctioning of 
a computer or digital device. Several business processes rely on clouds, 
even if they are located overseas. Examples are Dropbox and Microsoft 
OneDrive. However, the outsourcing of sensitive data to third parties is 
inevitably risky; data losses with financial consequences, such as through 
theft by cyber criminals, cannot be ruled out with certainty. 
The number of objects connected to the internet is rapidly growing: The 
trend of using so-called “smart objects” (also known as the “Internet of 
things”) refers to everyday objects such as mobile phones and tooth-
brushes, but also to houses that react autonomously to their environment 
or even industrial plants with Internet-controlled sensors. Smart tech-
nologies will also be key elements of “smart cities”, whose entire urban 
environments are equipped with sensors that make all recorded data, f.i. 
traffic movements, available in a cloud. Risks are posed not only by the 
increasing dependence on functioning Internet access, but also by the 
limitless recording and collection of sensitive data. As a consequence, 
new targets for cybercriminals are increasingly emerging. 
2. Typology of Cybercrime 
The term cybercrime is not legally defined and covers a wide range 
of criminal offences. One approach can be found in the Convention on 
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Cybercrime of the Council of Europe, known as the Budapest Conven-
tion.4 Art. 2 ff distinguishes between four different types of criminal 
offences: 
1. Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of com-
puter data and systems:5 f.i. hacking computer systems or denial of 
service attacks; 
2. Computer-related offences:6 f.i. identity theft, phishing and other 
forms of online fraud and forgery; 
3. Content-related offences:7 f.i. distribution of child sexual abuse mate-
rial, incitement to racial hatred, incitement to terrorist acts and glo-
rification of violence, terrorism, racism and xenophobia; 
4. Copyright-related offences:8 f.i. unauthorized music and movie shar-
ing on internet platforms. 
The typology is not wholly consistent. Categories 1,3 and 4 focus on 
the object of legal protection, whereas the computer-specific category 
2 focuses on the method used to commit the offences in question. As a 
result, some forms of offences in category 2 seem to overlap with the 
other categories; f.i. phishing also fits into category 1. 
3. Challenges in Fighting Cybercrime 
Compared to the offline environment, the fight against crime in the 
cybersphere poses particular challenges.9. 
Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (CETS No.185), available at: 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185>. 
Art. 2 (Illegal access), Art. 3 (Illegal interception), Art. 4 (Data interference), Art. 5 (System inter-
ference), Art. 6 (Misuse of devices). 
Art. 7 (Computer-related forgery), Art. 8 (Computer-related fraud). 
Art. 9 (Offences related to child pornography). 
Art. 10 (Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights). 










First of all, cybercrime became a service-based industry and is easily 
accessible for every Internet user.10 For instance, botnets are available for 
rental on the darknet at a low price; the offer comprises of thousands of 
infected computers of random people worldwide.  Without their knowl-
edge the infected computer systems are used for denial-of-service-
attacks, disrupting the system of a target, for instance the website of a 
company or a state entity. Furthermore malware can be easily obtained 
and used for highly destructive attacks worldwide, just by sending them 
as an e-mail attachment to various targets. Thus, the cybersphere allows 
for attacks with huge and worldwide damages without expert knowledge 
and at a low cost. 
In addition, the Internet is undergoing rapid developments and cyber-
criminals are constantly developing their tools and methods. Vulnera-
bilities in a software or operating system are often detected early and 
exploited immediately. Law enforcement agencies are therefore under 
pressure to keep up with technical developments. 
Another challenge is posed by anonymization technologies.11 Internet 
users often have a legitimate interest in the anonymous use of services. 
However, such technologies also pose a risk of misuse. This has been 
realised, for example, with the establishment of illegal trading platforms 
for weapons and drugs. 
Finally, a challenging characteristic of cybercrime is its cross-border 
nature. The borderless structure of the Internet leads to attacks even 
from formerly under-connected areas of the world. As a result, the num-
ber of attacks increases. In addition, cross-border criminal investigations 
are more complex and less effective. 
KSHETRI NIK, The Global Cybercrime Industry – Economical, Institutional and Strategic Per-
spectives, Springer 2010. 
International Communication Unity, Understanding Cybercrime : Phenomena, Challenges and 





III. EU Regulatory Approaches 
Within the European Union, the efforts for cybersecurity have been 
intensified at the latest since the large-scale cyber attack on Estonia 
in 2007 and were manifested in the EU cyber security strategy of 2013. 
Despite its limited legislative powers, the EU has adopted several legal 
acts on cybersecurity and cybercrime. 
1. EU Competences and Strategies in the Field of 
Cybercrime 
In the field of criminal law, the European Union has only limited legislative 
powers. Art. 83 I TFEU grants the Parliament and the Council the compe-
tence to lay down, by means of directives, minimum rules for the deter-
mination of criminal offences and penalties in areas of particularly serious 
crime, insofar as they have a cross-border dimension. Among the types 
of offences listed are terrorism, organised crime and computer-related 
crime. Beyond these limited harmonisation measures, the EU can only 
promote cooperation between Member States in the fight against crime. 
Art 84 TFEU excludes any harmonisation of member state provisions, par-
ticularly in the field of crime prevention. 
Taking into account these limited competences, the European Commis-
sion presented a general cybercrime strategy in 2013. It provided an 
allover framework for EU initiatives to combat cybercrime and articulated 
the EU’s vision of cyber security in terms of five priorities: Achieving 
cyber resilience, drastically reducing cybercrime, developing a cyber 
defence policy and capabilities , developing the industrial and technologi-
cal resources for cyber-security  and finally establishing a coherent inter-
national cyberspace policy for the EU and promoting core EU values. 
The subsequent 2016 Action Plan formulated concrete measures to 
strengthen Europe’s cyber security and resilience, amongst them: 
improvement of knowledge, education and training on cybersecurity; 
support of markets for cybersecurity products and services in the EU; 
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fostering cybersecurity investment; establishment of a public-private 
partnership with the industry to improve cybersecurity capabilities and 
innovation in the EU.12 
2. Selected Legislations on Cybersecurity 
Despite limited competences, the EU has in recent years adopted some 
important secondary legislations to combat cybercrime, the most impor-
tant of which are mentioned below. 
a. Security of Critical Infrastructure 
A directive on security of critical infrastructure from 2016 lays down bind-
ing safety standards and reporting obligations for “operators of essen-
tial services” in the energy, transport, banking and health sectors and for 
drinking water supply.13  On the basis of certain criteria, Member States 
must determine whether such services are essential on their territory for 
the maintenance of critical social or economic activities and whether a 
security incident would significantly disrupt their provision. 
Some digital service providers, such as online marketplaces, online search 
engines and cloud computing services, must also take measures to ensure 
the security of their infrastructure and are required to report major inci-
dents to national authorities. However, security and reporting obligations 
are less stringent for these providers. Micro and small enterprises are 
completely exempt from these obligations. 
In addition, a strategic cooperation group has been established on the 
basis of the new regulations in order to exchange information and sup-
CARRAPICO HELENA/BARRINHA ANDRÉ, The EU as a Coherent (Cyber)Security Actor, in: Journal of 
Common MarketStudies 6/2017, p. 1254 ff. 
Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concern-
ing measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across 




port Member States in capacity building in the area of Internet security. 
EU Member States are obliged to define a national network and informa-
tion security strategy. 
They also need to set up a network of Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams (CSIRTs) to deal with security incidents and risks, dis-
cuss cross-border security issues and find common answers (24/7 con-
tact points). 
b. Certification System for IT Products, Services and Processes 
A new regulation from June 2019 introduces a security certification sys-
tem for IT products, services and processes.14 These certifications have 
the purpose to enable consumers to make informed choices and make 
it easier for companies to place safe products on the European market. 
However, this regulation does not oblige industry to use the new certifi-
cation system; its use is voluntary. The Commission will regularly moni-
tor the impact of the certification systems and assess the extent to which 
they are used by manufacturers and service providers. 
Besides this, the new regulation extends the mandate of the Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) and transforms it into a permanent 
EU Agency for Cyber Security, which is – amongst other tasks – in charge 
of the aforementioned certification system. 
c. Fight against Illegal Online Content and Fake News 
In March 2018, the European Commission published a Recommendation 
on operational measures for dealing with illegal online content.15 Accord-
ing to the Commission, progress has been made in protecting Europeans 
Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communica-
tions technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 
(Cybersecurity Act), OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 15–69. 
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle 




on the Internet, but Internet platforms need to step up their efforts to 
remove illegal content from the Internet faster and more efficiently. On 
the basis of this recommendation, the voluntary measures taken by busi-
nesses should be further strengthened before any legislative measures to 
supplement the existing legal framework are considered. The measures 
recommended by the Commission are detailed: Clearer reporting and 
redress procedures, use of proactive tools to detect and remove illegal 
content, safeguards for businesses to respect fundamental rights (free-
dom of expression, data protection) when removing content and closer 
cooperation with the authorities. With regard to the distribution of ter-
rorist content online, the Commission recommends additional specific 
provisions, in particular an obligation to remove such content within one 
hour of its publication online. 
In a Communication to the Parliament and the Council of April 2018, the 
European Commission set out its views on how to tackle disinforma-
tion on the Internet.16 The Commission draws on the results of the lat-
est Eurobarometer survey, according to which 83% of respondents said 
that “fake news” posed a threat to democracy. In particular, the deliber-
ate disinformation aimed at influencing elections and immigration policy 
was considered by respondents to be of particular concern. In response, 
the Commission proposes the development of a code of conduct for busi-
nesses and the establishment of a network of factual auditors. 
d. Countering Hybrid Threats 
In 2006, the Commission reacted to the uprising of hybrid threats to the 
EU and its Member States with a respective Joint Framework.17 The def-
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling online disinfor-
mation: a European Approach, COM/2018/236 final, 26 April 2018. 
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats, JOIN(2016) 18 final, 6 April 2016 ; Joint stuff 
working document, Report on the implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on countering 
hybrid threats and the 2018 Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capa-




inition of “hybrid threats” varies and mostly refers to actions conducted 
by state or non-state actors, whose aim is to undermine or to harm the 
target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or 
institutional level. Such actions are coordinated and synchronized and 
deliberately target democratic institutions’ vulnerabilities. Activities can 
take place, for example, in the political, economic, military, civil or infor-
mation domains. They are conducted using a wide range of means and are 
designed to remain below the threshold of detection and attribution. 
Key elements of the Unions’ strategy to counter hybrid threats are to 
strengthen the strategic communications to tackle disinformation on 
social media and other relevant channels and to establish a new sanctions 
regime to respond to hybrid attacks. 
3. EU Cybersecurity Institutions 
On the EU level there are currently four institutions dealing with the 
enhancement of cybersecurity, namely the European Cybercrime Center 
(EC3), the European Network and Information Security Agency, the Euro-
pean Defence Agency and the Computer Emergency Response Team for 
the EU Institutions, Agencies and Bodies. The tasks of these institutions 
overlap in certain regards, which is why they set up a cooperation in 
May 2018. In a Memorandum of Understanding the institutions agreed on 
leveraging synergies and promoting cooperation on cyber security and 
cyber defence. The cooperation comprises of exchange of information, 
education and training, cyber exercises, technical cooperation and strate-
gic and administrative matters. 
a. European Cybercrime Center (EC3), The Hague 
The EC3 was launched in January 2013 to strengthen the law enforcement 
response to cybercrime in the EU and thereby to help protect European 
188
citizens and businesses.18 It is a subdivision of Europol, the law enforce-
ment agency of the EU, and takes a three-pronged approach to the fight 
against cybercrime: forensics, strategy and operations. 
EC3 has two forensics teams, digital forensics and document forensics, 
each of which focuses on operational support, and research and develop-
ment. 
There are two strategy teams, namely „outreach and support“, which 
establishes partnerships and coordinates prevention and awareness mea-
sures, and „strategy and development”, which is responsible for strategic 
analysis, formulation of policy and legislative measures and development 
of standardised training. 
At the operations level, EC3 focuses on cyber-dependent crime, online 
child sexual exploitation and payment fraud. Since EC3 is a subdivision of 
an EU agency it does not have any executive power and supports Member 
States’ investigations through coordination, advice and education. 
b. European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA), Heraklion 
The European Network and Information Security Agency is an agency of 
the European Union, located in Heraklion/Greece and has been in opera-
tion since September 2005.19 The agency supports the European Commis-
sion and the Member States in meeting the requirements of network and 
information security. It assists the Commission in developing respective 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Tackling 
Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre, COM/2012/140 final; 
official website with current information: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/>. 
Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communica-
tions technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 




legislations and offers training and courses on network security matters. 
Like EC3 it does not have executive powers and therefore supports only 
through coordination and expertise. 
c. European Defence Agency (EDA), Brusseles 
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was set up in 2004 and is located 
in Brussels/Belgium.20 It supports Member States in improving their 
defence capabilities through cooperation and acts as a coordinating body. 
It accompanies defence ministries in their projects to build a common 
defence capability.  The EDA is also committed to strengthening the 
European defence industry and acts as an intermediary between military 
stakeholders in the EU and EU policies affecting defence. 
The agency covers a broad range of topics: Harmonisation of require-
ments for the provision of operational capabilities, research and inno-
vation for the development of technology demonstration systems and 
finally training and exercises in support of operations under the Common 
Security and Defence Policy. With regard to Internet security, the EDA 
deals, for example, with significant cyber attacks on critical infrastruc-
tures of the Member States and the Union. 
d. Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU Institutions, 
Agencies and Bodies (CERT-EU), Brussels 
After a pilot phase, the EU set up a permanent Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT-EU) for the EU institutions, agencies and bodies in 
2012.21 The CERT-EU is made up of IT security experts from the European 
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and opera-
tional rules of the European Defence Agency, OJ L 266, 13.10.2015, p. 55–74. 
Arrangement between the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the 
European Union, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the 
European Central Bank, the European Court of Auditors, the European External Action Service, 




Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of the 
Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. It cooperates closely 
with CERTs in the Member States and specialised IT security companies. 
CERT-EU’s mission is to contribute to the security of the ICT infrastruc-
ture of the EU institutions, bodies and agencies by helping to prevent, 
detect and respond to cyber attacks. 22 
IV. International Legal Framework 
In the last 20 years, several international and regional organizations, 
amongst them the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union have started developing instruments 
to enhance cybersecurity.23 The activities of the organisations range from 
the establishment of expert groups and the provision of training and 
information to the development of regulations. There are currently 5 
legally binding international regulations worldwide addressing the fight 
against cybercrime. Each of these instruments covers only certain 
regions of the world. There is no worldwide accepted legal framework to 
combat growing cyber threats. 
1. Legally Binding Instruments to Combat 
Cybercrime 
The existing international legally binding instruments to combat cyber-
crime seek to adress the growing challenge by harmonizing domestic 
criminal substantive law, improving investigative techniques provided in 
domestic criminal procedural law and increasing cooperation among the 
the European Investment Bank on the organisation and operation of a computer emergency 
response team for the Union's institutions, bodies and agencies (CERT-EU), OJ C 12, 13.1.2018, p. 
1–11. 
CERT-EU’s tasks are laid down in Art.2 of the Arrangement on CERT-EU (see FN 21). 
Noteworthy are f.i. the UN GGE « Voluntary, non-binding norms for responsible state behav-





signature states. Cross-border investigation and use of electronic  evi-
dence, which is crucial to successful cybercrime prosecutions, is not cov-
ered by all of these instruments. 
The first international treaty addressing cybercrime has been the Con-
vention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention.24 It was 
drawn up by the Council of Europe and entered into force on 1 July 2014. 
As of August 2019, 63 states have signed and ratified the Convention. 
Amongst the signature states are the Council of Europe states with the 
exception of Russia. Furthermore 19 non–Council of Europe states have 
ratified the Convention, amongst them Australia, Canada, the Dominican 
Republic, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Panama, Sri Lanka, and the United 
States. Important countries like Brazil, China and India are still not mem-
bers to the Convention. 
In the Middle East, the Arab League adopted the Convention on Combat-
ing Information Technology Offences in December 2010.25 So far, it has 
been signed by most of the 22 Member States of the League. The conven-
tion’s primary aim is to strengthen cooperation between states to enable 
them to defend against and protect their property, people, and interests 
from cybercrime. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) adopted the Agreement 
on Cooperation in Combating Offences Related to Computer Information 
in 2001.26 10 states have signed the Agreement, amongst them Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova. The agreement specifies that the coop-
eration between the parties of this framework shall be conducted directly 
between the competent authorities, based on requests for assistance 
Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (CETS No.185), available at: 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185>. 
Arab Convention on Combating Technology Offences, available at: <https://dig.watch/instru-
ments/arab-convention-combating-technology-offences>. 
Agreement on cooperation among the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent 







made by the competent authorities, which another party may refuse to 
execute if it would be contrary to its national legislation. For this purpose 
the agreement lists forms of cooperation that signatories engage in. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization concluded the Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security in 2009.27 
The Agreement was initially signed by 6 of its currently 8 Member States, 
namely Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. The agreement’s focus extends beyond cybercrime and 
cybersecurity to include information security of Member States as one of 
its primary objectives, as well as national control over systems and con-
tent. 
The African Union adopted the Convention on Cybersecurity and Per-
sonal Cybersecurity in 2014.28 As of August 2019, it has been signed by 14 
of the Union’s 55 members and ratified by 5.29 The Convention imposes 
obligations on Member States to establish legal, policy and regulatory 
measures to promote cybersecurity governance and control cybercrime. 
2. Budapest Convention 
Among the aforementioned international legally binding agreements, the 
Budapest Convention is the most important instrument with the widest 
degree of harmonisation and the biggest impact radius with 63 Member 
States. 
Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, available at: 
<https://ccdcoe-admin.aku.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SCO-090616-IISAgree-
ment.pdf>. 
African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, available at: 
<https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/29560-treaty-0048_-_african_union_conven-
tion_on_cyber_security_and_personal_data_protection_e.pdf>. 
On the ratification process and challenges regarding the implementation:  UCHENNA JEROME 
ORJI, The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity: A Regional Response Towards Cyber 







The convention consists of three parts. The first part deals with the 
harmonisation of substantive criminal law. The aim is to avoid criminal 
safe harbors by criminalizing common types of cybercrime in all Member 
States in the same way. The catalog of offences comprises attacks against 
computer systems and networks as well as crimes commited via com-
puter systems and/or the Internet. Among those offences are: Illegal 
access to a computer system, production and distribution of computer 
misuse tools, computer-related fraud and intellectual property offences. 
The second part of the Convention concerns the harmonization of proce-
dural criminal law. The aim is to enable or enhance global evidence col-
lection. On the basis of the principle of territoriality, a state (or its law 
enforcement authorities) can only do investigation within its own ter-
ritory. Therefore mutual assistance is of great importance. The harmo-
nization of procedural law aims at facilitating the mutual assistance. For 
this purpose the second part of the Convention provides for domestic 
criminal procedural law powers necessary for the investigation and pros-
ecution of such offences. Among these powers is the preservation and 
disclosure of traffic data, search of stored computer data and real-time 
collection of computer data. 
The third part of the Convention aims at setting up a fast and effective 
regime of international cooperation in order to minimise obstacles to the 
access to information and evidence. In this respect, the third part of the 
Convention includes provisions on mutual assistance, extradition, expe-
dited preservation of stored computer data and the establishment of a 
24/7-contact point in all signature states. 
Noteworthy is the provision on transborder access to stored computer 
data, it allows limited transborder access to data without the official neu-
tral assistance procedure. This a certain exception to the Principle of 
Territoriality. Under this provision, the law enforcement autorities of a 
signature state may, without the authorisation of another signature state: 
(1) access publicly available stored computer data, in another signatory 
state; (2) access or receive, through a computer system in its territory, 
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stored computer data located in another state, if it obtains the lawful 
and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to dis-
close the data to the Party through that computer system. In practise, 
this means that law enforcement authorities can (1) use openly accesible 
information on websites in other signature states as evidence and (2) can 
directly ask information from Internet service providers in other signa-
ture states and use the information as evidence if it is legally disclosed by 
the service provider. A possible situation under the second constellation 
would be: A  suspected drug trafficker is lawfully arrested while his/her 
mailbox – possibly with evidence of a crime – is open on his/her tablet, 
smartphone or other device. If the suspect voluntarily consents that the 
police accesses the account and if the police are sure that the data of the 
mailbox is located in another Party, police may access the data.30 
The guidance note of the Council of Europe concerning this article indi-
cates, though, that service providers are unlikely to be able to consent 
validly and voluntarily to the disclosure of their users’ data under this pro-
vision. Normally, service providers would only be holders of such data; 
they would not control or own the data, and they would, therefore, not 
be in a position to validly consent.31 As a result, in a constellation that 
an Internet Service Provider might obtain evidence, only the standard 
mutual assistance procedures would apply and be the best solution to 
obtain cross-border evidence. 
Despite the remaining technical limitations, the Convention provides a 
far-reaching basis for harmonising the relevant criminal law and for 
improving international cooperation in criminal prosecution.32 
Council of Europe, T-CY Guidance Note #3 (Transboarder access to data (Article 32)), p. 4, 
<https://rm.coe.int/16802e726a>. 
Council of Europe, T-CY Guidance Note #3 (Transboarder access to data (Article 32)), p. 7, 
<https://rm.coe.int/16802e726a>. 






In reaction to the misuse of social media, an additional Protocol to the 
Convention was adopted in 2006 in order to criminalize the dissemina-
tion of racist and xenophobic material through computer systems, as well 
as threats and insults motivated by racism or xenophobia. 
V. Perspectives 
Current legislative activities at the International and EU level aim at facil-
itating cross-border law enforcement. The focus is on securing electronic 
evidence at short notice, such as e-mails or the identity behind an IP 
address. With regard to the often cross-border nature of cybercrime, the 
principle of territoriality leads to delays in the cross-border preserva-
tion of evidence. The official way of mutual assistance via state entities 
can take a long time. It is therefore helpful if law enforcement author-
ities can cooperate directly with Internet service providers in obtaining 
evidence. The Budapest Convention in its current version allows direct 
contact with Internet service providers in other signature states. Foreign 
law enforcement authorities, however, have no right to recover evidence, 
which is why the obtaining of evidence in an individual case may depend 
on the willingness of the Internet service providers to cooperate. In order 
to facilitate the cross-border extraction of electronic evidence, legislative 
proposals are currently under discussion at the level of the Council of 
Europe and the European Union: 
The Council of Europe is negotiating a Second Additional Protocol to the 
Budapest Cybercrime.33 The following elements are being discussed as 
part of it: 
• Provisions for more effective mutual legal assistance, in particular: 
a simplified regime for mutual legal assistance requests for sub-
On the background and drafting process: Council of Europe, Enhanced international coopera-
tion on cybercrime and electronic evidence: Towards a Protocol to the Budapest Convention, 
<https://rm.coe.int/t-cy-pd-pubsummary-v6/1680795713>. See also: SEGER ALEXANDER, "Gren-
züberschreitender" Zugriff auf Daten im Rahmen der Budapest Konvention über Comput-
erkriminalität, in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 73/2018, pp. 71-85. 
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scriber information; international production orders; direct coopera-
tion between judicial authorities in mutual legal assistance requests; 
joint investigations and joint investigation teams; audio/video hear-
ing of witnesses, victims and experts; emergency mutual legal assis-
tance procedures; 
• Provisions facilitating direct cooperation with service providers in 
other jurisdictions with regard to requests for subscriber informa-
tion, preservation requests, and emergency requests; 
• Clearer framework and stronger safeguards for existing practices of 
transborder access to data; 
• Safeguards, including data protection requirements. 
Meanwhile, the European Commission also adopted legislative proposals 
on new instruments for Member State authorities to claimdirect access 
to electronic evidence from Internet service providers for investigation 
purposes and as evidence in court proceedings: In April 2018, the Com-
mission presented a proposal for a Regulation on European orders for the 
issuance and safeguarding of evidence in criminal matters.34 The Regu-
lation aims at regulating how and under which conditions law enforce-
ment authorities of Member States may require service providers offering 
their services on Union territory to surrender or not delete certain elec-
tronic data held by the service provider so that such data can be used as 
evidence in pending criminal proceedings. This may include, for exam-
ple, data on the content and sending of e-mails. On the same date, the 
Commission presented a proposal for a Directive establishing common 
rules for the appointment of legal representatives of service providers and 
facilitating access to evidence in criminal matters.35 In addition, the Com-
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Produc-
tion and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, COM/2018/225 final. 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down har-
monised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evi-




mission has started negotiations with the United States on an agreement 
to accelerate access to electronic evidence by US service providers in EU 
Member States and vice versa.36 
The initiatives to intensify direct cooperation between law enforcement 
authorities and Internet service providers in other States are particularly 
noteworthy since the existing provision in the Budapest Convention 
already constitutes an obstacle for some states to accede to the Conven-
tion. Russia in particular has pointed to a violation of national sovereignty 
in this respect. One can assume that an extension of the provision of Art. 
32 Budapest Convention would make an accession to the Budapest Con-
vention even less attractive for countries such as Russia, Brazil and China. 
As these countries have also recognised the need for a global instru-
ment to combat cybercrime, Russia and China, together with the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organisation, submitted a proposal for an “International 
Code of Conduct for Information Security” 37 to the UN General Assembly 
in 2011. 
No global support was given to the proposal as it contained a number of 
controversial aspects, namely the introduction of an intergovernmental 
system for Internet governance, instead of the existing multistakeholder-
system. Another point of criticism was the highlighting of the principle 
of sovereignty in cyberspace which in effect prevents cross-border coop-
eration with Internet service providers and, as some scholars note, could 
be a way to legitimize censorship. A revised version of the proposed 
Code from 2015 did not include major changes and obviously hasn’t found 
global support until today. A globally applied instrument to combat cyber-
crime, in particular to facilitate electronic evidence collection, is there-
fore not in sight for the time being. 
Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations with a view to concluding an agree-
ment between the European Union and the United States of America on cross-border access 
to electronic evidence for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 6 June 2019, Council Doc. 
10128/19. 
Proposal « International Code of Conduct for Information Security », available at: <https://dig-
itallibrary.un.org/record/786846>. 
36 
37 
198

